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 Scholarship on the form of sermon known as the American jeremiad—a 
prophetic warning of national decline and the terms of promised renewal for a select 
remnant—draws heavily on the work of Perry Miller and Sacvan Bercovitch. A wealth of 
scholarship has critiqued Bercovitch’s formulation of the jeremiad, which he argues is a 
rhetorical form that holds sway in American culture by forcing political discourse to 
hold onto an “America” as its frame of reference. But most interlocutors still work with 
the jeremiad primarily in American studies or in terms of national discourse. Rooted in 
the legacy of Puritan rhetoric, the jeremiad is most commonly used to frame discussion 
of political speech or literary texts that grapple with national identity.  
 The jeremiad is also firmly entrenched in science-fiction literature, and some 
attempts have been made to assay its function in that genre. But studies of the 
jeremiad in science-fictional literature tend toward framing those works, too, in terms of 
national discourse, even though science-fictional literature typically relies on tropes and 
strategies that are far beyond the ability of nationality to contain. 
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 In this dissertation, I argue that the jeremiad in science-fictional American 
literature works against the framework of national identity. Though the texts draw on 
contemporary political discourses that are often specifically American, their 
engagements with the jeremiad lead them beyond the imaginary of the United States. 
Instead, by examining specific science-fictional approaches to the concepts of time and 
space, race, technocracy, and images of exodus, I demonstrate that these texts 
consistently urge readers to imagine political belonging outside the framework of 
national culture. 
 After examining the science-fictional approaches to these concepts and how we 
can best understand them in terms of the jeremiad, I put them together to show that, 
even in an American literary context, the American jeremiad militates against cohesion, 
generating different vectors of political action within and without the American 
paradigm. 
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INTRODUCTION. Imagining Prophecy—The Jeremiad in 
American Science Fiction 
The Propheteers 
 Prophecy, prophet, prophetic, prophesy—these terms are as endemic to science 
fiction critical discourse as “spaceship,” “future,” “robot,” or “alien.” Almost invariably, 
what is meant by such a term is a kind of futurological prognostication. Though more 
recent examples can easily be found,  I would like to take as an example the 1
emblematic 1962 essay entitled “The Hazards of Prophecy,” in which Arthur C. Clarke 
suggested that a science-fictional prophet runs the risks of either a failure of nerve or a 
failure of imagination. Failure of nerve: “when even given all the relevant facts the 
would-be prophet cannot see that they point to an inescapable conclusion” (134, 
emphasis in original). Failure of imagination: “when all the available facts are 
apprehended and marshaled correctly—but when the really vital facts are still 
undiscovered, and the possibility of their existence is not admitted” (142-143, 
emphasis in original). For Clarke, prophecy proceeds from the accumulation and 
interpretation of data; his “prophet” is more aptly called a scientist: a forecaster of 
technological probabilities. Everything predictable is within the realm of material 
possibility, from rocket ships to nuclear power. If we were to use Clarke’s examples to 
define them positively rather than negatively, prophecy encompasses two basic 
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categories: what we think we know and what we think we don’t. But prophecy in its 
historic social functions does not operate on the basis of data. Prophecy is multivalent, 
often intuitive, and finally concerned with the social order. 
 Until the early twentieth century, the science-fictional prophecy was typically 
intertwined with utopian narratives of an anthropological cast set sometime in the 
future. At least from the appearance of Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s L’An 2440 in 1770 to 
the utopian speculations of H.G. Wells—such as A Modern Utopia (1905) or The Shape 
of Things to Come (1933)—futuristic “sf” in everything but name often showed 
snapshots of better, more just societies. Rather, such stories projected their authors’ 
social ideals onto potential futures. Mixed with the more optimistic forecasts were 
dystopias or apocalyptic fictions, ranging from Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) to 
Yevgeny Zamayatin’s We (1924). By the 1930s, utopian narratives as such had become 
incredibly rare, with the sunnier imagined futures migrating to the adventure yarns 
published in sf pulps like Amazing Stories or Astounding Science Fiction, where the 
focus was less on the anthropology and more on showing those bug-eyed space 
pirates what for with a little heat from one’s hip-mounted, chrome-plated zapper. 
Narratives set in dystopian societies, such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) 
or George Orwell’s 1984 (1949), have dominated socially-critical sf henceforth.  
 These prophetic warnings tap into contemporary fears about emerging social 
trends, and to be a science-fiction prophet after Hiroshima has frequently meant 
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anticipating some form of technological or social catastrophe—one that, in the sf 
produced from 1950 on, we usually have brought on ourselves. So it is not uncommon 
for people to regard science fiction, as George Hay once put it, as a sort of “early 
warning system.”  But because they draw on hopes and fears about the shape of 2
society, even if we consider science-fictional speculation to be rooted in technological 
prognostications—as Clarke does in the example in my opening paragraph—those 
prediction are still freighted with the moral, spiritual, and political concerns of the 
present. Especially when prophecy takes the form of a warning, that warning implies (or 
explicitly states) how the prophet thinks things ought to be. 
 American literature has from its inception nurtured a particular form of prophetic 
warning called the jeremiad. A jeremiad is a particular kind of prophetic warning, 
derived from the style of the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines a jeremiad as “A lamentation; a writing or speech in a strain of grief 
or distress; a doleful complaint; a complaining tirade; a lugubrious effusion.” In 
vernacular usage, it may be the hysterical raving of a visionary, or it may be a forecast 
laden with dire portents. Though not commonly used, it is a term commonly associated 
with a certain kind of science fiction story. A popular example is Soylent Green (1973), 
adapted from Harry Harrison’s novel, Make Room! Make Room! (1966). Both the film 
and novel depict a future in which overpopulation and its attendant food shortages are 
managed by turning corpses into government-distributed food rations. Harrison’s novel 
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was published two years before Paul R. Ehrlich’s bestselling The Population Bomb, 
which one retrospective New York Times article describes as “a jeremiad that 
humankind stood on the brink of apocalypse because there were simply too many of 
us” (Haberman). The Population Bomb was but one of several nonfiction jeremiads of 
the 1960s, including Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring (1962) and Ralph Nader’s Unsafe 
at Any Speed (1965), all of which alerted the public to imminent threats that demanded 
immediate, concerted action before all was lost.  
 More important than the nature of the message was the prophetic mode in 
which these jeremiads were delivered. Soylent Green certainly paints a nightmarish 
portrait of an overpopulated urban hellscape, and to do so it taps into the jeremiadic 
mode. Charlton Heston, bleeding out from a bullet in his gut, cries out in the indelible 
denouement that “Soylent Green is people!”  Kitschy though it might be, Soylent 
Green’s “lugubrious effusion” works in concert with its social critique in part because of 
its science-fictionality. To the extent that it was able to persuade audiences seriously to 
ponder the warnings of doomsayers like Ehrlich, it did so because audiences were able 
to see their own contemporary situation—not, one hopes, nearly so desperate or 
terminally sweat-stained—in that of Heston and Edward G. Robinson’s betided 
protagonists while simultaneously taking Soylent Green’s projected future on its own 
terms. Heston’s anguished cry—“Soylent Green is people!”—is a legible shorthand for 
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a particular form of environmental social catastrophe because it is a science-fictional 
jeremiad. 
 Because both the jeremiad and science-fiction have particularly strong roots in 
American literature, this dissertation explores  the science-fictional jeremiad in 
American literature from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century in order 
to sketch its contours and varieties of species. The purpose of this exploration is to use 
the American jeremiad as a framework for understanding the political dimensions of 
particular science-fictional texts and their relations to their social contexts. Doing so will 
illuminate how science-fictionality works in each text to enhance its jeremiadic aspects. 
Focusing on the science-fictional aspects of these works of literature will enhance our 
understanding of the jeremiad as a particular prophetic mode in American literature, 
and, I hope, this study will lay the foundation for further research into the intersections 
of the jeremiad and American speculative fiction. Not every text in my dissertation is a 
jeremiad, per se, but every one is shaped, in some respect, by jeremiadic discourse. 
Not only does each text therefore expand our understanding of how the jeremiad 
works in different contexts, but examining each text in the context of the jeremiad 
enables us to clarify some of the stakes involved in those texts. 
 Before outlining the structure of my dissertation, I will review the scholarly 
conversation on the American jeremiad, define and defend my use of science-
fictionality as a theoretical framework, and briefly justify my periodization. In the 
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chapter outline at the end of this introduction, I will identify my core primary texts and 
how they have guided the structure of each chapter. 
The Nationless Jeremiad 
  
 As a literary form of distinctly American character, the jeremiad dates back to the 
Puritan settlers who arrived in the Massachusetts Bay Colony from the early 1620s to 
1640. Perry Miller’s magisterial two-volume intellectual history, The New England Mind 
(1939), laid the foundations for a renewed interest in Puritan studies in American 
letters, and he posited the jeremiad as exemplary of the Puritan character. In towns like 
Boston and Salem, seventeenth-century ministers would typically deliver sermons on 
election days, and in these sermons, the orator would index, in high prophetic register, 
the sins of the community and offer them as violations of the covenant—thereby 
identifying the causes of whatever crisis currently plagued the community. Declension 
was always linked to the ways in which the community had violated its covenant with 
God, and with each passing generation, the spiritual and moral stature of the founders 
of the covenant which engaged the Almighty’s providential blessing on the community 
seemed to grow.  Forsaking immorality and re-embracing the virtues embodied in 3
these quasi-mythic figures was the surest way to renewing the covenant and revitalizing 
the community. 
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 The language of covenant and providence was endemic to Puritan rhetoric, 
which relied on biblical typology for metaphors to frame the colonists’ own 
experiences. Though the culture of religious radicalism in England had fostered this 
frame of references,  the colonization of the New World called for a special set of 4
symbols, which evolved their own unique resonance in the nascent culture of colonial 
America. The harshness of the continent and its distance from their actual ancestral 
home in England led the Puritans to liken themselves to Israelites setting out on their 
exodus through the wilderness in order to reclaim a Promised Land, a spiritual, 
ancestral home that none of them had ever seen. In guiding Israel through the 
wilderness by his providential hand—a journey elongated as a punishment for the 
Israelites’ disobedience, thus making it a time of trial for the covenanted nation—God 
fulfilled his promise to Abraham, the patriarch, and his descendants. But that covenant 
depended upon Israel remaining faithful to God’s law. For each generation of God’s 
chosen, this was a moral struggle with political dimensions, as the Old Testament 
books (not least Jeremiah) repeatedly illustrate. Miller argues that the jeremiad helped 
the Puritans make sense of a transition “from European to American experience,” “a 
way of conceiving the inconceivable, of making intelligible order out of the 
transition” (31). Believing as they did that their purifying trial in the wilderness of the 
New World was to be the first step toward renewing Christ’s kingdom across the earth, 
the Puritans could not countenance failure. Failure on a practical level—to erect and 
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maintain John Winthrop’s famed “city on a hill”—meant a prerequisite failure on a 
spiritual level, as these latter-day Chosen could only endure declension as a result of 
Providence withdrawing its guiding hand from their colonial venture. This became 
especially urgent as each colonial generation seemed to fall further and further away 
from the righteous example of the settlers who journeyed to the New World on their 
world-redemptive, civilizing mission. So it was that prophetic sermons lamenting moral 
turpitude and communal crisis were “the one literary type which,” Miller concludes, 
“the first native-born Americans inevitably developed” (31). 
 Though Miller interpreted the jeremiad primarily as a lamentation meant to drive 
degenerate faithful back into the fold, Sacvan Bercovitch saw the jeremiad’s social 
function as much more flexible and expansive. In The American Jeremiad (1978), 
Bercovitch made the case that the jeremiad’s essential optimism about the American 
project, as it evolved from a provincial religious outpost in New England to a continent-
spanning nation, served to contain political dissent. In contrast to Miller, whose New 
England divines uttered jeremiads that bore witness only perpetual disappointment 
and dissolution, Bercovitch contended that the form of the jeremiad itself survived the 
Puritans because it ultimately retained confidence in the eventual triumph of the Elect. 
He described it as “a ritual designed to join social criticism to spiritual renewal, public 
to private identity, the shifting ‘signs of the times’ to certain traditional metaphors, 
themes, and symbols” (xli). By retaining the ideal of “America” as a vessel of hope (the 
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eternal Promised Land, ever waiting to be reclaimed by the true Chosen People), 
political contradictions between ideal and reality can be reconciled rhetorically, if not in 
fact. So even in the midst of apparent decline, declension will lead to a revitalization of 
the errand, and thus, too, to an even greater restoration. This rhetorical strategy most 
benefitted, in Bercovitch’s view, the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant bourgeoisie, which 
remained culturally dominant in part thanks to the jeremiad. Bercovitch charted the 
evolution of the jeremiad from Puritan election-day sermon to its expression in mid-
nineteenth-century American literature. Authors such as Nathaniel Hawthrone, Herman 
Melville, and Henry David Thoreau all attempted to cleave a more secular millenarian 
faith to the fate of the nation during the period of its greatest expansion. For Miller, the 
gap between ideal and reality in their jeremiads was a sign of the Puritans’ declining 
influence; for Bercovitch, the proliferation of the jeremiad beyond the historical 
confines of colonial New England was evidence of their success in transforming 
“America”—heavily inflected with the so-called New England Way—into a powerful 
and enduring myth. 
 Criticism from within American studies has taken issue with the scope of 
Bercovitch’s formulation. The New Americanists, who strove in the 1980s and nineties 
to undercut the tendency in their field to present America as totalizing paradigm for all 
its subjects, particularly resisted this. As Donald Pease has argued, Bercovitch’s model 
of the jeremiad leaves absolutely no place outside the catchall idea of “America” from 
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which progressive dissensus can gain critical distance, denying the progressive 
potential of the rhetorical form itself in any capacity.  Critical work on the jeremiad into 5
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has also often emphasized American 
exceptionalism to the point of becoming a myth in the service of raw imperial violence, 
far in excess of the middle-class liberalism Bercovitch sought to critique.  Attempting 6
to redeem the jeremiad from its close association with national exceptionalism, Andrew 
Murphy distinguishes between traditionalist and progressive jeremiads. The former he 
characterizes as “a vision for the future in which the past serves as a model and a 
limiting condition” (111), whereas the latter treats historical circumstances as “a 
promise or birthright” which urges the nation “to realize founding principles ever more 
fully and completely” (115). The African-American jeremiad is a distinct enough variant 
that I will discuss it separately in chapter two. At issue for these interlocutors are three 
entwined problems in Bercovitch’s interpretive analysis. First, despite the generational 
flexibility of the jeremiad, he contends that its essential function remains unchanged; 
that is, it is always about containing dissent through a rhetorical “ritual of consensus.” 
Second, Bercovitch neglects the potential of the jeremiad to subvert the status quo 
because he identifies it too closely with an essentially bourgeois nationalism. Finally, 
despite the ever-increasing pluralism of the United States, Bercovitch reads the New 
England character as quintessentially dominant, even though the challenge of a 
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pluralist culture—or, perhaps, the fact of America being multicultural—is itself often the 
focal point of the jeremiad’s anxiety. 
 In the wake of The American Jeremiad, Bercovitch spent the next three decades 
refining his analysis of American culture to account for these critiques,  but, ironically, 7
the debate with his critics only gave him more grist for his totalizing theory of the 
American jeremiad. He never relinquished the contention that the processes of 
American culture-making—exemplified by the jeremiad—did anything less than harvest 
the energy of dissent in order to shore up the mythological power of an “America” 
haunted by the specter of industrious Puritans. As Bercovitch’s critics note, though, the 
WASPy provinciality of New England does not—and cannot—contain the multitudes 
who actually inhabit what has become the United States of America. While the trope of 
the wilderness suggested endless possibility for reinvention—fertile ground for 
Jeremiahs of each generation to sow their seeds—Bervocitch always reframed it in 
terms of the proto-capitalist New England Way. Or he argued that the jeremiad 
inevitably reframed it as such, which is a distinction without difference. In so doing, he 
neglected the untamed power of the jeremiad’s prophetic mode. 
 Despite its appeal to ultimate, divine authority, the prophetic mode tends to be 
a bit bumptious. Prophets in Judeo-Christian tradition—which primary informs the 
jeremiad—exercise power from both the center and the margins. Certainly prophets 
are classically considered to be fortune tellers and revealers of divine truth. Since 
!11
antiquity, though, especially in theocratic societies, prophets also function as civil 
lawgivers, judges, and mediators between rulers and their people.  Because prophets 8
claim authority derived from their own experience of the divine, they are not 
necessarily beholden to established political institutions. Or, more abstractly, they 
derive moral and political authority from their intuitive comprehension of the cosmos, 
which may be a prophet’s peculiar sense of righteousness and justice, or it may be a 
sense of the will of the people.   Since the authority that undergirds the prophetic 9
mode is drawn, as it were, from the aether, the social criticism which prophets level at 
the political establishment (or, just as often, each other’s religious doctrines) has often 
been viewed with suspicion by political theorists or censured by official decrees, 
especially in the early modern England that spawned the Puritan errand.  Christian 10
sects and unaffiliated prophets proliferated in late sixteenth- through mid-seventeenth-
century England, contributing to the civil war that culminated in regicide.  So 11
incendiary was prophecy in the Jacobean era that mentioning the king in a prophetic 
vision was explicitly outlawed.  Prophecy has always thus retained an innate 12
revolutionary potential. The seventeenth-century Puritans prophetically cast themselves 
as the Israelite remnant on an exodus to the Promised Land, and that prophetic 
antitype can be found just as readily in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s millennial 
call for a global revolution of the dispossessed poor or in the jeremiadic writings of 
Cornel West.  Trying to limit the prophetic purpose of the jeremiad to the American 13
!12
middle class thus ignores the basic propensity of the prophetic mode to foster a wide 
variety of political aims, whether radical or conservative.  
 At the heart of any prophetic discourse is a normalization of one’s own 
commitments as inherently, perhaps transcendently, superior. The great Jewish 
theologian Abraham Heschel considered prophets to be vessels of “divine pathos,” 
which he described as “a reaction to human history, an attitude called forth by man’s 
conduct; a response, not a cause. Man is in a sense an agent, not only the 
recipient” (225). Prophets respond so fiercely to their times because they perceive 
political evil, because the prophetic perception of injustice is at one with a reaction 
against it. In a religious sense, prophets feel these evils so intensely because injustices 
work against God’s active participation in human history (118, 121). In a broader sense, 
prophets respond to a feeling that their community is being profoundly wronged in 
some way, even if that community is culturally or politically dominant.  
 The anxiety a jeremiad prophetically creates—the crisis to which a prophet is 
compelled to respond—is therefore necessarily rooted in the political jostling of 
divergent and often opposed political interests. Bercovitch acknowledged this anxiety; 
it was essential to his notion that the jeremiad “is not divisive but progressive—or more 
accurately, progressive because it denies divisiveness” (Jeremiad 17). Building on 
Miller’s foundation, Bercovitch argued that the jeremiad attempts to wrest control over 
the process of cultural transition into the guiding vision of the bourgeoisie. In a pluralist 
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society, culture is always evolving—always in process—so the jeremiad became a stable 
framework for identifying dissident or minority political concerns and complaints with 
the work of realizing the dream of America. What Samuel Danforth, a mid-seventeenth-
century preacher, called the “errand into the wilderness” became the central trope of 
the jeremiad. Bercovitch writes that the American jeremiad “made anxiety its end as 
well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of 
errand, after all, implied a state of unfulfillment” (Jeremiad 23). So even having 
colonized the New World, and with each generation deepening its roots in now-native 
American soil, the jeremiad made it possible for political groups in America to think of 
themselves as still making their way toward the Promised Land, an exodus threatened 
by some internal or external threat. Jeremiadic discourse, “enforces an identity that is 
at once transitional and representative,” but, Bercovitch crucially argues, “it identifies 
the community’s ‘true fathers’ not by their English background but by their exodus from 
Europe to the American strand” (26). And this is certainly the case for most of the 
jeremiads or works influenced by jeremiads analyzed by Bercovitch.  
 But the form of the American jeremiad per se is not the exclusive property of 
one class or race or ideology, however they are comprised within a national discourse. 
To invoke Raymond Williams,  an emergent prophetic discourse may coexist with a 14
dominant prophetic discourse as part of the evolution of hegemony within a culture, 
and the political interests represented by each prophetic vision may be mutually 
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irreconcilable. Not all people who live in the United States are from Europe; not all are 
even originally from America. Even among those who claim European ancestry may not 
adhere to the cultural traditions their ancestors brought with them. George Shulman 
argues that prophets must still “resist the fantasy of escaping the nation, which still is 
the organizing center of political life,” since it is their purpose to “invoke and trouble 
national political identity by dramatizing what is costly, fantastical, and fateful in it” (25). 
Which is to say that the organizing framework of a particular nation does not foreclose 
different—perhaps radically opposed—visions of nationhood and who gets to be part 
of it. But what if the cultural process of troubling national identity by its nature exceeds, 
ignores, radically reconfigures, fractures, or abandons national political identity? 
 By evoking the mythic image of an “America” that never existed and can only 
fully be realized in the imagination of a self-identified remnant, the jeremiad in 
American political discourse can sometimes dispense altogether with the United States
—its history, its people—as it actually exists. This may seem unlikely, given how closely 
linked the jeremiad is to narratives of national exceptionalism. In both political rhetoric 
and even in literary texts such as those hotly debated by the New Americanists, 
America remains the floating signifier. But though it always, interminably invokes the 
nation, the American jeremiad does not, in practice, even attempt to reconcile the 
divergent political interests of its various people. Instead, the Jeremiah presenting his 
prophecy attempts to offer a unifying vision for an emerging discourse that seeks to 
!15
become dominant or a dominant discourse competing with the emergent. Though 
people excluded by the jeremiad’s vision may recognize that they have been 
rhetorically exiled from the nation, Bercovitch would say that those to whom and for 
whom it speaks feel that the community has been satisfactorily reintegrated—at least 
rhetorically. I would say the opposite. I do agree with him that the jeremiad normalizes 
a sense of crisis and reifies irreconcilable differences within society. But it creates 
endless possibilities for renewal because there will always be divisions and subdivisions 
among the populace to exploit.  Even if, in the process of exiling a nation within the 15
nation (to paraphrase Frederick Douglass), the jeremiad rhetorically resolves the crisis it 
has conjured, it has also established the preconditions for the next crisis, precisely 
because it has set the terms by which the Elect sets itself apart from everyone else.  
 While perhaps unifying a political Elect, the jeremiad therefore undermines the 
discourse of national community and elevates the distance between the remnant and 
all others. To put it crudely, the American jeremiad makes it easier for people not to 
consider their fellow citizens to be real Americans. That is, it’s a form of cultural 
discourse that normalizes a hierarchy based primarily and foremost on a particular 
sense of cultural identity, but not one that is exclusively middle-class or even rooted in 
manifest destiny. In the final instance, the jeremiad fractures any broadly coherent 
national identity at all. As a result, I define the jeremiad as a prophetic warning of 
communal—not national—decline and the terms of promised renewal for a select 
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remnant. What this means is that when we talk about the American jeremiad, what we 
refer to is a prophetic discourse addressing present American political concerns 
through a particular set of tropes (errand into the wilderness, a remnant or Elect, crisis 
due to failing to uphold the covenant, idealized founding figures, exodus, a city on the 
hill which represents civilizational redemption, providential grace), but from a specific 
cultural standpoint. Our task, therefore, is to identify the characteristics of the remnant 
and what renewal means for it in a specific context, because the nature of the remnant 
illuminates how the crisis is to be managed or averted. To do this, we need to know the 
political controversies primarily at stake for the prophet, which means tethering a 
jeremiad to its time and place. In the process, we will see that there is no one, 
monolithic American jeremiad, because there is no one, monolithic American culture. 
We will also see that even when the nation remains a central rhetorical sign in the 
American jeremiad, the concept of the nation may be so thoroughly troubled that, 
contra Shulman’s caveat, the prophecy may even explicitly dispense with the nation as 
its organizing political unit. 
Nerve and Imagination: Science-Fictional Prophecy 
  
 By the early 1960s, sf had established its credentials as an intellectually serious 
endeavor, even though (then as now) many regarded it as frivolous, paraliterary trash. 
The big moment was, of course, Hiroshima, which turned pulp fantasies about 
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tomorrow’s superweapons into yesterday’s news. But fantasies and nightmares about 
civilization-threatening weapons had operated on the American consciousness for 
decades, and the public looked as much for guidance to the editorials of John W. 
Campbell, Jr. (editor of Astounding Science Fiction) as it did to the scientists of Los 
Alamos.  By the sixties, though, civilizational conflict conducted via technology was 16
not just about futuristic WMD. Every facet of American and Soviet technological 
advancement became a contest of Cold War dominance. Vice-President Richard Nixon, 
for instance, managed to squeeze almost as much political mileage out of a model 
kitchen in 1959 as he did when NASA put a man on the moon during his presidency a 
decade later.  So prognosticating technological developments became for writers like 17
Clarke—as mentioned at the outset of the introduction—a way to coin cultural capital 
for their science fiction, not to mention burnish their credentials as a forecaster. 
 Early critical theorization of science fiction as such framed it in technological 
terms, too. Hugo Gernsback classically defined it in 1924 as “a charming romance 
intermingled with scientific fact and prophetic vision” (3), and three decades later 
Golden Age tyros like Campbell and Isaac Asimov were still grappling with the 
implications of that formulation, expanding the technological territory of sf into the 
potential of the human mind or sociology.  Early scholarly histories of sf were often 18
bibliographic in nature or focused on defending sf as “literature” per se.  In the late 19
1960s and seventies, theoretical frameworks moved beyond technology or the effects 
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of the industrial revolution as definitive hallmarks of sf, though overviews based on 
historical anecdotes and wide-ranging surveys remained popular.  The most enduring 20
scholarly intervention in sf theory has been Darko Suvin’s Metamorphoses of Science 
Fiction (1979). Suvin proposed that the unique characteristic of sf was not a set of 
tropes, but a poetic device that makes it “a literature of cognitive estrangement” (4), 
meaning that it defamiliarizes the reader’s reality through the introduction of some new 
thing, which is presented to the reader as materially plausible. Borrowing from the 
utopian philosopher Ernst Bloch, Suvin dubbed this new thing the novum, something 
whose introduction into the world carries the potential to alter it fundamentally and 
irrevocably. A science-fictional novum must therefore depict revolutionary social 
consequences of any alteration to reality’s status quo. Thus for Suvin and sf critics who 
draw upon his framework—including but certainly not limited to Fredric Jameson, Carl 
Freedman, and Philip Wegner—the best sf evinces radical politics consonant with 
historical materialism. That is, sf is a literature of change—often political change. More 
specifically, debates about sf tend to be about how progress is represented, whether 
progress is identified with technological advancement or political revolution (or both). 
Like the early authors, editors, fans, and scholars who carved out the contours of sf 
discourse, the Suvinian paradigm therefore retains both a prophetic register and a 
commitment to a materialist worldview, if not necessarily one as inflected with 
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nineteenth-century positivism as the early pulp stories Gernsback solicited for Amazing 
Stories. 
 As sf slowly gained stature in the academy, Samuel R. Delany—himself a science 
fiction author of considerably stature—produced criticism, like Suvin’s, that focused on 
the interaction of the text with the reader, but he emphasized linguistics. Inspired by 
Michel Foucault’s approach to French historiography, Delany suggested that sf 
discourse taught readers to read science-fictionally through certain reading protocols.  21
What that meant in practice was that science-fictional stories presented a wider variety 
of possible readings than what he called “mundane” fiction. Delany’s most famous 
example is this sentence: “Her world exploded” (“Conscience” 68). Such a sentence 
would have a very different valence in the context of Mr. Darcy’s proposal to Elizabeth 
Bennett than to Princess Leia in Star Wars. In anything other than a science-fictional 
story, that sentence would be a metaphor, but in sf, its literal meaning is privileged 
without sacrificing the multiple other registers on which the sentence works. For sf 
texts, Delany explains, “as the sentences build up, we build up a world in specific 
dialogue, in a specific tension, with our present concept of the real” (69). Seo-Young 
Chu has taken Delany’s ideas from this period a few steps further, arguing in Do 
Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep? (2010) that essentially all representative fiction is in 
some sense science-fictional, since all fiction must struggle in some ways with mimesis, 
and sf is simply a more “high-intensity” variation on that struggle. That particular claim 
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erodes, if not collapses, the meaningful distinction between science-fictional modes of 
representation and all others,  but Chu mounts an important critique of Suvin’s 22
approach to sf. It is not the poetics of sf that induces estrangement, but aspects of our 
lived reality itself. She therefore conceptualizes “science fiction as a mimetic discourse 
whose objects of representation are nonimaginary yet cognitively estranging” (3). 
Especially with regard to slippery yet operative phenomena such as race, the flows of 
capital, or the scope of the technocratic apparatuses that help corporations and 
governments perform their basic functions—not to mention national identity—science 
fiction is a way to concretize the experience of such things. Philosophy Timothy Morton 
has dubbed such referents “hyperobjects,”  but Chu suggests that science-fictionality 23
can represent virtually everything in human experience in a much more evocative, 
tangible sense.“In transcending the literal/figurative dichotomy,” Chu argues, “science 
fiction provides a representational home for referents that are themselves neither 
purely ideal nor purely figurative in nature” (14). The literalness of a science-fictional 
story gives life and breath to concepts and political ideas that cannot find their fullest 
narrative expression in any other way. 
 The linguistic framework articulated by Delany and Chu comes closest to the 
way that I want to present science-fictionality in this dissertation. I agree with John 
Rieder, who argues that it is less useful simply to classify a text as sf than it is to 
consider more deeply “the dynamic interaction taking place between its different 
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generic elements or strategies” (14). Undoubtedly, technological tropes such as 
airships, appearance-altering chemical treatments, telepathy, and futurological 
prognostication—which we will see in the coming chapters—are all science-fictional in 
the classic sense. But science-fictionality is not ultimately derived from specific tropes. 
As a literary mode, I see it as a way of giving concrete form and substance—specificity 
and tactility—to ideas that otherwise exist only in the abstract. Though I would 
emphasize its linguistic register more than Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., he is right that 
science-fictionality is more of a habitus, a “kind of awareness… a mode of response 
that frames and tests experiences as if they were aspects of a work of science 
fiction” (2). More significantly, it is a mode of response that extends proactively beyond 
the science-fiction text, once one is accustomed to its protocols. 
 When Arthur C. Clarke offers his formulae for prophecy, he is of necessity 
synthesizing more than the current state of scientific knowledge. Implied in his failures 
of nerve and failures of imagination are all the hyperobjects that make them possible. 
Implied, too, in his notion of prophecy is the notion that progress can be measured by 
technological benchmarks. Progress itself therefore becomes a science-fictional 
conceit. To succeed as a prophet, even in Clarke’s extremely narrow, technologically 
predictive sense, a person would have to be aware of historical trajectories, different 
epistemologies, and the flux of current affairs. That is, one would have to be plugged 
in politically and historically, even if the issue at hand is the approximate year that a 
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human being will set foot on Mars. Science-fictionality does create critical distance 
between the world of the text and the world, and it does offer new political 
possibilities, but those possibilities only come into focus once that critical distance is 
once again synthesized into concrete form. It is not enough to want to get beyond the 
horizon, as Bloch might put it. One has to have a specific, plausible vision of how to 
get there. Science-fictionality charts those uncharted waters, and even if the form a 
course takes is silly or improbable, if it is at all persuasive, it is going navigate by the 
light of the stars—even those yet undiscovered.   
 When a prophecy is presented science-fictionally, it presents in concrete, literal 
form a normative spiritual and political vision of society and the individual’s role in it.  24
The texts we will examine in this dissertation create science-fictional protocols of 
comprehension that engage with the jeremiad in a number of ways. I have already 
suggested that the American jeremiad works to destabilize, fragment, or dispense with 
the nation, but when it takes the form of political speech, the typical reconfiguration of 
the Elect in an American context does, as Bercovitch argues, nominally resorts to 
America as its signifier. When the jeremiad is engaged with science-fictionally, the 
reconfiguration of the fragmented national culture does not have to take that form. 
Instead, it can recrystallize in all sorts of ways, each with its own particular dimension. 
 I do not intend to index every science-fictional vector in every text we will 
examine. What I will do is attempt to identify each text’s specific engagement with the 
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jeremiad. So doing, we will be able to identify the science-fictional aspects of each text 
that most directly correlate with its prophetic purpose. In some ways, this makes our 
task more challenging, since we have to draw connections between the historical 
context of each text in order to identify the vectors that are transmuted into science-
fictional representations. As we will see, this can be somewhat circuitous at times. By 
the same token, this process may make the outcome of our labors more provocative. 
Once we tether the science-fictional representations to their cultural contexts, both the 
science-fictionality and the contexts will, I hope, render each other more legible, thus 
highlighting what is most at stake in the text’s engagement with the American 
jeremiad. 
Rituals of Dissent 
  
 My work builds on the understanding that science-fictional elements ranging 
from early American novels such as those by Charles Brockden Brown through Cold 
War polemics and into the contemporary work of sf masters like Kim Stanley Robinson 
are deeply entwined with the jeremiadic tradition.  In charting the evolution of the 25
jeremiad in American science fiction from the late nineteenth through the mid-
twentieth centuries, though, I endeavor to push beyond establishing that these texts 
are jeremiads. As a matter of course, the jeremiad is different from one text to another, 
so I do not chart the evolution of the jeremiad into a powerful science-fictional form, as 
!24
if each text is a stepping-stone toward some final incarnation. Not every text is qualifies 
as a jeremiad per se. This dissertation is not a genealogy of a direct line of descent 
from the Arabella to the Quo Peregrinatur, which appears in the final chapters of 
Walter M. Miller, Jr.’s A Canticle for Leibowitz (1960). Much like the branches of an 
evolutionary tree, the varieties of the jeremiad all stem from a common root, but the 
fact of their genetic interrelation does not make The Iron Heel, for instance, the missing 
link between Caesar’s Column and “The Comet.” Rather, the examples of the jeremiad 
taken up in this project produce an intertwining genealogy. Though these texts may be 
said to branch from the trunk of the same tree, I urge you to remember the jeremiad as 
a discourse, a framework, a way of thinking about each of these texts, rather than a 
form to which each of them conforms. 
 Each chapter explores a key motif in two key science-fictional texts that form a 
bounded historical period. The chapters are presented chronologically in part to situate 
them within the rapid changes that occurred over the course of the eighty years that 
this dissertation covers. The chronological arrangment also facilitates a cumulative 
overview of the historical-cultural contexts in which each of these books appears. 
Chapter One engages with Ignatius Donnelly’s Caesar’s Column (1890) and Jack 
London’s The Iron Heel (1908) in order to chart how each novel constitutes a sense of 
class separatism. I situate contexts of late-nineteenth-century Populism and early-
twentieth-century socialism in terms of the novels’ science-fictional representations of 
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space and time to accentuate how those authors conceive of the unbridgeable 
distance between their political constituencies. In Chapter Two, W. E. B. Du Bois and 
George Schuyler posit the centrality of racial difference in American culture, exploring 
its possibilities and limitations in “The Comet” (1920) and Black No More (1931), 
respectively. Du Bois operates in a fully prophetic mode while Schuyler savagely 
lampoons it; both ultimately uphold the color line as the central problem of the 
twentieth century. In Chapter Three, we will explore two influential space operas: E. E. 
Smith’s Lensman saga (1935-50) and Isaac Asimov’s Foundation trilogy (1941-53). These 
series will be shown to exemplify an ideology of technocratic control which is ultimately 
expressed in the science-fictional trope of psychic superpowers. Finally, Chapter Four 
examines the trope of exodus in Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1957) and A Canticle for 
Leibowitz. For Rand, exodus symbolizes the quest for dominance, while for Miller it 
represents a posture of epistemic humility. In my Conclusion, I suggest that the aspects 
of the jeremiad examined in the previous chapters outline a new way to think about the 
jeremiad and its social function, a way that is more broadly applicable than analyzing 
the American character, yet narrow enough to remain a distinct prophetic mode.   
 As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. has said, “Modern historical consciousness is 
shaped by belief in novums” in part because the “dominant cultural consciousness of 
the twentieth century perceived the nonstop emergence and production of novums in 
a myriad of technological and social relations” (Beauties 57-58). At the beginning of 
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the twentieth century, a sense that the United States was the vanguard of those myriad 
technological and social relations was felt widely; it was precisely that sense that fueled 
H. G. Wells’s The Future in America (1906), for instance. But the sense of society’s 
development being contingent upon ever-emerging newness has never been an 
exclusively American phenomenon, and it is even less so now.   The science-26
fictionality of a novum has always been as keyed to technological emergence as to 
evolving social relations. Whenever Americans have grappled with a crisis, they have 
often responded with a prophetic vision that attempts to reconfigure those social 
relations. As my dissertation will argue, many such prophets have done so through 
science-fictional discourse. 
 Both science fiction and prophecy respond to socio-historical situations in a way 
that bypasses abstraction and reason. They make intuitive, extrapolative leaps. 
Prophets, both science-fictional and divinely-inspired, create their authority by 
articulating political yearnings as-yet unimagined in a concrete form. For nearly a 
century, the jeremiad in the context of the United States has largely signified the legacy 
of Puritan cultural consensus as ultimately binding and normative for the American 
literary imaginary. As I attend to a diverse body of science-fictional texts over a period 
of rapid historical transformation, I hope to demonstrate that the prophetic responses 
to those changes fundamentally challenge our understanding of the American ritual of 
consensus. Perhaps narratives of decline ultimately say more about the irreconcilable 
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tensions in the body politic than they do about the ability of a powerful myth to forge 
many peoples into one.  
 For instance, see Peter J. Bowler, A History of the Future: Prophets of Progress from H.G. Wells to Isaac 1
Asimov (2017), which ably traces the discursive dimensions of futurological speculation from late 
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 Hay, “Science Fiction: Mankind’s Early Warning System” (1973).2
 See Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (1975), which highlights the 3
importance of Cotton Mathers’s Magnalia Christi Americana (1702) in establishing a mythos of the 
colonies’ founding fathers. 
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hermeneutics, and politics in early modern Britain” (2003); Teresa Feroli, Political Speaking Justified: 
Women Prophets and the English  (2006); Hilary Hinds, “Prophecy and religious polemic” (2009). Keith 
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 See Peter Stallybrass, “Macbeth and Witchcraft” (1982).12
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remained true to the radical vision outlined out in his seminal manifesto. 
 See Marxism and Literature (1977), esp. ch. 8.14
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 See Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light (1985), esp. chs. 20 and 21. H. Bruce Franklin’s War Stars: 16
The Superweapon and the American Imagination (1988) is an erudite guide to the theme of peace 
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 Nixon’s “kitchen debate” with Nikita Khrushchev took place in an American National Exhibition set up 17
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superiority. See Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (1996), pp. 72-76.
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Fiction is very helpful. In particular, I refer here to J. O. Bailey’s Pilgrims Through Space and Time (1947) 
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 See “Some Reflections on SF Criticism” (1981).21
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A Diamond in the Rough, Not the Philosopher’s Stone” (2012).
 See Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (2013).23
 Ingrid Bartsch et al., for example, present Donna Haraway’s science-fictional methodology as a 24
“postmodern jeremiad” that productively troubles the easy dichotomy between literal and figurative 
representation in her work, although they would also say that Haraway's prophetic mode distinctly works 
to circumvent attempts at normativity; see “Witnessing the Postmodern Jeremiad” (2001).
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CHAPTER ONE. Imagining Class: Ignatius Donnelly’s 
Caesar’s Column and Jack London’s The Iron Heel, 
1890-1910 
Project for a New American Century 
  
 In 1906, the British prophet of science fiction, H. G. Wells, published an account 
of his voyage to the United States of America. He wished to ascertain the quality of the 
nation’s “collective will,” so that he might better understand what world-historical 
events America might shape “in the next thirty years or so” (2). A committed socialist, 
Wells was deeply engaged with the progressive intelligentsia of his day, most of whom 
presumed that the contradictions of capitalism would be exploded and resolved in the 
young nation, which was an economic and technological tyro, for all its fits and starts. 
Thus it was in the West—rather than the East, as it actually happened a bit more than a 
decade later—that many radicals expected the proletariat to emerge victorious from 
the class struggle.  
 At the very least, European thinkers knew that the United States would be a 
continued factor in geopolitics; they speculated as to how large a shadow the nation 
would cast. Secondhand knowledge was insufficient to fuel Wells’s “prophetic habit of 
mind”: he needed to witness the people and environs of this nation directly. “For all 
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the Philippine adventure,” Wells thought, America’s “future still seems to lie on the 
whole compactly in one continent” (17). It is strange that Wells did not foresee that a 
nation dissatisfied to remain east of the Mississippi River would confine itself to a single 
continent in the intermediate future, to say nothing of the coming century. In fact, this 
passage illustrates the even stranger complexities of tying spatial imagination 
(“compactly on one continent”) to temporal imagination (the “future still seems to lie”), 
and how central a colonial “adventure” (the acquisition of the Philippines from Spain in 
1898) plays in that nexus. Space and time and imperialism are all so tightly knit in this 
offhand observation that it is difficult to parse how implicated each of these concepts is 
by the others. But the imagination of distance—temporal distance and spatial distance
—was integral to the way reformist and revolutionary movements in the United States 
had thought of their resistance to capitalist plutocracy. As it would turn out, America 
would not be the revolutionary vanguard of the twentieth century, but it was home to 
radical political groups which harnessed the language of temporal and spatial distance 
to articulate their class grievances. 
 Though it may sound counterintuitive, the novels I discuss in this chapter use 
distance space and time—which are often presented as abstractions—to give 
concreteness and recognizable dimension to irreconcilable class differences. So doing, 
the imagination of space and time also gives specific form to the boundaries of 
political belonging. Both Ignatius Donnelly and Jack London use temporality and 
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spatiality in the texts explored in this chapter to imagine ways of being that they see as 
radically different from the status quo. As a result, they also imagine ways of belonging
—ways of defining the nation—that refuse the messy, plural reality of the body politic. 
For Donnelly, this was Populism; for London, socialism. Caesar’s Column depicts a late 
twentieth-century America in which the plutocrats of Donnelly’s time have consolidated 
total economic and political control in Europe and America. As a reaction, the masses 
stage a bloody uprising that wipes away Western civilization, and Donnelly’s 
protagonists flee to the mountains of Uganda to found a utopia along Populist lines. 
The Iron Heel presents itself as a manuscript of the near future, annotated by a 
historian in the distant future. The main narrative depicts an abortive socialist 
revolution, but the future historian’s retrospective palimpsests confirm that after several 
hundred, a global socialist utopia is built on the ashes of the oligarchs’ oppressive 
police state. Space and time in Caesar’s Column and The Iron Heel help readers 
imagine vast, unbridgeable distances between themselves (the Populists, the socialists) 
and the rest of their fellow citizens. Donnelly and London’s science-fictional prophecies 
gave their readers ways to imagine clearly the class-based political divisions that 
wracked the United States in the decades surrounding the turn of the century. In these 
jeremiads, class proves to be the covenanted nation that transcends America itself. 
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Populism’s Jeremiah Laureate 
   
 While perhaps most famous for writing the preamble to the platform of the 
national People’s Party in 1892, Ignatius Donnelly maintained a vigorous, if turbulent, 
political career in Minnesota, which stretched from the antebellum period to the 
waning years of the nineteenth century. Having moved west from Philadelphia in the 
1850s, Donnelly quickly became a radical abolitionist, active in Minnesota’s young 
Republican Party. After the war, without the moral clarity of antislavery as an anchoring 
issue, Donnelly’s liberal reform politics found the two major parties less and less 
hospitable, and he drifted between Republicans, Democrats, and third parties. Settling 
by the mid-1870s on monetary policy as his political lodestone, he made a reputation 
for himself as a freewheeling advocate on behalf of the country’s farmers. While his 
political career boasts a number of modest achievements, his work in building the 
Minnesota Farmer’s Alliance into a viable regional political entity,  starting in 1883 and 1
going up through the early 90s, is what attracted the attention of the national Populist 
movement. That, and a novel called Caesar’s Column (1890). 
 The People’s Party was the culmination of a movement that originated in 
nonpartisan alliances organized by farmers for the purposes of self-education and 
cooperative mercantilism. After the Civil War, tycoons in a variety of agrarian ventures
—grain elevator combines in the Midwest, the crop lien system in the South, railroad 
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monopolies everywhere—consolidated their political influence over Republicans and 
Democrats in the northern and southern states, respectively. The evolution of the 
farmers’ alliances from nonpartisan experiments in self-sufficiency to an insurgent third 
party reflected a growing (and only partially reciprocated) sense of solidarity with urban 
laborers and a belief that a political revolution alone would provide the economic 
preconditions necessary for the nation’s real producers to gain ground against the 
corporations squeezing them.  While Donnelly’s preamble to the People’s Party 2
platform gave eloquent form to the grievances of the Populists who had organized it, 
his first novel is explicitly a warning against the potential of the multitude’s anger to 
overflow the levees established by existing political institutions. Caesar’s Column is 
therefore surprisingly inextricable from the context of the nineteenth-century Populist 
revolt.  
 The protagonist of Donnelly’s novel is Gabriel Weltstein, a Swiss shepherd from 
a colony in Uganda who comes to New York City in 1988 to sell his wares to purchasers 
directly (a strategy of last resort with which Populists, in their struggles with railroad 
monopolies, would sympathize). After some scenes depicting Gabriel’s initially 
disquieted appreciation for the city’s technological wonders, he is shown the city’s 
underbelly by Max Petion, who is a kind of Scarlet Pimpernel-cum-Vergil. Max is one of 
the triumvirate heading a worldwide Brotherhood of Destruction, primarily made up of 
the evolutionarily degenerate masses, which is on the verge of bringing a global 
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uprising to fruition. While the novel’s nominal villain is an Oligarchy headed by the 
Jewish Prince Cabano, who pulls the strings on a plutocracy grinding the world into 
dehumanizing impoverishment, the Brotherhood’s goal is not the overthrow of the 
Oligarchs. Instead, its goal is the total destruction of Western civilization—to wipe the 
slate clean for building a better future. Trapped between these historically 
overdetermined classes, both bent on catastrophic collision, Gabriel can do little but 
bear witness to the apocalypse. There’s a bit of erstwhile skulduggery involving the 
rescue of Estella Washington (a descendent of America’s venerable first president) from 
Cabano’s clutches. Estella and Gabriel fall in love, and Max, too, finds a mate in 
Christina Jansen, a young songstress whose literary genealogy brings her within a twig 
or two on the same tree as Stephen Crane’s Maggie (1893). After providing a pastoral 
interlude for the happy couples to consecrate their double-marriage, Donnelly has the 
Brotherhood wreak its bloody revenge on the world. While one of the Brotherhood’s 
other leaders, Caesar Lomellini, erects a phallic monument to the orgy of violence, 
Gabriel and his tiny band of refugees flee the chaos in an airship, laden with the best 
learning and technology that civilization had to offer, back to his farm in Uganda. 
There, the colonists and the refugees build a Populist utopia in the mountains. 
 The unmistakable connections between Donnelly’s increasing Populist agitation 
at the time he wrote the novel and its political themes have given Caesar’s Column a 
somewhat privileged place in some accounts of nineteenth-century Populism. Richard 
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Hofstadter’s pathfinding analysis of agrarian Populism in The Age of Reform (1955), in 
fact, rests heavily on Donnelly’s novel.  This “nettlesome if distinctly minor prophetic 3
book” offers, to Hofstadter, “a frightening glimpse into the ugly potential of frustrated 
popular revolt” (70). As such, it not only serves to explain the anti-Semitic rhetoric of 
Midwestern Populists like Mary Lease (79),  but even Woodrow Wilson’s forebodings 4
about monopoly capitalism more than 20 years later (231). Even without reference to 
Hofstadter, literary critics frequently posit Caesar’s Column as a synecdoche for the 
most apocalyptic aspects of nineteenth-century Populism.  But Hofstadter wrote Age of 5
Reform in the McCarthyite 1950s, and developed his theory of the “paranoid style” in 
tandem with the Barry Goldwater insurgency in the early 1960s. In his essay explicating 
the paranoid style, Hofstadter argues that the perspective of seeing vast forces arrayed 
“against a nation, a culture, a way of life” (4) is most often “the preferred style only of 
minority movements”—in contradistinction, he notes, to the German fascists or Soviet 
Stalinists, whom he believed succeeded in winning over majorities in their respective 
countries (7). While his readers could take small solace in radicals attaining, as yet, only 
minority status in the United States, Hofstadter does find it expedient to quote a 1895 
Populist manifesto as exemplary of this style, with the obligatory footnote of Donnelly’s 
preamble (8). Hofstadter’s basic framework resonates in the analyses of many later 
political theorists who view the Gilded Age Populists as the antecedents of more 
regressive populisms throughout the twentieth century.     6
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 Others see Donnelly’s Populism as part of the root system of a more constructive 
range of political possibilities, even though populism’s unruly energy also engenders 
some ambivalence.  In his monumental Democratic Promise (1976), Lawrence 7
Goodwyn straightforwardly characterizes third-party Populism as realizing in good 
measure a progressive alternative politics to the entrenched, binary Republican and 
Democrat establishment. In direct contrast to Hofstadter, who alleges a nostalgia for 
Jacksonian agrarianism when he writes, “The utopia of the Populists was in the past, 
not the future” (62-3), Goodwyn says the Populists treated the nation’s past as an 
adaptable resource, not a monolithic myth: though they “would appear to involve a 
backward look toward a Jeffersonian ethos, they would speak less to the past, or to 
their contemporaries, than to the future” (xix). Though stump orators like Donnelly 
often brought a revolutionary fervor to their Populist apologetics, Populism was in 
broad strokes more reformist in scope. As Goodwyn cogently argues, the actual 
political program of the People’s Party advanced solutions to political problems that 
did not fundamentally alter the terms of the American social contract; the reformers 
thought of themselves in continuity with a grassroots democratic tradition, and 
defensibly so. But the movement fed off the apocalyptic urgency of firebrands like 
Lease and Donnelly. As a consequence, even though Populism made room for women 
and minority advocates in its big tent, that tent was also capacious enough to include 
outright racism and paranoid conspiracy theories. 
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 Donnelly’s career as a popular author exemplifies Populism’s less judicious 
approaches toward the wild energies of democratic politics in his attempts to 
revolutionize the accepted paradigms of natural science and literary history. As Martin 
Ridge notes in his thorough biography, though Donnelly was a renowned man of letters 
by the early nineties, he was not universally acclaimed. His first book, Atlantis: The 
Antediluvian World (1882), was a bestseller, though reputable scientists regarded his 
argument—that all of Western civilization owed its greatest accomplishments to the 
cultural heritage of ancient Atlantis, now swallowed by the ocean—as hokum. His next 
two books—one which predicted a geological cataclysm and one which tried to 
provide that Francis Bacon was Shakespeare—were about as critically lauded as 
Atlantis and much less financially successful.  8
 Perhaps because of his growing reputation as a crackpot, and perhaps because 
the subject matter of the book was so “revolutionary not to say inflammatory,”  9
Caesar’s Column was published pseudonymously (Ridge 265). Though the book sold 
well, Donnelly did not reveal his authorship to his own political constituents until the 
National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union convened in December of 1890. 
Already “projected into national leadership,” his fight to retain presidency of the 
Minnesota Alliance Labor Union was cemented into certain victory when it became 
known that he had written the apocalyptic novel (277). Afterward, he was proudly 
identified as the author of Caesar’s Column in Donnelliana: An Appendix to Caesar’s 
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Column (1892), written by one of Donnelly’s associates largely to raise Donnelly’s 
political profile. Being the author of Caesar’s Column, in short, was integral to 
Donnelly’s rise in the Populist movement in the early 1890s, even as it bolstered his 
national notoriety as a crank. 
 Into this context, Donnelly delivered the polemic for which he is best 
remembered: the preamble to the “Omaha platform” of the People’s Party in 1892. 
The author of Caesar’s Column drew on agrarian mythology rooted in a Jeffersonian 
ideal of American democracy. In Donnelly’s soaring rhetoric, freedom and prosperity 
belongs to a landed yeomanry, a myth of the tamed wilderness filtered through values 
inherited from the Jacksonian age of westward expansion. Critics and historians tend to 
highlight Donnelly’s apocalyptic language of “a nation brought to the verge of moral, 
political, and material ruin,” as well as the specter of “A vast conspiracy… organized on 
two continents,” and appropriately so. This is clearly prophetic rhetoric in the tradition 
of the jeremiad.  He warns that “two hostile camps” lay in “wait only for the drum-10
beat and the trumpet to summon them to armed conflict,” and it draws into the 
Populist camp a diverse array of political groups whose common interest is in a 
“nation”—that is, America—“brought to the verge of moral, material, and political 
ruin.” It is not coincidence that these images correspond so closely to the structure and 
climax of Caesar’s Column, and the images Donnelly evokes in his preamble strive to 
knit together a sense of common class interest under the aegis of a new political party. 
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 Tension between nation and class remained nestled inside the rhetoric of the 
Populist revolt. Though most talk of “battle,” “conflict,” or “revolution” throughout the 
1880s did not call for bloodshed,  people were certainly angry, and the Civil War 11
served as an apt revolutionary metaphor for Leonidas L. Polk in 1891 as he traveled the 
country, trying to gin up support for a third party.  Stirring up the living memory of the 12
most deadly and divisive conflict in U.S. history was not uncommon practice in 
electioneering, but it did not exactly nurture comity between conflicting regional 
identities. As his protagonist avers in the Caesar’s Column, Donnelly himself sought to 
avoid political revolution fomenting another civil war.  That does not mean he was not 13
committed to change. As a lecturer for the Minnesota Farmers Alliance, he was 
particularly sensitized to the hardships of agrarian life in his grassroots contact with 
common folk.  The United States had already undergone the turbulent transition from 14
an agrarian to an industrial economy in the middle of the nineteenth century; by the 
1890s, it was in the nascent stages of the transition from monopoly capitalism to the 
decentralized flow of extranational capital.  With the deprivations of capitalism visible 15
everywhere and felt by a majority of Americans, the language of class had the potential 
to regional, gender, and racial boundaries. In order to achieve political goals, political 
parties are by necessity something of a coalitional hodgepodge, a cold fact most 
Populist leaders recognized, yet struggled to finesse into their realpolitik. And so 
Populist rhetoric (like most populist rhetoric) fell back on the language of nation, even 
!41
though what the Populists offered was essentially a class-based critique. Though the 
agrarian ideology may have carried the Populist agenda to fruition in the Progressive 
Era after the turn of the century,  Donnelly’s preamble reaches beyond divisions of 16
race and gender (to a limited extent) to forge his audience into a cohesive whole 
precisely by hinging it on national identity.  
 But a common interest in the fate of the nation did not preserve the Populist 
revolt from collapse. Laura Grattan argues that “internal contests over race, gender, 
and national identity” were central to Populists’ “efforts to enact horizontal popular 
power” (54). But horizontal popular power—that is, class interests—did not prevent the 
People’s Party from being co-opted by William Jennings Bryan into the Democrat Party 
in 1896, and national Populist leader Charles W. Macune’s litmus test for Populist 
political solidarity, the federal subtreasury, finally died on Bryan’s cross of gold.  The 17
Populists also struggled to reconcile the interests of urban laborers with their own, and 
racism strangled the potential alliances between white and black farmers’ alliances in 
the South.  Despite the Populists’ best efforts, they ultimately failed to create a viable 18
third party in their own time in large part because they were unable to reconcile 
multiple coalitional interests into a cohesive political vision of a new American class. 
But the discourse they fostered has remained, not least in the fact of cleaving the 
language of threatened class interest to the ideology of producerism—to which 
subscribe the people who believe that they make things, create jobs, and materially 
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drive economic growth. Sacvan Bercovitch might have noted this development as 
simply another in a long line of the jeremiad’s permutations, all working to identify 
American striving with the ideological goals of the middle class. And it is that, in part. 
But the other part is the ways in which this particular class identity ultimately dissolves 
attachment to America, a dissolution—the effect of an irreconcilable division—
expressed in terms of space and time.  
As a City on a Mountain (in Uganda) 
  
 Of all the books examined in this dissertation, Caesar’s Column is probably the 
one which adheres in its form the closest to the narrative logic and tropes of the 
jeremiad.  The cleavage has been noted by several critics, most notably Lee 19
Schweninger, who explicates the resonances in detail, and whose account I cannot 
avoid replicating to some extent.  As we examine key scenes in the novel, I will also 20
draw attention to the motifs of spatial and temporal distance. The moments in which 
Donnelly is at his most jeremiadic are also moments in which he lays particular stress 
upon distances in space and time. He starts before the novel proper even commences, 
in an introduction addressed “To the Public.” 
 Here we find Donnelly wishing that his novel, “under the providence of God, do 
good to this generation and posterity!” (3). He also identifies himself as a “prophet 
[who] is not responsible for the event he foretells. He may contemplate it with 
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profoundest sorrow” (3). To avoid any misunderstanding: Donnelly explicitly positions 
himself as a prophet offering a lament, one privileged with insight into historical telos. 
He goes on to warn readers about historical forces which will “eventuate in the 
overthrow of society and the destruction of civilization,” which can be avoided if 
society reaffirms “the essentials of religion,” though with an emphasis on “deeds, not 
creeds.” He is even prepared to accept the fact that not everyone will take his jeremiad 
to heart: “Some will say the events herein described are absurdly impossible” (3). While 
no friend to orthodox religion,  the religious sentiment which inflects his apocalyptic 21
vision often invokes providence and the divine in moments layered with Donnelly’s faith 
in historical overdetermination. The overdetermination is a dichotomy between 
mutually opposed forces: “society divides itself into two hostile camps; no white flags 
pass from the one to the other. They wait only for the drum-beat and the trumpet to 
summon them to armed conflict” (4). (At this point, you may recall the phrasing of his 
preamble.) All of this derives from the lineage of the Puritan jeremiad; taken altogether, 
the “impossible” events are not Donnelly’s technological prognostications, but the 
cataclysms that destroy the Western world at the novel’s climax. The very idea that 
there may be two classes locked in a life-or-death dialectical struggle certainly might 
strike some readers in Donnelly’s time as difficult to swallow, but because Donnelly 
frames his novel as a jeremiad, he still holds out hope that his prophetic voice will 
arrest people in their backsliding. 
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 One particular impossibility requires a little more explication: the novel’s setting, 
one hundred years hence. It is not the case that Donnelly’s reading public was 
unfamiliar with the conceit of utopian novels set in the future; the late nineteenth 
century saw a tremendous proliferation of American literary utopias, not least of which 
was Edward Bellamy’s lightning rod, Looking Backward (1888). But many of them, as 
Jean Pfaelzer observes, did not in any immediate way depict the transition from Now 
to Then.  Caesar’s Column is one of the few that does. To do so he invokes a naturalist 22
analogy: “There is an acceleration of movement in human affairs even as there is in the 
operations of gravity” (4). Stuart Culver argues that Donnelly’s synthesis of pastoralism, 
apocalypse, and utopia points to a broader trend in nineteenth-century historiography 
to conflate natural and social history. If Caesar’s Column fits into the cosmology 
sketched in his previous work,  the social catastrophe for which Donnelly sets the 23
stage is and is like a natural catastrophe—an evolutionary bottleneck that winnows 
cultural progress to its essentials. In a rhetorical move that might have channeled the 
ghost of Jonathan Edwards, he reconfigures an impossibility—his futurological 
speculation on the coming catastrophe—into an inexorable natural law.  And it’s a law 24
of historical overdetermination, as Donnelly’s invocations of “posterity” and “the event 
he foretells,” drawing attention to the distance between the readership’s contemporary 
period and the setting of the novel, set a hundred years in the future. That distance, 
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though, is presented as the logical extrapolation of a natural law, and the natural law of 
acceleration toward catastrophe—born from the divisive conflict between “two hostile 
camps”—is the very thing Donnelly prophesies against. Distance in time supplies the 
power of Donnelly’s prophetic warning, a jeremiad against the consequences of class 
warfare. 
 Let us linger for just a moment longer on how Donnelly generates his prophetic 
power in this introduction, because it informs everything that follows. Having 
established distance in time as a key motif, he buttresses it with the authority of natural 
law. But the evidence of that natural law lies in Donnelly’s futorological speculation. The 
class conflict that is already happening in his own country is not what Donnelly laments, 
but “the event he foretells.” Though he invokes Providence, and though his 
protagonist, Gabriel, expends much energy in one memorable scene haranguing a 
church congregation, the prophetic authority he invents for himself comes from a 
proleptic invocation of an apocalypse he hopes to avert. The images of that 
apocalypse, summoned forth from the future, are immediate and terrifying. The vast 
temporal distance of a century signifies the outcome of a historically overdetermined 
class war. The science-fictionality of Donnelly’s strategy here is the source of his 
prophetic authority. In both Caesar’s Column and The Iron Heel, the play of distances 
of space and time again and again signify the stakes of class conflict. 
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 With a great gulf of time establishing the authority for Donnelly’s intervention, 
he next sets to work setting up the motif of distance in space. The first chapter of the 
narrative proper, opens with Gabriel surveying the wonders of futuristic New York City. 
But in his mind, he turns “back to the old homestead, amid the high mountain valleys 
of Africa; to the primitive, simple shepherd-life.” From the Darwin Hotel, he writes to 
his brother, “This gorgeous, gilded room fades away, and I see the leaning hills, the 
trickling streams, the deep gorges where our wooly thousands graze; and I hear once 
more the echoing Swiss horns of our herdsmen reverberating from the snow-tipped 
mountains” (9). From the outset, Donnelly signifies his commitment to agrarian values, 
evoking the pastoral mode. Pastoral motifs recur only sporadically throughout the text, 
but emerge most forcefully in two more occasions.  One is the final chapter, when 25
Gabriel and his companions escape the apocalyptic violence of the Brotherhood’s 
revolution, and they found a new utopian society in the mountains of Uganda. We will 
examine that in more detail later. The other key evocation of the pastoral mode occurs 
when Gabriel and Max marry Estella and Christina on the Jansens’ farm. All of these 
scenes set the images of pastoral paradise far from the urban centers—at a great 
geographical distance. The vast distances involved uphold the jeremiad’s purpose of 
illustrating the mutually exclusive class value systems and the necessity of committing 
to only one. 
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 Marrying on the Jansens’ farm, well outside the New York City limits, Gabriel, 
Max, Estella, and Christina enjoy their joint honeymoon free from the cares of 
impending revolution, but not free from political implication.  In the ribaldry of their 26
garden idyll, Max jokes that Gabriel is “about to marry a girl with pedigree, and I 
another without one,” to which Christina ripostes: “I am ‘Christina Carl’s Dotter,’ and 
‘Carl’ was the son of ‘John’… I have a long pedigree; and I am very proud of it; and 
what is more, they were all good, honest, virtuous people” (183). Estella, you may 
recall, is descended from the closest thing the United States has to a founding 
monarch, George Washington, and the other from Scandinavian “plain people.” Max is 
himself the scion of a family crushed by the plutocrats. The double-marriage represents 
a strategic set of unions that unite agrarians, aristocrats, and plain people against the 
wealthy. As the bucolic interlude draws to a close, Donnelly speckles the chapter with 
shades of Vergil’s poetry and a paean to the technology of animal husbandry. More 
significantly, he links the provenance of Gabriel and Max’s wives’ ancestries to an 
agrarian mythos.  He evokes the domesticated cow, husbanded over hundreds of 27
generations, as a eugenic metonym for “Aryan” civilization. The double-wedding 
serves to link Gabriel and Estella culturally to Christina of the “milk-maiden daughters,” 
so intimately associated with “the foundation on which to build civilization” (187).  28
This patch of land, the protagonists’ temporary bulwark against the decline of western 
civilization, is located “about twelve miles beyond the built-up portions of the suburbs, 
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in a high and airy neighborhood, and contained about ten acres of land” (175). This 
pocket utopia is, in short, a just-so intersection of culturally and genetically inherited 
traits—literalized in the provenance of Estella and Christina’s ancestry—and physical 
separation from the city. 
 The greatest distance represented in the novel is, of course, that between New 
York City and Gabriel’s plantation in the mountains of Uganda. The specificity of 
Uganda and why Donnelly settled on it as Gabriel’s home is a bit puzzling, but there 
are some suggestive threads we might tentatively weave together to understand it.  29
The Uganda of 1889 was beset by factional religious and political conflicts, which 
would eventually prompt the British Empire to consolidate the northern great lakes 
region of East Africa into a colonial protectorate in 1894 in order to fortify its own 
interests in the region.  Nothing in Caesar’s Column refers to the process by which 30
Uganda came to be settled by Swiss shepherds and miners and, apparently, almost 
entirely depopulated of its native kingdoms and their inhabitants, but that 
depopulation might be related to contemporary internecine conflicts. At the time 
Donnelly was writing, Swiss missionaries had established a presence along the 
southeastern coast, and beyond the influence they exerted in places like Mozambique, 
they were often the source of European accounts of the various peoples in these 
regions, which were often amateur ethnographies sketched.   But it is not clear that 31
the Weltstein plantation is run by missionaries at all, and Gabriel’s pieties (following 
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Donnelly’s, I suspect) are decidedly universalist rather than particularly Presbyterian or 
Calvinist. The nineteenth century was the high tide of Western colonialism; not just with 
the European “scramble” for Africa, but also with the United States’ expansion from 
Atlantic to Pacific. Homologies can be made between the depiction of Africa 
throughout the 1800s as a “dark continent,” waiting to be filled with the blessings of 
European civilization, and the myths of the Western frontier of the North American 
interior,  although I scruple to lean heavily on those homologies alone, since they 32
apply broadly to the continent, rather than Uganda in particular. More significantly, 
though, Lake Victoria is the source of the Nile, and Donnelly’s particular interest in 
ancient Egypt in Atlantis lends the river’s own origins in the sub-Saharan continent the 
aura of being civilization’s wellspring, a trope imported into Caesar’s Column.  33
Donnelly’s well-established cosmology, in which evolutionary bottlenecks winnow 
decadent civilizations to their hardiest, most productive, and most intelligent members 
seems most apt to his selection of locale. As the Nile was the source of the ancient 
Egyptian empire’s flowering, so it may serve, for Donnelly, as the source of civilization’s 
redemption. The trope of the dark, uncivilized continent and the city on a hill 
(mountains), coupled with the founding of utopia at the source of one of the world’s 
most storied rivers, all support the jeremiadic purpose of Caesar’s Column: an errand 
into the wilderness to bring the light back to the world. What is more, it is on nearly the 
opposite side of the globe from New York City; not quite the antipodes, but a 
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landlocked garden in a place that, at the time, was considered the social and 
geographical opposite of Western civilization. And only a certain class of people is 
allowed entry. 
 Each of these Edenic evocations is expressed in the pastoral mode, which is 
contrasted sharply with the industrial aesthetic of New York City, the metropole of 
Western civilization and the seat of oligarchic power. The very first scene of the novel—
in which Gabriel lets his mind drift across the Atlantic to the mountains of Uganda—
establishes the need for physical distance. As he pastoral reverie is interrupted, Gabriel 
remarks, “But my dream is gone. The roar of the mighty city rises around me like the 
bellow of many cataracts” (9). It is a moment not unlike the locomotive whistling so 
rudely past Emerson’s copse, as Leo Marx argued in The Machine in the Garden.  The 34
city immediately challenges Gabriel (and his readers) to retain the memory of the 
garden in the belly of the machine. This moment, coming immediately after Donnelly 
establishes the conceit of distance in time in his introduction, establishes the conceit of 
distance in space. Gabriel’s inability to retain the utopian memory of his home 
represents the power of the industrial, oligarchic hegemony. The utopian dream—
which is, in this novel, a reality, albeit one on another continent—and the crushing 
immediacy of the urban machine are two mutually incompatible modes of existence. 
The dream cannot be realized in the West. 
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 This memory, this dream, is conspicuously located in the East, in Uganda, 
whence the Swiss colonist traveled with samples of wool and ore. Thus Gabriel dutifully 
follows, at least at first, the course Berkeley charted for empire in the early eighteenth 
century, and on which Josiah Strong drew for his vision of westward expansion in the 
late nineteenth.   Richard Hofstadter argued in Age of Reform that a great many of the 35
farmers who settled the frontier throughout the age of expansion did so because of the 
land’s value, not because they valued the land (43). This is, in fact, largely the story 
behind Donnelly’s own migration from Philadelphia to Nininger, Minnesota, a city he 
co-founded in 1856 with an eye toward profiting from a rise in land value.  And like 36
many ventures in land speculation, both Donnelly and Nininger foundered upon the 
complex economics of expansion, infrastructure, and boom-and-bust cycles that 
characterized the late nineteenth century. Gabriel’s dream, however, is shattered by 
urban industrialism, not by periodic economic depressions and the exigencies of real 
estate value. But here Donnelly identifies the vagaries of agrarian production with the 
inescapable reach of the oligarchic machine, as did the disenfranchised farmers, 
entrepreneurs, and non-industrial laborers who comprised the Populist revolt. Gabriel 
has gone west, and the West does not even permit him the uninterrupted memory of 
his garden home. Urban alienation thus extends outward from the city, touching even 
the lives of Swiss shepherds in Uganda. At the novel’s outset, nowhere is far enough to 
escape the reach of the oligarchs. 
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 As the narrative progresses, the conflict of pastoral dream and urban nightmare 
develops into a dialogue. Alexander Saxton describes this dialogue as “a kind of binary 
constellation and the power generated was that of a double wish fulfillment through 
justification of the elect and confusion and torture of all enemies” (231). In Donnelly’s 
cosmology, the oligarchic machine’s eradication of pastoral virtues provokes and 
justifies the apocalyptic uprising that ultimately swallows it. Like Jean Pfaelzer, Saxton 
interprets this as Donnelly’s attempt to resolve the problem of transition from anti-
utopia to utopia (230, 233). Indeed, the slippage between the pastoral mode and the 
mode of literary naturalism leads Pfaelzer classifies Caesar’s Column as an “apocalyptic 
utopia,” a kind of nineteenth-century utopia whose key feature was that it “attempted 
to represent historical process” (112).  The shadow of apocalypse hangs over even the 37
double-wedding at the Jansens’ farm. Like Gabriel’s initial dream of his mountain home 
upon his first contact with New York, this pastoral dream also “faded away, and the 
storm came down, at last, heavy and dark and deadly” (188). Once again, we see that 
pastoral utopia and industrial anti-utopia are mutually incompatible. Even the twelve 
miles between city and country is insufficient to reconcile the tension. As we saw 
earlier, the pastoral honeymoon helps Donnelly attempt to weld several types of 
people together into a single class interest. Only once this union of class interests is 
achieved can the deluge break forth and sweep away the oligarchic machine. And it is 
only the apocalyptic uprising, which destroys the western civilization, that ends the 
!53
oligarchic machine’s hegemony around the world. Whereas Gabriel had come to New 
York precisely because Uganda was not far enough away, the impending doom of 
civilization finally makes it just far enough for a better, more just civilization to be born 
anew in those mountains. 
 When Gabriel and his band complete the exodus from New York to the 
mountains of the moon in their airship, the only natives Gabriel identifies are “the 
remnants of that curious white race first described by Stanley”; still, the refugees build 
a “wall so thick and strong that it would be impossible for any force… to batter it 
down” (231). The Uganda of the 1980s is totally estranged from historical 
developments at the time of Donnelly’s writing by its removal into the future and by its 
distance from the United States—a spatiotemporal place where a new republic might 
“reside outside of the historical process” (Axelrad 54).  As a jeremiad, Caesar’s 38
Column’s science-fictionally distances its readers in time, geography, and nationality 
from Donnelly’s present circumstances places it outside the framework of American 
promise, but that very process intensifies the exclusivity of the city on the Ugandan hill. 
Militantly isolationist and rabidly committed to statist intervention on behalf of 
Jeffersonian ideals, Gabriel’s government actively discourages the land speculation at 
the heart of Hofstadter’s analysis of the agrarian myth (237). In this aetas aurea, 
however, remain echoes and reinforcements of other inequalities. The government is 
divided into three classes, of which the “producers,” who are the “workmen in the 
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towns and the farmers and mechanics in the country,” are the largest and most heavily 
represented by the legislature (234).  The other two branches are fundamentally 39
“employers” or those employed in letters and science. The utopia in Caesar’s Column 
is therefore removed by space and time and nationality from the United States (even as 
it does draw on a much more globalized mythology of decline and renewal that 
transcends national discourse), and it instantiates a producerist class at the top of a 
political hierarchy. 
 Each of these moves in Caesar’s Column outlines specific attributes found in the 
class of the Elect, signs for the receivers of Donnelly’s jeremiad to recognize so that 
they may know if belong to that class—and if not, the consequences they will reap if 
they do not swiftly alter their class consciousness. As Lee Schweninger remarks, the 
novel is full of sermonic moments. Didacticism is characteristic of utopian novels in this 
period, but Donnelly repeatedly contrives opportunities for his protagonist to deliver 
sermons—as opposed to being sermonized to by occupants of the utopia he is visiting.   
Like Jeremiah, Gabriel repeatedly “puts himself in physical danger and his enemies 
cast him out” (Schweninger 113).  First, Gabriel blows his covert surveillance of the 40
oligarchs to plead with them not to massacre potential rebels with chemical weapons. 
Full of prophetic pathos, he offers himself on the altar of their mercy, vowing to “wear 
the flesh from off my bones, if I can reconcile the castes of this wretched society, and 
save civilization” (Donnelly 107). It goes as well as one might expect, and after a 
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successful escape, Gabriel accompanies Max to a workingmen’s meeting and then to a 
church service. At the former, Gabriel tries and fails to persuade the workingmen out of 
anarchic revolution; at the latter, he attempts and fails to persuade the congregants 
that their Spencerian, hedonist creed is an abomination. The workingmen—many of 
whom suffer Lamarckian genetic deficiencies due to their mistreatment—refuse to heed 
Gabriel, and the meeting is broken up by the police; the church service ends with 
Gabriel and Max bolting for refuge under a fusillade of the worshippers’ 
accoutrements. These scenes provide occasions for Gabriel to proselytize in vain to 
groups that ultimately fall outside the class he forges with Max, Estella, and Christina 
on the farm twelve miles outside New York. Political salvation is rejected by the 
comfortable upper class, the deformed lower class, and the oligarchs themselves. 
Gabriel repeatedly laments the blindness of those who have refused to listen (137, 
146), as well as the passive role he seems doomed to play. Gabriel laments to Max that 
“we witness the working-out of great causes which we did not create.” In these 
moments, Gabriel becomes the mouthpiece for Donnelly’s overdetermined 
historiography: “When man permits the establishment of self-generating evil he must 
submit to the effect. Our ancestors were blind, indifferent, heartless. We live in the 
culmination of their misdeeds” (135-136). When Gabriel bemoans his inability to reach 
the hearts of his contemporaries, blaming his ancestors, he is, of course, pointing 
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outward toward Donnelly’s contemporary readers—a fact of which many of them were 
keenly aware.  41
 As Alex Beringer argues, Donnelly primes readers to search their own reality for 
auguries of the future he prophesies in Caesar’s Column, but not merely for the sake of 
discovering the possibilities. Instead, Gabriel directly places moral—that is, political—
responsibility squarely on his readers’ shoulders, specifically charging them to avert this 
particular social catastrophe. In the chapter titled “How the World Came to Be 
Ruined,” Max shows Gabriel several journalistic accounts from the late nineteenth 
century,  telling him that “even a hundred years ago the air was full of prophecies” (71). 
According to Beringer, Donnelly’s readers would have been the ones who could, 
following Gabriel’s example, treat “every document in the public sphere [as] an object 
of suspicion and, accordingly, a chance to re-create this invigorating experience of 
sifting and searching for evidence of a sublime underlying system” (53). While he does 
acknowledge the millenarian tropes Donnelly uses (55), the practice of storing up 
records of daily events and sifting through them for providential significance was 
already part and parcel of hermeneutic practices that dated back to the Puritans and 
deeply informed the assumptions governing their jeremiads.  Donnelly explicitly 42
signals that practice at the very start of his novel with his address to the public. So even 
in these moments where Gabriel bears prophetic witness to his contemporaries, 
Donnelly is bearing witness to his. The science-fictional distance in time between 
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present and future once again, as a jeremiad should, turns readers’ attention to the 
apocalyptic stakes in the looming class conflict. 
 The apocalyptic climax ultimately facilitates the revitalization of the civilizing 
errand by stripping it of its American context and replanting it in the mountains of 
Uganda. Caesar’s Column’s contrast of the industrial present against the “bucolic past,” 
as Schweninger puts it,  shores up the claims of a racially homogenous, property-43
owning yeomanry to political power in a world rapidly moving away from a Jeffersonian 
economic model (if it had ever really rested on one in the first place). As Gabriel 
explicitly states, the function of the Ugandan colony’s laws is to “protect ourselves from 
ourselves; for the worst enemies of a people are always found in their own midst” (232, 
emphasis in original). In other words, the system must be made to protect the claims of 
this particular class against the claims of other classes or face catastrophe. We know 
that many Populists did regarded Caesar’s Column as an apt prophecy for their time, 
and even though he distorts some of the features of Populism and the novel itself to fit 
his analysis of agrarian radicalism, Hofstadter correctly identified agrarian mythology as 
ascendant in the Populist movement.  And this novel, more than the politics of the 44
People’s Party itself, demonstrates that the cultural legacy of Populism shares some 
continuity with the evolution of producerism into movement conservatism later in the 
1950s.  45
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 Because Donnelly’s ideology is a petit bourgeois producerism, it cannot help but 
enshrine inequality into law. The providential calamity, which has overdetermined the 
evolutionary bottleneck of civilizational collapse, winnows to their most essential—that 
is, the most rooted in agrarian, Populist values—the political tools to be used in 
progressive social reconstruction. The peculiar, quasi-republican constitution erected by 
the remnant is one of those tools. It breaks society into three classes with competing 
claims, with workingmen garnering the most constitutional power. This political 
hierarchy in the Ugandan garden is Donnelly’s attempt to reckon with the power of 
monopoly capitalism, and Donnelly seems to sense the need to reckon with the 
transition from monopoly capitalism to decentralized Empire.  The fact that his 46
jeremiad terminates in legislating class divisions and aesthetically justifying them by 
appealing to a pastoral aesthetic is troubling. In part, Donnelly simply cannot resist the 
colonization of the future by some form of capitalism, which Fredric Jameson warns 
against.  This particular extrapolation of American populism went a bit further than the 47
People’s Party’s demands, but it was a logical extension of the basic critique of the 
system. The legitimate grievances of an alienated class found a prophetic articulation in 
Caesar’s Column, warning the public of a coming social disaster, thus troubling the 
dominant organizing political unit of Donnelly’s day. But the vast distances in time and 
space which Donnelly introduced to emphasize the apocalyptic stakes and to draw 
necessary boundaries between the class of the plain people and their political 
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opponents also render the United States irrelevant to their class interests. By relocating 
their political imaginary to Uganda in the then-distant future, the Populist class escapes 
America as a vehicle of prophetic fulfillment or containment.   
1908—The Rising Tide and Impending Ebb of American Socialism 
  
 Populism in its agrarian-producerist form was dead by the turn of the century. 
While the Democrats seemed content to keep nominating William Jennings Bryant for 
president, even as the great reformer’s views grew more and more distant from the 
American mainstream, the socialists had gained some momentum in the last prewar 
decades. Though tensions with organized labor would continue to plague the more 
theoretically doctrinaire socialists well into the twentieth century, the workers of the 
United States (if not the world) felt united in common cause against the excesses of 
monopoly capitalism. It was this, after all, that had momentarily appealed to farmers 
and industrial workers alike during the high tide of anti-capitalist revolt. With the 
reformist/Populist constituencies largely domesticated by the Democrat Party, those 
still feeling overwhelmed by sweeping change on a civilizational scale found a refuge 
of sorts in the Socialist Party.   
 Jack London came of age during the 1890s, sailing to Japan, marching toward 
Washington in Kelly’s Industrial Army, whiling away a brief period in the Erie Co. 
hoosegow, and—most famously—spending a year in the Alaskan wilderness looking for 
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gold in all the wrong places but finding a rich vein of literary material to mine. And it 
was in 1896, before lighting out in the gold rush but after returning home from his 
cross-country tramp alongside the dispossessed vagrants comprising Kelly’s and 
Coxey’s Armies, in the year of Bryant’s crucifixion on a cross of free silver, that London
—that American avatar of defiant masculinity—joined the Oakland Socialist Party. By 
the time The Iron Heel was published in 1908, London, already a celebrated author, 
had also established his reputation as a socialist lecturer, delivering the speech later 
published as “Revolution” across the country. Following the events of Bloody Sunday 
in 1905, London encouraged American support for the Russian socialists resisting Tsar 
Nicholas II.  
 There was a substantial feeling among American socialists that Marx’s most 
radical prophecies really might come true “here, now,” as London put it near the end 
of his speech. When the Californian writer issued his challenge to those opposing the 
socialist revolution, “Stop it who can” (156), he expressed an article of faith held by 
most Marxians in the West: capitalism was in its final throes, and with its final 
convulsions would come the socialist future. Strangely enough, the political ascent of 
the Socialist Party since 1900 suggested that a socialist revolution might succeed in the 
United States without armed insurrection. Ignatius Donnelly presented violent 
apocalypse in 1890 as a foregone conclusion, but Upton Sinclair was able to close his 
otherwise ghastly 1906 novel, The  Jungle, with a hopeful prophecy of socialist triumph 
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through the ballot box. In this, the spirit of Edward Bellamy was alive and well. 
American socialists, as represented by the Socialist Party, were cautiously sanguine 
about their prospects in the twentieth century’s first decade.  
 And if they couldn’t win enough hearts and minds to vote them into power, 
examples in Europe and Russia offered the possibility of remaking the world through 
force. Even as London preached the inevitability of socialism from the lectern, The Iron 
Heel shows that he was skeptical as to the timeframe of its success. The novel famously 
opens a gap between the revolutionary activity that could arise from contemporary 
conditions and the final form of a utopian socialism that could scarcely be imagined. 
The novel presents itself as a found manuscript written by Avis Everhard sometime in 
the 1930s. In her manuscript, Avis documents the rise of the proto-fascist oligarchy (the 
titular Iron Heel) and the germination of a mass revolution that, in her lifetime, ends in 
bloody failure. But a future historian named Anthony Meredith, writing from within a 
socialist utopia, alludes in his introduction—which frames the novel—and footnotes to 
the eventual triumph of the socialist cause through long, bloody struggle. Avis is known 
to the Meredith and his contemporaries as the wife of Ernest Everhard, a martyr whose 
exploits as a revolutionary freedom fighter have enshrined him in their history as a 
hero. The climax of the book is an abortive uprising in which the agents of the oligarchs 
crush a revolutionary commune in Chicago, and the novel ends on the eve of another 
abortive revolution in which Ernest will die, a historical turning point that ushers in the 
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age of the titular Iron Heel, which is how dissidents refer to the oligarchs who grind 
egalitarians underfoot for several hundred years.  
 Like Donnelly and most other utopian writers from the 1870s through the 1910s, 
London’s socialism could only be imagined at great temporal distance from his own 
time. But the specter of mass violence loomed over it all even as socialists like Victor 
Berger gained material political power in localities like Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the 
Socialist Party ran up exponentially increasing vote totals in presidential races for the 
charismatic Eugene V. Debs. Why would London write a novel so pessimistic about the 
possibilities of his own historical moment when the time seemed so ripe for revolution
—a nonviolent one at that?  
 As we saw in Caesar’s Column, The Iron Heel relies upon science-fictional 
presentations of temporal and spatial distance to heighten a sense of class division. In 
The Iron Heel, we will see the working class occupy a much more central place in this 
division, as opposed to the producer class of Caesar’s Column. (London’s racism is less 
overt than Donnelly’s; while it recedes into the background, it does not disappear 
completely.) London uses the science-fictional narrative device of depicting the 
(distant) socialist future in the marginal annotations of The Iron Heel, while the primary 
text takes the form of a memoir about an abortive uprising in the early twentieth 
century. London dispenses with the possibility of realizing a distinctly American 
socialism and consolidates the optimism of his jeremiad in a class identity so far 
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removed in space and time that it transcends not only nationalism but internationalism, 
becoming truly global in scope. As he declared of the 1905 Russian revolt, “The 
comradeship of the revolution is alive and warm. It passes over geographical lines, 
transcends race prejudice” (142). Space and time in The Iron Heel signify the degree to 
which London’s jeremiad upholds class over national identity, and thereby enables his 
readers to consider other Americans to be little more than counter-revolutionaries who 
must be consigned to the dustbin of history. 
In but Not of the Nation 
  
 From the vantage point of 1937, Leon Trotsky could plausibly claim the 
“incontestable fact” that The Iron Heel “foresaw and described the fascist regime as 
the inevitable result of the defeat of the proletarian revolution” (138). Such a “fact” was 
indeed plausibly “incontestable,” but “inevitable” is often how we describe historical 
events in a way that is suspiciously consonant with our present desire to have been 
right all along. Trotsky was probably safer in declaring that the novel bore “the 
undoubted imprint of 1905”: “Jack London not only absorbed creatively the impetus 
given by the first Russian revolution but also courageously thought over again in its 
light the fate of capitalist society as a whole” (137). St. Petersburg, however bloody, 
was not the United States, as contemporary reviews reflect. The Overland Monthly 
acknowledged America’s “serious problems,” but asserted, “The end in America is to 
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be reached by a process of peaceful evolution rather than by war” (135). Even socialist 
critic Joseph Wanhope, while recognizing the probable insufficiency of revolution by 
vote, averred that as long as “capitalists will abide by the rules of the game,” socialists 
will remain “consistent in our advocacy of the ballot to achieve Socialism.” He provided 
a key addendum, though: “If the point is ever reached when the ruling class refuse to 
abide by this method, nothing remains for Socialists but armed revolution.” In his view, 
London deserved much credit for “calling attention to these contingencies” (132).  48
What Trotsky saw as inevitability was seen by his American peers as but one possibility, 
albeit a possibility rooted in the brutal experience of many American socialists. 
 Unlike Trotsky, Jack London did not have firsthand knowledge of the 1905 
Revolution, but as his lecture indicated, he was well aware of it. His daughter, Joan, 
bluntly declared that it “was of supreme importance, bringing him to full stature as 
writer and Socialist. Without 1905 The Iron Heel would never have been written” (280). 
She emphasized that while many reform-minded socialists who sought victory through 
the ballot box panned the novel rather badly, the book grew in stature among socialists 
and unionists on the front lines of labor struggle.  The year after the Tsar crushed the 49
revolt in Russia, the IWW ramped up its attempts to organize strikes even as three of 
their leaders were framed for a terrorist assassination of Idaho’s Populist governor. They 
sponsored Maxim Gorky’s stay in the U.S. and proclaimed solidarity with workingmen 
overseas.  London clearly had the long history of anti-capitalist struggle in mind as he 50
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wrote The Iron Heel, given that he has Meredith specifically mention the Haymarket 
affair and the Idaho frame-up (143-44). Such outrages, according to Joan, formed a 
continuum with the 1905 revolt. To her father, peaceful democratic processes were 
clearly insufficient, and the decades since his birth merely proved “his instinctive belief 
in militant, revolutionary action amply justified” (264). While the violent repression at 
home and abroad signaled to London the need for much more direct action than the 
Socialist Party was prepared to perform, his was but one voice, and apparently not the 
most persuasive one at that. At least, not in the form of The Iron Heel. As it turned out, 
the putatively milquetoast Socialist Party was right to fear that overheated revolutionary 
rhetoric would be as apt to drive people away as to draw them in, perhaps especially 
when derived from foreign internecine conflicts like the Russian Revolution. 
 Socialist leaders like Debs, Berger, and Morris Hillquit tended to present their 
revolution to the public in the lexicon of the American republican tradition, 
emphasizing votes and voluntary self-organization.  By way of illustration, Hillquit in his 51
History of Socialism in the United States (1903) observed the “exceptional position” 
held by America “among the nations of the earth” (150). Echoing Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s frontier thesis, Hillquit argued that America’s prosperity was linked to its 
historically unique situation: an abundance of uncultivated land available to a new 
nation delinked from the Old World’s established hierarchies. These very factors were, 
in his view, central to its resistance to socialism, because opportunity and wealth 
!66
tended to disincentivize radicalism. But industrialization and the concentration of 
working people into cities by the end of the nineteenth century had redirected political 
tension from the agricultural frontier to the swelling urban centers: “In short, the United 
States, so recently the ideal republic of equal and independent citizens, became the 
theater of the most embittered class wars and most glaring social contrasts ever 
witnessed in modern times” (152). Another way to put it is that America’s uniquely 
good historical luck also made it uniquely susceptible to socialist intervention in 
Hillquit’s time. His history ends with a survey of the Socialist Party’s gains in elections, 
media, and membership—clearly staking the future of socialism in the United States on 
the nation’s existing democratic processes. 
 Violent uprising seemed a much more viable response to others in socialist 
circles. The railroad strikes of the previous two decades—especially Attorney General 
Richard Olney’s crackdown on ostensible radicals following the 1894 Pullman Strike—
had underlined for reformers and radicals alike the shared interests of the state and 
corporate trusts in using state-sanctioned violence to preserve capital’s dominance over 
workers. But while state violence nudged Eugene Debs toward radical Leftism, Samuel 
Gompers urged trade unionists to withdraw from partisan politics and to focus on issue 
advocacy. The tensions among socialists, unionists, and reformers remained throughout 
the early twentieth century. The 1905 convention of radicals, including Debs, visionary 
organizer and theorist Daniel De Leon, and activist William Haywood, that resulted in 
!67
the Industrial Workers of the World was meant to offer the proletariat an organization 
that functioned as a union and a conduit for radical political action.  The IWW’s 52
founding radicalism was matched by escalating rhetoric. By 1912, IWW leader Bill 
Haywood would declare that “no Socialist can be a law-abiding citizen. When we come 
together… to overthrow the capitalist system, we become conspirators then against 
the United States government” (qtd. in Salvatore 253). The U.S. government 
(somewhat understandably, if not forgivably) reacted strongly to such rhetoric, 
engaging in two decades of repression of the IWW that were often marked by horrific 
bloodshed. It is no wonder that the Wobblies (as IWW members came to be known) 
referred to capitalists and their strikebreaking minions as “the Iron Heel.”  For many 53
Left radicals, the nation-state was simply an enforcer for global capital, making appeals 
to American cultural norms and institutions—such as those practiced by Debs—a form 
of betrayal of the world proletariat. So it was that American socialists were intensely 
divided on how “American” the revolution ought to be and what kinds of civic 
protections and norms should, as a result, be ignored. 
 Reactions to the radicalism of the world proletariat are similar to, but not the 
same as, nativist fears that Marxism was a foreign doctrine smuggled into America by 
immigrants.  The socialism that attracted widespread support for Eugene Debs in the 54
1900 and 1904 elections was built on traditional American notions of individual 
responsibility, citizenship, and republicanism that contrasted sharply with the more 
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theoretically orthodox (read: European) versions of socialism championed by leaders 
like De Leon.  London’s own vision of socialism corresponded with Debs’s homegrown 55
radicalism in many ways, not least of which was a personal trajectory that adapted a 
communitarian individualism brewed in U.S. culture to his revolutionary socialist ideals. 
This home-brewed socialism fermented in traditional American notions of citizenship 
but was not bound to them. As he testified in “How I Became a Socialist” (1903), his 
experience as one of the downtrodden caused his “national patriotism” to leak “out of 
the bottom of his soul somewhere,” though he “finds that he cares more for men and 
women and little children than for imaginary geographical lines” (127). 
 That same phrase, “imaginary geographical lines” was used in his “Revolution” 
speech, making it clear that London’s attachment is to class, not nationality. It is also 
clear, however, that London’s evolution as a socialist hinges on his specifically American 
context. It was in the course of his cross-country march as a tramp-soldier in Kelly’s 
army that he experienced (capitalist) state violence in his brief incarceration, and it was 
through American interlocutors that Marxism rooted itself in his worldview. Bill 
Haywood’s oft-repeated quip comes to mind: “I’ve never read Marx’s Capital, but I 
have the marks of capital all over my body” (qtd. in Cohen 34).  American socialists 56
were not necessarily well-versed in Marx or his European heirs, but the general 
contours of his diagnosis were legible enough to anybody in the United States who 
possessed a passing acquaintance with industrial conditions and corporate 
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malfeasance. But it was the experience of capital in the American context, not the 
Hegelian schema of Marx’s writings, that provided American socialists with their 
primary theoretical basis. Daniel Bell famously charged American Marxists in 1952 with 
being too “in but not of the world”: too little attentive to the peculiarities of the 
American context and too much enthralled with (European) dogmata, which continually 
fractured socialist coalitions with doctrinaire sectarianism.  The problem was that, as 57
Marx and Engels predicted in the Manifesto, workers had to deal with their own ruling 
class first, within their own national contexts, while still maintaining a focus on the 
endgame of a worldwide proletarian revolution. Reconciling supranational class identity 
with the specifically American experience of capitalism was a nearly impossible task. 
American socialists were of the world but in the United States. Imagining citizenship 
beyond “imaginary geographical lines” required science fictional acumen. 
Scry Like an Eagle 
  
 Like Caesar’s Column, The Iron Heel is set in the future; also like Caesar’s 
Column, it makes use of the conceit of found documents. In Donnelly’s case, these take 
the form of letters written by Gabriel to his brother (or, later, simply addressed to future 
generations). London presents The Iron Heel as an annotated manuscript, a memoir 
written in the near future but discovered and historically contextualized several 
hundred years hence.  Donnelly’s seemingly forgets about his epistolary conceit within 58
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a few chapters, whereas London maintains a semblance of verisimilitude with respect to 
his conceit throughout the entire novel. Caesar’s Column evokes the jeremiad in its 
structure, tone, and tropes to the point of being a jeremiad itself. London does not so 
so closely follow the form of the jeremiad, but The Iron Heel is forcefully prophetic and 
it shares the jeremiad’s concern with civilizational crisis and redemption, and his 
commitment to the aesthetic of the found manuscript is crucial to that end. As we have 
seen, the political context of The Iron Heel was somewhat ambivalent, with some 
radicals favoring outright revolution and others favoring something more along the 
lines of incremental reform. All fellow travelers shared a sense that they lived in a 
critical historical juncture, but not all felt the crisis to be so pressing as to necessitate 
mass violence. London therefore drew upon jeremiadic discourse to create and sustain 
a sense of imminent crisis in The Iron Heel, accentuating the gulf between the 
committed revolutionary class and everyone else and prophesying that the future 
would belong to the vanguard which was willing to do everything in its power to 
redeem civilization on behalf of the world proletariat. 
 Though Caesar’s Column and The Iron Heel are occasionally linked—mostly by 
virtue of the similarity of their apocalyptic climaxes —the most subtle discussion of 59
both books together to date can be found in Philip Wegner’s Imaginary Communities 
(2002). He argues that one of utopia’s central functions is materially to imagine 
spatiotemporal ways of social living that make the constant change of modernity 
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meaningful for communities.  Naturally, this is impossible to do without finding 60
meaningful ways to address the evolving forms of global capital. As I mentioned in my 
introduction, science-fictionality is one way to give concrete form—it is a way for the 
human imagination to get a real handle on—materially real objects that are otherwise 
too big or too slippery to grasp. Capital and its relationship to institutional power is 
one of those things. Wegner argues that by identifying monopoly capitalism so closely 
with the oligarchs per se, Donnelly failed to prophesy “the migration of social 
hegemony” from the relatively concrete oligarchy and its institutional infrastructure at 
the end of the Gilded Age to “into some new, as yet untheorized stage (Power)” (123), 
a symptom of Donnelly’s misguided belief that political reform through existing 
institutions was the only way to avoid catastrophe.  In Donnelly’s time, he argues, 61
social critics may have been possible to imagine whom or what the oligarchs or their 
apparatuses were. By the time London wrote The Iron Heel, capitalism had become 
such a flexible, totalizing, and global system that even a class-based response to it 
would have to rethink how such a class would be structured.  
 Wegner contends not that London had wished to “countenance the 
consequences” of revolution, but that “the social totality, its horizons now extending 
far beyond the borders of the individual nation-state, has emerged in an original and… 
cognitively ungraspable new form” (125). The Iron Heel, in other words, was to London 
more than the sum of its parts: the trusts, the state, the vigilante enforcers, etc. The 
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corporation, a legal fiction, had emerged as the dominant class, and networks 
predicated on that legal fiction had established themselves in forms that he dubbed 
the Iron Heel. To battle the Iron Heel required a new kind of class organization, one 
that would transcend class differences—differences embodied, in 1907 America, in 
diverse political organizations like the IWW, the rural reformers, the trade unionists, and 
the various socialist groups (137-138). The Iron Heel is London’s attempt to articulate 
what it might actually feel like for the resistance—the revolutionary vanguard—to 
coalesce into a class. Ultimately, his fictional revolutionaries must mimic the structure of 
the Iron Heel. Just as the agents of the Heel are faceless, potentially everywhere, 
infiltrating any organization (covert or otherwise) that the vanguard manages to get off 
the ground or co-opt into the revolution, so must be the revolutionaries. The fact that 
London leaves it open to the reader how, exactly, the revolution eventually succeeds, is 
part of London’s success in recognizing that the forms of political resistance must 
continually evolve in a dialectic process with the forms of capitalist power.  
 Though Wegner seems to admire London’s ambitious grappling with the 
demands of revolutionary action in this context, he reads the “increasingly receding 
horizon” embodied by the text’s spatiotemporal lacuna—that centuries-long gap 
between the end of Avis’s manuscript and the emendations that Anthony Meredith 
makes on it for the readers of his utopian society—as a political stalemate. The Iron 
Heel maps out its revolutionary program in the manner of a corporate bureaucracy, 
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which erases vital and concrete class demands, in addition to replicating the Heel’s 
nefarious power structure. This is perhaps the most significant point of comparison to 
Caesar’s Column. However flawed Donnelly’s diagnosis of capital’s structure and 
however regressive his conception of class hierarchy may have been, he charted a path 
through the process of revolution to utopia. Extrapolating from Wegner, and echoing 
Arthur C. Clarke, we might say that if Donnelly was wrong, he suffered from a failure of 
imagination; London, if he, too, was wrong, may have suffered from a failure of nerve. 
What is not at issue is whether London invoked a prophetic mode—his muscular prose 
and revolutionary fervor certainly place him firmly in that—but how he proposed to 
arrest civilizational decline. London’s most jeremiadic touch is connecting the seeming 
hopelessness of the present (or near-future) moment with the utopian promise of the 
distant future. The distance in space and time embodied by the dialogue between 
manuscript and annotations once again underlines the unresolvable class tensions of 
London’s moment. To whom is redemption promised? Who builds the city on a hill in 
London’s far-flung future? 
 The problematic dialogue which embodies the jeremiadic tenor of The Iron Heel 
appears in the first pages of the narrative proper. We are introduced to Avis, 
anticipating the Second Revolt, worried that it may be “premature,” as Meredith 
informs us in his note that it indeed was (1). On this eve of destruction, she thinks of 
Ernest, her husband, whom she calls “my Eagle,” “the flaming ideal of human 
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freedom” (1-2). Avis and Meredith have a hermeneutic disagreement as to Ernest’s 
importance to the Second Revolt, but both agree that it is unprecedentedly 
international. “There has been nothing like it in the history of the world,” she writes. 
“The solidarity of labour is assured, and for the first time will there be an international 
revolution wide as the world is wide.” Meredith concurs that it “was truly international. 
It was a colossal plan—too colossal to be wrought by the genius of one man alone,” 
and as united as the workers of the world had been, Meredith notes that also were “the 
united oligarchies of the world” (2). In these details emerge the central tensions that 
sustain the rest of the narrative. 
 If Meredith’s introduction did not signal it clearly enough, his annotations 
throughout consistently indicate that he believes Avis’s historical perspective to be 
constrained by her proximity to events and distorted by her adoration for her martyred 
husband, whereas his perspective is more authoritative, if admittedly sketchier. This 
tension between the historical longview and the present’s fog of war also imparts a 
sense of doom with Avis’s foreboding of the coming revolt—a doom already confirmed 
by Meredith’s introduction, though alleviated in part by the fact of his speaking to us 
from a utopian future. In his analysis of the novel’s dialogical conceptual structure and 
its relation to Marxist aesthetics, Nathaniel Teich praises London’s presentation of the 
novel through both Avis and Meredith a “dual focus” as appropriate to revolutionary 
literature. He argues that London’s technique presents individual perspectives of anti-
!75
capitalist struggle (Avis) and victory over capitalism (Meredith), but transcends the 
individual limitations of each.  A more apt term, one which reflects the focus on these 62
two characters’ perspectives, might be dual focalization. Emphasis on focalization 
reminds us that these are characters with emotional and psychological biases and 
commitments, and I believe that we are better served to think of them as such. But 
Teich is right to consider these characters as cornerstones in a dialectical schema, and I 
tend to agree with him the sense that the tension between these focalized perspectives 
works to create a more coherent overall political aesthetic. By contrast, Alessandro 
Portelli reads the novel’s dialectical structure as addressing a “vacuum” of realistic, 
rational paths forward (181). The Iron Heel is emblematic for Portelli of American 
literature’s general tendency to leave “black holes” in narratives dealing with revolution
—a reticence to “countenance its consequences” (187). Furthermore: “This 
structure”—that is, the 700-year gap between Avis’s and Meredith’s narratives—“tells 
us more about London’s attitude toward revolution than all his explicit political 
statements” (183). In his reading, the gap between Avis and Meredith reveals an 
inability or unwillingness on London’s part to confront the political ramifications of his 
revolutionary stance. These examples are illustrative of how London’s use of dual 
focalization has remained at the forefront of critical discussion of The Iron Heel since 
the advent of Marxian formal analysis in the mid-1970s, and resolving its political 
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implications typically frames the critic’s judgment of the novel’s efficacy as a 
revolutionary novel.   63
 Those ramifications ultimately hinge on how the revolutionary vanguard 
constitutes its class identity, a problem that taps into the problems which has plagued 
class formation across groups with distinct political goals. Building on Trotsky’s 
appreciation of The Iron Heel, Paul Stein observes that its dual focalization emphasizes 
“the transience and relative insignificance of individuality when seen in context of the 
slow but relentless evolution of human society” (90). That is, Avis’s idealization of her 
husband—which tends to affirm his individual importance—is undermined by 
Meredith’s persistent addenda, which always remind his readers of the larger world-
historical forces that eventually brought about the utopian Brotherhood of Man.  Avis 64
and Meredith’s joint authority, by contrast, is always upheld wherever the global 
revolutionary working class is mentioned. Stein interprets the defeat of the novel’s 
middle-class reformers by the ever-adaptable oligarchs as a sign of the need for “a 
socialist party, fortified by invincible theory and comprised of fighting 
revolutionaries” (88). That is, the bourgeoisie must pick sides or get crushed between 
them. He notes the similarity between London’s fictional revolutionary movement and 
V. I. Lenin’s outline for the same in What Is to Be Done? (1902)—an organization that, as 
Wegner has observed, adapts to and adopts the form of the Heel itself.  But in 65
endorsing a socialist organization “fortified by invincible theory and comprised of 
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fighting revolutionaries,” Stein also unwittingly confirms Daniel Bell’s diagnosis of Left 
Marxism in the United States of the time as a loose gathering of socialists whose twin 
overriding commitments to ideological purity and radical action rendered them 
perpetually fragmented and at war with each other. Francis Shor suggests that, though 
the marginal utopia of Meredith’s annotations holds the future open to socialist 
triumph, London presents a basically pessimistic view of internecine radical politics, 
which undermines the text’s utopian optimism.  So despite the international character 66
of the revolutionaries who eventually overthrow the Iron Heel, London’s 
uncompromising concept of class consciousness seems to reproduce the dogmatism 
that has persistently divided would-be revolutionaries throughout the last hundred-plus 
years. 
 Though division across diegetic space and time—represented by the literal 
spatial division between annotations and narrative proper—signifies social chasms that 
London is both unable and unwilling to bridge, I would suggest that this is more 
indicative of optimism than pessimism. The spatial and temporal realization of true 
international solidarity is relegated to the margins (Meredith’s annotations), but its 
seeds are planted in the more conventional, linear testimony by Avis. Avis spends the 
narrative in and about the United States, it is true, removed from London’s time by 
mere decades but occupying the same space—most notably the Sonoma Hills in 
California, London’s own home in his last years and, not-so-coincidentally, the place 
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whence the Everhard manuscript is recovered. She also bears eyewitness to the bloody 
Chicago Commune. Meredith writes his annotations from Ardis, a “wonder-city” whose 
construction is begun in Avis’s lifetime, and whose wondrousness has only been 
increased in the Brotherhood of Man era. The locations of Ardis and Asgard, the other 
wonder-city mentioned by Meredith, are nonspecific—they may be located in 
continental North America, perhaps elsewhere. Even though they provide a concrete 
link between near-future and far-future, they are located nowhere particular. Much like 
the jeremiad itself, which ardently condemns backsliding and predicates a present crisis 
upon the failure to adhere to opprobrious standards, The Iron Heel offers a detailed 
catalogue of moral-political abuses and a civilizational catastrophe that flows from 
them. As Bercovitch argued, though, it also affirms a nigh-inevitable redemption of 
civilization for those who act upon the correct precepts. London renders the gap 
between ideal and reality—which is to say, a reality he characterizes by decline and 
rampant civil corruption—by presenting a gap between legible, concrete places 
(Sonoma, Chicago) and imaginary places (the wonder-cities). This is just another layer 
of dual focalization. Avis is identified with the places closer to home, while Meredith is 
identified with a city on a hill just over the horizon. In jeremiadic fashion, this 
reconciliation between a more immediate Here and a more distant There resolves the 
tension between decline and redemption—but only, again, for the covenanted 
remnant, for a particular class. As conceptually important as the Iron Heel itself is, more 
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important to the narrative’s jeremiadic function is being able to classify the non-Elect as 
counter-revolutionaries.   
 Both Avis and Meredith refer to the “serfs” conscripted by the oligarchs for the 
building of what Meredith identifies as wonder-cities. Avis more colorfully describes 
their “dull bestiality” (168), while Meredith simply provides dry statistics. Avis continues 
to say, “We of the revolution will go on with that great work, but it will not be done by 
the miserable serfs. The walls and towers and shafts of that fair city [Asgard] will arise to 
the sound of singing, and into its beauty will be woven, not sighs and groans, but 
music and laughter” (168-9). This is true in a generational sense, of course, but it also 
signals a clear distance between the revolutionary class and the counter-revolutionary 
laboring classes that have knuckled under to the oligarchs. 
 Earlier in the text, Ernest discourses with co-conspirators on the difficulty faced 
by the proto-revolutionaries in maintaining the general strike as a tactic against the Iron 
Heel. Ernest fails to persuade a Gompers-esque trade unionist to maintain solidarity 
with the socialists, and he prophesies that with skilled labor under its thumb, the 
oligarchs will use their surplus value generated from pitting various working-classes 
against each other to build wonder-cities as decadent monuments to themselves. Both 
Ernest and Meredith cite William J. Ghent’s Our Benevolent Feudalism (1902) as a 
blueprint for the coming dystopia (102). Ghent himself, as Meredith wryly notes, was no 
friend to the capitalists, and his tract is a sardonic extrapolation of current trends that, 
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in retrospect, has aged rather well. Joan London repeatedly affirms it as a key 
inspiration for The Iron Heel,  and its warning is implicit, rather than explicit. Ghent 67
shrewdly argues that corporate capitalists will increasingly present themselves as lords 
to a peonage increasingly beholden via wage-slavery to their masters. While the barons 
will curtail their worst excesses out of self-interest, the majority of workers will remain 
docile out of gratitude to the trickle-down patronage, and if they become restless, their 
exercise of democratic freedoms will signal the shifting contours of the limits by which 
the oligarchs must abide. In this arrangement, the state will increasingly be used to 
suppress militant rebellion (as opposed to vigilante groups or strikebreakers like the 
Pinkertons) in order to maintain the safety and security of satisfied lords and serfs alike. 
In Ghent’s view, the “elastic limit” democracy provides for capitalist exploitation is to 
the overlords’ benefit, because “the mass of mankind are more ready to endure known 
ills than to fly to others that they know not” (182-3). Mediating institutions like skilled 
trade unions, therefore, are primarily tools for oligarchs, not instruments for laborer 
self-protection: slots in a hierarchy. 
 Any person or institution that does not stand with the revolutionaries is, in 
Ernest’s view, counter-revolutionary, because they maintain the Iron Heel’s quasi-feudal 
hierarchy. This was the logic that led to the creation of the IWW and the perpetual 
fragmentation of more radical from more conservative socialist groups. More tellingly, 
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Ernest’s prophecy, set down by Avis, is thrice affirmed by Meredith. “Everhards’ social 
foresight was remarkable”; “We cannot but marvel at Everhard’s foresight”: 
And since that day of prophecy have passed away the three centuries of the Iron 
Heel and the four centuries of the Brotherhood of Man, and today we tread the 
roads and dwell in the cities that the oligarchs built. It is true, we are even now 
building still more wonderful wonder-cities, but the wonder-cities of the 
oligarchs endure, and I write these lines in Ardis, one of the most wonderful of 
them all. (124) 
In these lines, London establishes continuity between Ernest’s revolutionary prophecy 
and Meredith’s historically authoritative retrospection. We should consider what else is 
affirmed, though. The other laboring classes and artists wind up being confirmed as 
collaborators with the Iron Heel. Everhard prophesies that from under them, “who 
knows in what day, the common people will rise up out of the abyss; the labour castes 
and the Oligarchy will crumble away” (125). In this vision, the distance is implicitly 
wideneded between groups such as the Industrial Workers of the World and the 
American Federation of Labor, Gompers’s life’s work. 
 At that point in the narrative, Ernest identifies the common man with what Avis 
and Meredith later call serfs. But the serfs are still not the revolutionary corps. As 
Wegner pointed out, the revolutionaries build an organization that mimics by necessity 
the amorphous adaptability of the Iron Heel. With that comes a willingness to 
!82
dehumanize and utilize those outside the revolution as raw materials. London describes 
the climactic outbreak of the People of the Abyss in the Chicago Commune as 
“misshapen monsters… a raging, screaming, screeching, demoniacal horde” (181). 
Walter Rideout cites this Donnellian scene as evidence that London’s “concern is with 
the struggle, which horrifies and fascinates him, rather than with the achievement” (45). 
Rather than mere avatars of London’s lurid fascination with violence, Geoffrey Harpham 
argues that these monsters “are agents not only of the revolution, but of the wrath of 
God,” yet they “also embody afflictions of degeneration and devitalization” (30). Joan 
London calls the scene a transmutation of his “scorn of the pacifism of the Socialist 
party leaders and disillusionment with his own slogan, ‘The revolution is here, now. 
Stop it who can!’” (249). The result of Jack London’s disdain for anyone not committed 
to direct revolutionary action is to deny them meaningful political agency or count 
them as enemies. 
 The abortive, premature Chicago Commune is “precipitated by the Iron Heel,” 
which primes the serfs to revolt by “a course of outrageous treatment” (172). 
Donnelly’s oligarchs also prime the revolutionary pump, but they do not adequately 
prepare for the far-reaching foresight of the Brotherhood of Destruction. While both 
Donnelly and London depict conspiracies against the capitalist overlords, in Caesar’s 
Column, the degenerate laboring classes are co-conspirators who successfully destroy 
the Oligarchy, even if they are not taken to the Promised Land in the end. London 
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simply weeds them out. Donnelly feared the latent power of the loosed masses; 
London advocated harnessing it for revolutionary ends. “Why, we even depended 
much, in our plan, on the unorganized people of the abyss,” Avis states. “They were to 
be loosed on the palaces and cities of the masters. Never mind the destruction of life 
and property. Let the abysmal brute roar and the police and Mercenaries slay.” In short, 
the plan of the international revolutionary vanguard was to pit counter-revolutionary 
classes against each other as so much cannon fodder. “In the meantime we would be 
doing our own work, largely unhampered, and gaining control of all the machinery of 
society” (171).  
 For London, the common man is a tool of the revolutionary. Meredith remains 
strangely silent throughout most of the novel’s climax, mostly remarking that Chicago 
really was rather bad in the early twentieth century (171) and offering a few 
emendations to Avis’s account of the guerrilla urban warfare (191-2). The serfs are not 
revolutionaries. They, like the skilled trade unionists, are tools of the oligarchy—
responsible for building the wonder-cities, but a class apart from the international 
vanguard, which seeks to appropriate the masters’ tools. Wegner calls this “the double 
negation of the place of the working class” (141), and identifies the mediating socio-
cultural place of the revolutionary vanguard with “the appearance of the transnational 
corporate entity” that birthed the “administrative, informational, and regulative 
bureaucracy” (144). For Wegner, this was a conceptual dead end that London 
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struggled in vain to resolve. In his view, London created the spatiotemporal distance 
between Avis and Meredith in order to preserve “the possibility of the ‘task’ that the 
very logic of his narrative made it impossible for him to represent” (146). Yet the 
revolutionary task remaining open and unrepresented—the black hole noted by Portelli
—is still reified, because London does narrate its origins and conclusion; it is 
represented through his dual focalization. There is no room in his class for the 
oligarchs, the sellouts, or the underclass.  68
 Meredith is evidence of the revolutionary vanguard’s triumph, not the liberation 
of the common man, the serfs. As a jeremiad, The Iron Heel seeks to revitalize the 
errand into the political wilderness for American socialists, grown reformist and 
meliorist. London’s dual focalization science-fictionally denies the shared interests of all 
American socialists, though. He underlines the provincialism and insufficiency of the 
reformists by emphasizing the internationalism of the revolutionary vanguard. Meredith 
is heir to the Everhards; the serfs and the oligarchs may have built the wonder-cities 
together, but these nonspecific locations are finally appropriated by the children of the 
revolutionaries and their children’s children. London prophesies in The Iron Heel that 
the world will belong to, as Stein put it, “a socialist party, fortified by invincible theory 
and comprised of fighting revolutionaries,” not to the trade unionists, the capitalists, or 
even to the drudges, the latter of whom are barely human in the end—reduced by Avis 
to beasts and to abstract numbers by Meredith. 
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Stop It Who Can 
  
 “What he failed mainly to foresee was that the middle class would not only 
survive but actually grow stronger through the capitalistic system,” write Earle Labor 
and Jeanne Campbell Reesman in their gloss of The Iron Heel (66). In actuality, London 
quite aptly prophesied the continued division of the national community into classes 
with mutually exclusive interests. On one level, his novel is a canny extrapolation of the 
trends that would continue to fragment the socialist Left in the United States and 
around the world (though he’d hoped to circumvent that). On another level, London’s 
creative appropriation of Ghent’s modified feudal hierarchy was tonally consonant with 
the co-evolution of globalized capital and urban centers.  More than that, The Iron 69
Heel’s science-fictional use of space and time dispenses with the American nation as 
the vehicle for communal revitalization and redemption. The backsliders in London’s 
novel are reformers and socialists who have allowed themselves to be duped by the 
hollow promise of peaceful revolution. Donnelly prophesied the danger of men like 
London, who would willingly and gladly unleash the multitude upon society in order to 
remake it in their own image, while London prophesied the enervating influence men 
like Donnelly would have upon militant revolution. For both authors, the science-
fictional use of space and time enabled their jeremiads to ignore America altogether as 
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a vehicle for their prophetic critique, moving their readers into identifying much more 
explicitly with particular class loyalties than with national belonging. 
 In that very decades that H. G. Wells traveled to the United States to see for 
himself whether the nation’s collective will boded well for his brand of political 
progress, America’s Jeremiahs were indeed using science-fictional devices of space and 
time to shatter the imagined experience of collective national will and reimagining it 
along class lines. Donnelly and the Populists had struggled to articulate a non-
revolutionary class consciousness for Americans who had fallen through the cracks. 
London, for his part, tried to lead the charge toward socialist uprising. In Caesar’s 
Column, Donnelly prophesied the need for a new class system that accounted for 
differing group interests and talents, though he held out little hope for the underclass 
or middle class to support its ascent; he feared that they would immolate themselves in 
a revolutionary backlash. London explicitly called for such a revolution, but The Iron 
Heel goes further than Caesar’s Column. Unlike the ignorant hordes who sweep 
themselves away along with Western civilization, London’s underclass is deliberately 
fashioned into a weapon to be wielded by the revolutionaries or the oligarchs. Both 
authors work to reify deep and untraversable divides between the multitudes contained 
within America, carving the imagined community of America into classes whose 
competing interests are totally incapable of being tamed—let alone resolved or 
resolved, even rhetorically—within the framework of the nation.  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 Ridge is much more generous in his assessment of Donnelly’s leadership in the Minnesota Farmer’s 1
Alliance (247, 267-72) than Goodwyn (157-9, 259-60).
 For this necessarily truncated overview, I am primarily indebted to Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise, but 2
I also consulted Kazin, chapter 2, McMath, chapters 3 and 5, Hofstadter, chapter 2, and Grattan, chapter 
2.
 See Abrahams 111, Axelrad 49-50, 63, Beringer 37-8, and Ruddick 257n23. For historians of Populism 3
on The Age of Reform, see McMath 12-13 and Grattan 52, 210n5-8.
 Historians have debated the degree of anti-Semitism in the Populist movement for decades. Norman 4
Pollack most vociferously contested Oscar Handlin’s use of Caesar’s Column as the basis for his 
interpretation of Populism’s anti-Semitism in “Handlin on Anti-Semitism,” with further refutations in 
“Hofstadter on Populism” and “The Myth of Populist Anti-Semitism.” Ridge notes that, as in Caesar’s 
Column, Donnelly often attempted in his public rhetoric to blunt charges of anti-Semitism, reserving his 
ire for the rich plutocrats, and not the race as a whole (263-4, 336-7). The novel is, in fact, virulently 
racist, not only in its depiction of Jews, but also in its association of villainy or Spencerian devolution with 
dark skin, as well as in its reference to “vile hordes of Mongolian coolies” (77), which reflected Donnelly’s 
own unambiguously racist views (Ridge 325).
 See Goldman 281-2, Williams and Alexander 8-95
 See, for instance, conservative pundit Jonah Goldberg’s Suicide of the West (2018), ch. 13. Gary 6
Marotta provides a sympathetic contextualization of Hofstadter’s views in “Richard Hofstadter’s Populist 
Problem and his Identity as a Jewish Intellectual,” which appears in Transformations of Populism in 
Europe and the Americas (2016), edited by John Abromeit, Bridget María Chesterton, Gary Marotta, and 
York Norman; see pp. 105-115.
 Norman Pollack, writing in dialogue with Hofstadter, insists that Populism was “a mirror of America, and 7
its criticism, a reflection of social conditions during the 1890’s,” conditions amounting to “the trend 
toward what we today call alienation” (Response 10). Michael Kazin flatly admits in The Populist 
Persuasion (1995), “my own sentiments about the populist persuasion are firmly equivocal” (6). He traces 
the language of Populism from Ignatius Donnelly to Ross Perot (269), but Kazin is not trying sympathize 
with the politics of the Texas millionaire; he simply attempts to demonstrate the rhetorical continuity 
from agrarian revolt to latter-day plutocrat. Populism can draw the energies of “the dispirited, the 
vengeful, and the cynical” from the vortex of “the whirlpool of decline” (283), but, like Grattan, Kazin 
does not think “the harmonious, hopeful, and pragmatic aspects” of it must be sacrificed as well (284). 
Many historians wrestle with reconciling the American right-wing populisms of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries to their progressive nineteenth-century progenitors, sometimes overtly denying any 
necessary connection; see Transformations (2016), esp. Charles Postel, “The American Populist and Anti-
Populist Legacy,” pp. 116-135.  Controversially, Ernesto Laclau contends in On Populist Reason (2005) 
that the motive power of populism is its capacity to knit together diverse coalitions against the evolving 
forms of capital, which he sees as the ever-pressing central issue of politics. Political theorist Jan-Werner 
Müller disagrees, even though he does not think the People’s Party of the nineteenth century fits the 
criteria of populism as such; see What Is Populism? (2016).
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 Ragnarok: The Age of Fire and Gravel (1883) argued that the earth continually undergoes a cycle of 8
obliterations from meteors while The Great Cryptogram: Francis Bacon’s Cipher in Shakespeare’s Plays 
(1888) that Bacon, that clever Renaissance man, had ciphered evidence of his authorship into the printed 
texts attributed to the Bard. As before, few experts in the field (whether English literature or cryptology) 
found Donnelly’s amateur literary sleuthing to be terribly compelling, though the book did earn him 
some notoriety and a trip to England (Ridge 236-41).
 The publisher who wrote this opinion to Donnelly, A. C. McClurg, was speaking quite literally. “‘It is 9
possible […] to make people believe that brutal and frightful remedies must be plotted… I believe the 
effects of this book (because it is so extravagant and so unjust toward the wealthier classes) would have 
effect only upon those who already believe in disturbance and anarchy’” (qtd. Ridge 265). He urged 
“that it be sold for more than one dollar to keep it from falling into the wrong hands” (Ridge 266).
 See Goodwyn 265-6, Hofstadter 66-7, Ridge 295-6, 300, Grattan 55-7, Kazin 28-31, McMath 161-3.10
 See Goodwyn 57, 63, 76-7, 94, 176, 192, 197, 211, 245, 251.11
 Ibid, p. 259.12
 Donnelly: “I believe in Caesar’s Column, and I would avert these results if possible” (Ridge 308).13
 Goodwyn argues that traveling lecturers hired by local alliances were particularly radicalized by what 14
they witnessed firsthand, and that this was key to the more hardline Left commitments of Populists like 
William Lamb, among others, who pushed Farmers Alliances toward partisan politics. See 74-5, 111-13.
 See Hardt and Negri 174-6.15
 Elizabeth Sanders makes this her central claim in Roots of Reform (3-4).16
 Goodwyn contends that monetary reform was at the heart of Populism’s radical potential, and a 17
lynchpin issue not only for the People’s Party, but also for the transition from the nonpartisan cooperative 
association of farmers to an activist third party (149-53, 169, 223-4). Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” 
speech at the Democratic convention in 1896, however, shifted the focus of monetary reform to “free 
silver.” The Populists’ signature issue, the subtreasury, was thus not only abandoned in favor of 
bimetallism as an alternative to the gold standard, but, William Harpine argues, Bryan’s rhetorical use of 
it may have cost him the election. In any event, the most radical policy proposal holding together the 
Populist coalition, once cast aside for the sake of expediency, dissolved the coalition.
 See Goodwyn, chapter 10; Kazin 34-7, 40-2; Grattan 59-60, 77-82.18
 Allan Axelrad (1971) characterizes Donnelly’s “routinzed hyperbole” in Caesar’s Column as redolent of 19
“the abusively damning tone of the Puritan jeremiad” (63).
 See “The Building of the City Beautiful: The Motif of the Jeremiad in Three Utopian Novels” (1985).20
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 “I cannot believe that the maker of the universe with its hundred million visible stars and its thousand 21
millions of invisible suns with a billion planets and satellites, worked for twenty years at the carpenters 
trade in Judea; and permitted a lot of lousy Jews to murder him. The proposition is too incredible to be 
thought of. But this does not say that the spirit & purpose of God may not be behind this 
Christianity” (qtd. in Ridge 266fn9).
 See The Utopian Novel in America, 1886-1896 (1984), ch. 6, esp. pp. 113-114.22
 Specifically, Atlantis and Ragnarok, as discussed above and in endnote 8 for this chapter. Culver 23
suggests that these two books represent a kind of apocalyptic cosmology, and I believe that Caesar’s 
Column fits into it quite nicely.
 See Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (1984), pp. 233-239. In Miller's account, Edwards long 24
wrestled with the intersections of natural science and theology, and Donnelly’s Ragnarok corresponds 
eerily with Edwards’s private meditations on meteorological cataclysm and their religious significance.
 I am particularly indebted to Jean Pfaelzer and Ernest Yanarella for their discussions of the pastoral 25
mode in Caesar’s Column.
 See Pfaelzer’s discussion of the “Elysium” chapter, pp. 123, 131-33.26
 See Culver, pp. 408-9.27
 Like London, Donnelly conceives of class in incredibly racialized terms. Because I discuss race explicitly 28
in chapter 2, I am setting aside for now the racism of Caesar's Column, though I acknowledge it in a few 
endnotes where it is most relevant to this discussion.
 I have not delved into Donnelly's papers, which might hold a more decisive clue as to the question of, 29
“Why Uganda?”
 See Ingham, chapters 1 and 2; Low, chapter 3. 30
 See Patrick Harries, Butterflies and Barbarians: Swiss Missionaries and Systems of Knowledge in South-31
East Africa (2007). The years of the depression in the 1880s saw a great increase in missionary activity, 
which very much tied into Western ideas of civilizing the “dark continent,” though Harries does not deal 
with Uganda at all, and his focus is on the reception of such accounts in Switzerland.
 Hickey and Wylie highlight how Henry M. Stanley’s training as correspondent on the Western plains 32
during the American Indian Wars of the mid-nineteenth century provided the tropes for his famous 
African travelogues. See 7-13, 188-9.
 See Atlantis, ch. 14. See also Ruddick 267, endnote 1.33
 “It is interrogative; it is prophetic: and this Cassandra is believed” (Marx 17).34
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 Berkeley’s “Verses on the Prospect of Planting Art and Learning in America” (1726) prophesy “another 35
golden age,” in the New World, for “Westward the course of empire takes its way.” In Our Country: Its 
Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (1885), Strong writes, “Like the star in the East which guided the 
three kings with their treasures westward until at length it stood still over the cradle of the young Christ, 
so the star of empire, rising in the East, has ever beckoned the wealth and power of the nations 
westward, until to-day it stands still over the cradle of the young empire of the West, to which the 
nations are bringing their offerings.” Echoing Hobbes, he swells to the imperial theme: “The West to-day 
is still an infant, but shall one day be a giant, in each of whose limbs shall unite the strength of many 
nations” (29).
 Despite Donnelly’s best efforts, Nininger never became the jewel of the plains he envisioned, although 36
his popularity in his home county was integral to his admittedly uneven success as a regional politician. 
See Harmon (1936).
 Darsey claims the opposite, that apocalyptic rhetoric places hope for change outside of history 37
(114-19). As I discuss later, Donnelly’s book bears this out in some respects. Ernest Yanarella claims to 
concur with her that the overly literary nature of this depiction of history offers little practical political use 
(203), though the stakes for Pfaelzer are in the possibilities that this particular literary form preserves. As 
she argues, Donnelly consciously draws on the literary modes of naturalism and the pastoral throughout 
his novel, in addition to the chilialistic tropes of decline and fall that precede the establishment of a 
utopian city on a hill. “With the secularization of the apocalyptic telos, utopia resists the fatalism of 
literary naturalism and insists on the possibility of hope” (Pfaelzer 140). Yanarella, however, interprets this 
combination of literary modes as “a formula for political barbarism”: “the pastoral heritage inevitably 
assumes the risk of countenancing either campaigns of cleansing from within or expeditions to new 
virgin lands beyond American borders” (202).
 In Imaginary Communities (2002), Philip Wegner considers the reversal a “transvaluation of the 38
America-Africa polarity” (123).
 This reflects the view Donnelly still retained in 1895 that “one great interest binds together all who 39
labor to produce the real wealth of the world,” but it also reflects the further implication that, in 
conjunction with the farmers, “the vast army of… men who labor in the cities, towns and villages” should 
“regard every man who advises otherwise [against moving into the People’s Party] as the corrupt tool of 
the Plutocracy” (qtd. in Response 67). In other words, both farmers and workingmen, despite being 
lumped together into one class, ought to be ever vigilant against the class traitors in their midst.
 Schweninger contextualizes Caesar’s Column, Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, and William Dean 40
Howells’s A Traveler from Altruria as all participating in jeremiadic discourse concerning the same social 
ills of this period.
 Donnelly’s onetime ally, Everett Fish, in Donnelliana: An Appendix to “Caesar’s Column” (1892), not 41
only frames Caesar’s Column in terms of (what he deemed) indelibly corrupt Minnesota politics, but the 
critical notices he cites invariably situate the novel in contemporary social conditions. See pp. 119-122.
 See Hall (1980) on Puritan personal providentialism. For accounts on historical providentialism in the 42
nineteenth century, especially regarding the Civil War, see Noll, esp. 426-438 (2002), Guyatt, ch. 7-9 
(2007), Murphy, ch. 3 (2009), and Hauerwas (2012).
!91
 Page links the jeremiad to the agrarian tradition in his account of Donnelly’s critique of the city (40-3).43
 In Roots of Reform (1999), Elizabeth Sanders argues that agrarian rhetoric even “generated the bulk of 44
the reform agenda and furnished the foot soldiers that saw reform through the legislature” (4) in the 
Progressive Era.
 Though I focus more on the discrete context of their own historical moments, resonances between 45
Caesar’s Column and Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, which I discuss in chapter 5, are readily apparent.
 See Hardt and Negri 174-6.46
 See Archaeologies of the Future, p. 228.47
 Quotes from Trotsky, Overland Monthly, and Wanhope as well as other contemporary reviews are from 48
chapter 5 of The Critical Response to Jack London (1995), ed. Susan M. Neurnberg.
 An article she sources to the Butte Daily Bulletin in May 1919 reads: “Those who have read Jack 49
London’s The Iron Heel will have no difficulty in recognizing the historical epoch through which we are 
passing. The ruthless suppression of all groups opposed to capitalism is outlined in this work. Many of 
the passages might, without exaggeration, be termed prophetic” (311). Foner notes that The Iron Heel 
was one of the rare fiction books in IWW lending libraries, and “always popular” (151).
 See Foner, ch. 2; also pp. 68-70.50
 I am particularly indebted in my summary comments on the history of American socialism to Daniel 51
Bell’s Marxian Socialism in the United States (1967) and Gary Marks and Seymour Martin Lipset’s It Didn't 
Happen Here (2000).
 See Philip S. Foner’s History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 4 (1965) and Melvyn 52
Dubofsky’s We Shall Be All (1969).
 Michael Cohen documents the terrorism directed against the Wobblies in the period leading up to 53
and especially during World War I; see “‘Ku Klux Government’” (2006), esp. 34, 40.
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 In Marxism and the United States (2013), historian Paul Buhle flatly argues that “Marxism in the United 54
States has been a class manifestation of the National Question,” which has struggled with “complex 
group loyalties and vernaculars” (13). Buhle quite specifically credits the diaspora of the March 
Revolution with importing Marxism to the U.S., along with later Jewish emigrants; see esp. pp. 24-40. 
The fact of German immigrant culture being central to Marxism’s foothold in America shouldn’t be 
conflated wholly with the nativist reaction: vernacular political philosophy is but one of a wondrous 
myriad of things nativists feared from the foreign masses. John Higham defines nativism generally as 
“intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e. ‘un-American’) 
connections” (4), but elaborates that anti-Catholicism and a nascent Anglo-Saxon racialism were as 
important to the American nativism that flowered in the mid-nineteenth century as was the suspicion of 
European political radicalism. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Higham argues, personalities 
as diverse as Edward A. Ross, Jane Addams, William R. Hearst, British writer Israel Zangwill, and the 
heads of the National Association of Manufacturers were motivated by pragmatism, idealism, or profit to 
adopt a cosmopolitan attitude toward immigrants. See chapter 7 of Strangers in the Land (2002). In 
short, it was not an auspicious time in the context of national discourse for critics to conflate socialist 
radicalism with foreignness.
 Nick Salvatore argues that Eugene Debs embodied the way the Socialist Party framed its “prophetic 55
call” to many Americans within the legacy of the American Revolution (229-30).
 Sam Baskett argues that The Iron Heel offers specific evidence not only of plagiarism but his 56
dependence on secondary sources; see “A Source of The Iron Heel” (1955).
 See esp. pp. 5-7 of Marxist Socialism in the United States (1967). Michael Harrington concedes much 57
to Bell, but emphasizes that similar problems occurred to socialist movements the world over, and 
argues that socialists didn’t fail so much as operate too much outside traditional partisan institutions to 
gain mainstream purchase; see Socialism, pp. 252-5. 
 For page numbers, I refer to the Wordsworth American Library edition (1996), but since that edition 58
does include Meredith’s foreword, any references to that are based on the Project Gutenberg edition 
(last updated 2018).
 See Francis Shor, “The Iron Heel’s Marginal(ized) Utopia” (1994); Alexander Saxton, “Caesar’s Column: 59
The Dialogue of Utopia and Catastrophe” (1967); and Allan M. Axelrad, “Ideology and Utopia in the 
Works of Ignatius Donnelly” (1971).
 See chapter 1 of Imaginary Communities (2002). Wegner further contends in Shockwaves of Possibility 60
(2014) that sf originated in the late 19th century in “a moment of proto-modernism” (7), and that amid 
the totalizing effects of the modernisms and modernities emerging with globalization, “A similar 
sensitivity to the emergence of the radically new has been a crucial dimension of the modernist 
technology of science fiction since its inception” (47).
 In contrast with Jack London’s Iron Heel, which more accurately traces the contours of capitalism’s 61
decentralized pervasion of society, even though his insight struggles to offer a workable vision for 
revolution. See chapter 4 of Imaginary Communities and my discussion of Iron Heel later in this chapter.
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 See Teich, “Marxist Dialectics in Content, Form, Point of View: Structures in Jack London’s The Iron 62
Heel” (1976).
 The term “dual focalization” is mine, but articles, other than his own, focusing on what Teich's “dual 63
focus” include: Nadia Khouri, “Utopia and Epic: Ideological Confrontation in Jack London’s The Iron 
Heel” (1976); Alessandro Portelli, “Jack London’s Missing Revolution: Notes on The Iron Heel” (1982); 
Francis Shor, “The Iron Heel’s Marginal(ized) Utopia” (1994); John Whalen-Bridge, “How do Read a 
Revolutionary Novel: The Iron Heel” (1998); Aaron Shaheen, “The Competing Narratives of Modernity in 
Jack London’s The Iron Heel” (2008). Teich, Khouri, and Whalen-Bridge basically affirm the progressive 
potential of the dialectical structure, while Shor and Shaheen interpret it as more regressive.
 Portelli claims that the way London positions Avis as a science-fiction narrator toward the audience 64
“assures not only their survival, but also the continuity of the essential foundations of their culture The 
more the plot concerns itself with historical, political, and otherwise public events, the more it allows us 
to take for granted that things are unchanged in private and daily life” (190). Whalen-Bridge, by contrast, 
argues that Meredith’s authority is not necessarily more certain than than Avis’s, given the gaps in his 
own historical knowledge, and that this double uncertainty opens the text up to speak prophetically to 
the future; see pp. 49-55.
 Lenin: “Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement” (25), but “the Social-65
Democratic movement is in its very essence an international movement. This means, not only that we 
must combat national chauvinism, but that an incipient movement in a young country can be successful 
only if it makes use of the experiences of other countries… At this point we wish to state only that the 
role of a vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced 
theory” (26).
 See Shor, “The Iron Heel’s Marginal(ized) Utopia” (1994)66
 See esp. pp. 249, 255, 303-4. The passage in Ghent of particular relevance to The Iron Heel is on p. 67
191.
 Elements of the way London characterizes the counter-revolutionary class is racialized; as with Caesar’s 68
Column, I will discuss this aspect a little more fully in chapter 2.
 See Abbott, “Suburbia and the Dual City in The Iron Heel” (2011).69
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CHAPTER TWO. Imagining Racial Difference: W. E. B. Du 
Bois’s “The Comet” and George Schuyler’s Black No 
More, 1910-1935 
Harlem’s Jeremiah and Jester 
  
 In the same year that Jack London published The Iron Heel, with Avis’s visceral, 
eyewitness account of the Chicago Commune, a group of progressive activists were 
gathering in response to an act of violence that took place on the streets of another 
Illinois city. The riot began as an attempted lynching, and African-Americans fought 
back, killing five white aggressors in self-defense when the frustrated mob turned its 
attention to the black citizenry. In all, the 1908 race riot in Springfield resulted in the 
deaths of seven people. More than fifty years after the Civil War, black Americans 
remained second-class citizens in many parts of the country—not just in the Jim Crow 
South, but even, as the Springfield riot showed, in the North. Such barbarism taking 
place in the land of Lincoln galvanized the formation of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People in 1909. Founded by a who’s who of progressive 
whites and blacks, the first secretary of the NAACP, William E. Burghardt Du Bois, 
became the editor of the Crisis, its official magazine. Most widely known now for The 
Souls of Black Folk (1903), Du Bois marked his transition from academe to full-time 
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activism with his 1909 biography of John Brown, an apologia for the kind of prophetic 
critique he honed to an art over the next 24 years at the Crisis—two and a half decades 
that started with a liberal dream of integration and ended with an explicit call for black 
nationalist separatism. 
 At the apex of his influence as editor of the Crisis, Du Bois published Darkwater: 
Voices from Within the Veil (1920), a collection of essays, poems, and fables written in 
his prophetic mode and presented in complementary pairs. Though mostly revised 
from pieces published in periodicals throughout the previous decade, Darkwater was 
published the year after the so-called Red Summer of 1919, which saw a number of 
deadly race riots around the country in both major cities and relatively isolated 
hamlets.  Du Bois—a Jeremiah for what his magazine called “the darker races”—had 1
tirelessly chronicled white racist violence in the Crisis throughout the decade, often 
despairing of America’s ability to rise above or progress beyond it, but he fought to 
retain a semblance of hope. From the “Credo” that opens Darkwater to “A Hymn to 
the Peoples,” which closes it, Du Bois struggles  in the book to maintain the tough, 
pragmatic faith in humanity’s capacity to improve its character that marked his earlier 
career.   2
 The book’s penultimate text, paired with the “Hymn,” is a short story in the vein 
of the many parables Du Bois penned in his career as a propagandist. “The Comet” 
imagines New York City after all but one black man and one white woman have been 
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killed. It is a seminal science-fictional articulation of the desire to transcend racial 
division, although, as we shall see, Du Bois trenchantly curtails the utopian potential in 
the story, fulfilling it only in the “Hymn” that ends his book. This prophetic diptych 
draws on the tradition of the African-American jeremiad to critique the failure of 
contemporary society to live up to its founding promise, warning of disaster but 
ultimately holding out hope for the fulfillment of that promise. 
 Du Bois honed his prophetic style throughout the remainder of his career, 
eventually writing Dark Princess (1928) as something of a riposte to the freewheeling 
modernists of the Harlem Renaissance, such as George Schuyler. Rather than record 
heroic examples of pan-African striving, the younger artists’ raw depiction of African-
American life rankled Du Bois’s romantic, New England sensibilities. Perhaps nobody 
exemplified the most irreverent, tricksterish sensibilities of the New Negro than 
Schuyler, whose science-fictional novel Black No More (1931) mercilessly lampoons 
every example of black striving as hustling or hogwash. The novel’s audacious premise 
is that an entrepreneur named Dr. Junius Crookman invents a treatment physically to 
turn people of African extraction into Caucasians: it is literally a whitewashing process. 
A Harlem hustler, first of many to undergo the treatment, decides to head South to 
make good on his newly-acquired white privilege. He hooks up with a white 
supremacist organization and lucratively stokes white anxiety, ultimately masterminding 
his father-in-law’s nearly-successful bid for the White House on the basis of those racial 
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fears. The entire scheme collapses when evidence surfaces that the white supremacists 
share African descent, and the novel ends with the revelation that Crookman’s 
treatment renders its subjects a little too white, sparking a craze for skin-darkening 
treatments. While Du Bois’s jeremiads chided a racist nation for failing to live up to its 
democratic promise, Schuyler mocked African-Americans who fell for the illusion of 
America’s democratic promise in the first place. Black No More certainly criticizes 
America’s obsession with race, but Schuyler’s engagement with the prophetic mode of 
the jeremiad is an ironic contrast to Du Bois’s romantic sincerity. Though both Du Bois 
and Schuyler write with the intent of encouraging a regeneration of American promise, 
Schuyler remains skeptical of prophecy. Black No More works toward a similar goal as 
Darkwater as through a mirror, snarkly. When Schuyler evokes the jeremiad near the 
end of his novel, it is to expose its most facile, horrifying role as a prop for white 
supremacy.  
 In this chapter, I will argue that race in our exempla is a science-fictional way to 
attempt to transcend or subvert America’s white supremacist caste system of the early 
twentieth century. Du Bois and Schuyler were both subtle thinkers who tended to write 
bluntly. Du Bois favored oracular pronouncements and romantic allegories while 
Schuyler favored whatever rhetorical footwork would enable him to leave the biggest 
bruise with his verbal jabs. In focusing on these particular writings, I want to emphasize 
how intensely tactical they were in their engagements with the jeremiad. Neither writer 
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essentialized the “blackness” of the Afrodiaspora. Instead, Du Bois and Schuyler 
treated race science-fictionally, with all the challenges inherent in doing so. The 
science-fictional approach to race we will explore in this chapter—Afrofuturism—
recognizes the problems inherent in retaining race as a conceptual category, even in a 
context where it is absolutely necessary to the project of undermining and subverting 
attempts to use race to reify caste-based systems of power. Du Bois utilizes the 
prophetic mode as a weapon against caste, while Schuyler refuses prophecy as a tool 
most apt to enable racism’s most violent extremes. Even though Schuyler engages with 
the jeremiad only to parody it, he and Du Bois both recognize science-fictional 
prophecy’s tendency to present race as an intractable problem, one which people of all 
nations must face squarely. 
Afro-American Prophecy and Afrofuturism 
  
 The concept of race has been a flexible tool in the hands of those invested in 
shaping and maintaining a social hierarchy that benefits those who already have power. 
Since antiquity, what we call “race” has incorporated notions of culture, geography, 
and biology in a variety of formulae. By the nineteenth century, the scientific positivism 
of the European Enlightenment, combined with Europe’s global investments in 
colonialism and the civilizing mission of Christian churches, produced a variant of race 
theory that emphasized whiteness as an intrinsic measure of excellence and 
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civilizational advancement, while blackness signified subhuman status and civilizational 
backwardness. In the United States especially, the discourse of scientific racism became 
a method of, first, justifying slavery and, after the Civil War, justifying laws and civic 
norms that denied full citizenship and human rights to persons formerly enslaved and 
of African descent. White racism was flexible enough to survive a nearly 180-degree 
shift across the conflagration. For instance, Thomas F. Gossett notes that blacks in the 
antebellum South were widely considered to be affable, helpless children, whereas 
they were spoken of as rapacious beasts after the war.  Either way, they required the 3
strict supervision of enlightened whites, even as the South’s quasi-feudal plantation 
economy gave way to the Northern-inflected industrial capitalism of the so-called New 
South.  What replaced colonial slavery was a multilayered system of Jim Crow laws, 4
capitalist manipulation of racial tensions in the service of controlling organized labor, 
and the persistence of white supremacy, even among those who presented themselves 
as friends to the American Negro. 
 In response to the vagaries of evolving oppression, African-Americans had 
developed their own variant of the jeremiad as a method of holding the racist nation of 
the United States to account and exhorting it to fulfill its redemptive promise. While 
not the only prophetic mode employed to challenge the realities of systemic racism,  5
the jeremiad has been employed by black leaders and thinkers throughout American 
history to address problems facing both the nation and the Afro-Americans who live in 
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it. Frederick Douglass, James Baldwin, Martin Luther King, Jr., Toni Morrison, and 
Barack Obama have all drawn on the jeremiadic tradition in some fashion.  Prior to the 6
Civil War, African-American jeremiads, such as David Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured 
Citizens of the World (1829), focused on slavery and the right to freedom, while during 
and after Reconstruction the focus shifted to the demand for equality and freedom 
from racist persecution. David Howard-Pitney agrees with the scholars of Puritan 
rhetoric that the African-American jeremiad, as a distinct variant of the genre, follows a 
formula that established a covenantal promise, issues a warning against the declension 
that accompanied backsliding, and prophesies eventual fulfillment of that promise. He 
adds, however, that the African-American jeremiad speaks of the relationship between 
“two American chosen peoples—black and white—whose millennial destinies, while 
distinct, are also inextricably entwined” (13). While the Puritan jeremiad evolved over 
the course of two hundred years from primarily religious origins into a political 
rhetorical tool of middle-class republicanism, Willie Harrell, Jr. emphasizes that the 
African-American jeremiad was intrinsically political from the beginning, since the 
cornerstone of its function was to lament the institution of slavery in the United States. 
John Winthrop’s “Modell of Christian Charitie” was delivered from the deck of a ship 
destined for an unknown land to be civilized as a redemptive errand into the 
wilderness.  By contrast, jeremiads by African-Americans such as Walker, Phyllis 
Wheatley, Jupiter Hammon, and Lemuel Haynes developed mainly in the context of 
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the Great Awakenings and the founding documents of the early republic.  They were 7
thoroughly American and thoroughly sociopolitical in nature and intent; African-
American Jeremiahs, Harrell wryly observes, were not venturing into the same spiritual, 
cultural, or geographical wilderness.  African-American jeremiads were not mere 8
narratives of redeeming Christendom from its wickedness. They were that, but they 
were also explicit, straightforward demands for “basic civil liberties for the 
oppressed” (Origins 26). 
 In the classic accounts by Miller and Bercovitch, the Puritan jeremiad predates 
the establishment of the United States proper, but the colonists drew heavily on biblical 
typology to frame themselves in their own narrative as Israel coming to the Promised 
Land. Over time, this rhetorical form evolved into a vehicle for sustaining national 
consensus, especially after the revolution. As Eddie Glaude, Jr. argues, the Puritan 
jeremiad evoked the figure of Israel’s Exodus from Egypt, which helped establish a 
national identity founded on colonial territorial expansion; the black jeremiad evoked 
Israel’s Exodus to solidify a sense of being a distinct people within a nation, and that 
their errand into the wilderness was more ethico-political than territorial—it is exodus 
as liberation.  Glaude disagrees in this respect with Wilson J. Moses, who contends 9
that the black jeremiad—in its antebellum form, at least—was linked more directly to 
the chiliastic role of the United States. The national chauvinism of the Puritan legacy 
tended either to conscript black leaders into the myth of American exceptionalism or 
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inflected black nationalism with its own brand of chauvinism.  According to Glaude, 10
“The black jeremiad as a rhetorical form ought to be understood as a paradigm of the 
structure of ambivalence that constitutes African Americans’ relation to American 
culture” (35).  American culture per se preexists and frames the African-American 11
experience, thus making Afro-American prophecy intrinsically political and intrinsically 
concerned with the position of African-American subjects within a white supremacist 
society. Though some African-American jeremiads prophesied the redemption of 
American promise, others prophesied the redemption of the black people oppressed 
by America. Whatever the form of a particular jeremiad, if it draws on the tradition of 
African-American prophecy, it recognizes that, as Frederick Douglass once put it, “A 
nation within a nation is an anomaly” —an anomaly reified above all by race, not 12
religious or national exceptionalism. It recognizes the anomaly, and it demands justice. 
 Du Bois’s own concept of double-consciousness most famously articulates this 
awareness of race as a distinguishing feature of the nation within a nation. Double-
consciousness is not merely the “sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes 
of others”; it is, as Du Bois put it in The Souls of Black Folk, a striving “to satisfy two 
unreconciled ideals”: “to be both a Negro and an American.” More broadly, it is an 
awareness of the inescapable blackness of oneself in the context of a society that 
defines itself by norms of European (English, Nordic, Aryan) white supremacy. As long 
as the conditions for double-consciousness persist, a black subject can never escape a 
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dual conception of the self: one that must strive for assimilation and one that can never 
be assimilated.  
 While double-consciousness describes the psychology of the divided African-
American self, the Veil was Du Bois’s metaphor for the social conditions that maintain 
that state of irreconcilability. Ever adaptable, the Veil makes the suffering of black 
subjects invisible to dominant whites even as it reinforces the blacks’ lower caste status. 
Both the Veil and double-consciousness are productions and producers of race.  But 13
the Veil did not stop at the borders of the United States. Du Bois himself was a 
founding figure of what came to be known as Pan-Africanism, which extended the 
problem of a nation within a nation beyond national borders and into the realm of 
international colonial politics. The color line, which he declared to be the problem of 
the twentieth century, was not just the American Negro’s problem, but the problem of 
every Afrodiasporic subject affected by European colonialism.  To speak of the 14
Afrodiaspora is per se to speak of nations within nations—a phenomenon that was 
never anomalous, but a standard feature of the colonial world. 
 Afrofuturism is a science-fictional paradigm that grapples explicitly with this 
problem. Though coined by Mark Dery in the mid-1990s as a framing device for 
interviews with African-American writers involved in science fiction, “Afrofuturism” has 
been developed in the last twenty-odd years beyond his initial formulation of an 
“African-American signification that appropriates images of technology and a 
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prosthetically enhanced future” (180). In addition to being produced by Afrodiasporic 
subjects who don’t identify as African-American, Afrofuturist projects include many 
forms of media.  Rather than a particular kind of science-fictional literary mode, 15
Afrofuturism is, as argued by Kodwo Eshun, a way for Afrodiasporic subjects to resist an 
oppressive, white supremacist record of the past, present, and future. With 
globalization motivating the “futures industry” (Eshun’s term for capitalism’s ever-
reaching consolidation of emerging markets) to control and commodify all possible 
versions of the future, he calls on Afrodiasporic subjects to articulate not only double-
consciousness, but triple-consciousness, quadruple-consciousness, and more (298).  
Drawing on the Suvinian critical theory of sf, Eshun declares, “Afrodiasporic subjects 
live the estrangement that science-fiction writers envision” (298). Liza Yaszek concurs, 
arguing that Afrofuturism is a way “to say yes to the possibility of new and better 
futures and thus to take back the global cultural imaginary today” (58-9). It does this 
“by harnessing one of the signature languages of modernity—the language of science 
fiction” (46).  Afrofuturism is not a mere literary mode of generic science fiction; it is a 16
discursive strategy for disclosing and rending the Veil in all its material and imaginary 
forms. 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that the political subjects who saw themselves 
in Donnelly and London’s novels recognized the boundaries of class interests in the way 
the authors science-fictionalized time and space to help them imagine the distance 
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between themselves and their fellow citizens. The political subjects in Afrofuturist 
fiction need only skin color. What Eshun highlights in his assessment of Afrofuturism is 
that science-fictional estrangement is not something Afrodiasporic subjects experience 
only when they read science fiction; it’s part of living in black skin in Western culture. As 
Seo-Young Chu might put it, Afrofuturism helps to science-fictionally imagine a 
conceptual referent. This is not an essentialist or mystical variant of Pan-Africanism. The 
counter-memories and counter-histories being preserved for the future are particular to 
the different contexts of different Afrodiasporic peoples. This is why Eshun calls for 
triple- and quadruple-consciousness: the multiplication of subjectivities predicated on 
complicated historical legacies, not merely on blackness. Because racism in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries has retained its ugly, incoherent conflation of 
culture and genetic ancestry, Afrofuturism acknowledges the visual signifier of dark 
skin, but subverts the historical, cultural, and biological (read: political) essentializing 
imposed upon it by white supremacy. In her critique of Darkwater, Lawrie Balfour 
reminds us of the prominence of optical metaphors in politics, especially with regard to 
race (540-1). White subjects, such as Donnelly and London’s readers, take for granted 
the opportunity to think about which culture they belong to in terms of history (time) or 
geography (space). Black subjects, in a Western context, must begin such reflections 
with their own skin. The Veil, in short, is the site of struggle within a political discourse 
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premised on white supremacy. Skin color is its ultimate boundary and frontier of 
political possibility. 
 Looking back at chapter 1, this adds a layer of complexity to the way Donnelly 
and London constitute class in their novels. In Caesar’s Column and The Iron Heel, class 
is the ultimate boundary and frontier of political possibility. As we saw, Donnelly’s 
protagonists are all constructed as white; darker complexions belong to the nefarious 
Jewish plutocart, Prince Cabano, and Caesar Lomellini, the atavistic brute who 
constructs the titular column as a monument to his bloodletting. Donnelly also codes 
the workingmen as twisted by their depredations into subhuman status. London 
explicitly builds this into his own conception of the underclass. As Geoffrey Harpham 
notes, the bestial, degenerate nature of the serfs could be read as racially inflected: a 
Spencerian influence, as it was for Donnelly. London was unquestionably racist, though 
his racism was somewhat ambivalent toward the long-term supremacy of any race 
extant in his time, and he was already thinking less in nationalistic terms and more in 
continental paradigms. His presentation of the serfs as a demoniacal horde was 
certainly an outgrowth of Spencerian philosophy, a eugenic dehumanization of his 
fellow Americans rooted more in his revolutionary class loyalties than in race.  But for 17
each of these authors, race is an integral component of class identity, and the cleavage 
of race to class results in the erection of a class hierarchy. Donnelly’s eugenicist 
obsession with the provenance of Gabriel and Max’s wives justifies the aristocracy of 
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plain people that wait out the apocalypse in the mountains of Uganda. And it is worth 
bearing in mind that Meredith’s annotations of the recovered Everhard manuscript are 
conspicuously silent on the question of how, exactly, racial strife was settled. Like many 
Marxists, London assumed that racial questions would be resolved as a natural 
outgrowth of settling class questions, and his even if his utopia is not as explicitly white 
as Donnelly’s, his ambivalence toward racial supremacy rests upon racial competition—
a centuries-long culling, science-fictionally presented in his dual focalization. For him, 
the primacy of class revolution does resolve the problem of the world’s color line, but 
only by erasing it through impersonal racial hygiene. 
 Class supremacy in those novels is unfortunately inseparable from the discourse 
of white supremacy, which polices that boundary of the color line as a limit, a 
beachhead for political repression. But skin color is thus also a beachhead for 
Afrodiasporic subjects to push back: to refuse race as the end point for their strivings. 
Because its insistent materiality and its political potential are always held in tension—in 
double-, triple-, quadruple-consciousness—the way race is bound to skin color makes it 
a site of critical estrangement. It is, Afrofuturism posits, inherently science-fictional. 
Both Du Bois and Schuyler respond prophetically and science-fictionally to the problem 
of the color line. But because the color line polices the boundary between white and 
nonwhite peoples, “The Comet” and Black No More do not address solely a black 
audience. Yaszek shrewdly observes that Afrofuturists “create” an audience of “young, 
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white, Western, and middle class men” in addition to their Afrodiasporic audience (46). 
That is, an audience similar to that imagined not just by Donnelly and London, but to 
authors we will meet in later chapters: E. E. Smith, Isaac Asimov, Ayn Rand, and even 
Walter M. Miller, Jr. Looking ahead, I would like to suggest that we remember the 
intersections of class and race and how prophetic Afrofuturism calls forth a rebuke to 
the implied caste dynamics in those narratives.   
 African-American sf writers from the mid-twentieth century onward, such as 
Samuel R. Delany, were keenly aware of and subverted the expectations of their white 
audiences,  but earlier earlier writers in the Afrofuturist tradition were no less aware or 18
subversive. Du Bois edited The Crisis from 1910 to 1934; Schuyler wrote for A. Philip 
Randolph and Chandler Owen’s The Messenger from 1923-24 and Robert L. Vann’s 
Pittsburgh Courier from 1924 through 1964. All of these periodicals were produced 
primarily for African-American audiences, with The Messenger advocating for socialist 
radicals, The Crisis cultivating progressive liberals, and the Courier goosing circulation 
by whatever sensational means were deemed just this side of respectable.  Yet Du 19
Bois and Schuyler were ever keenly aware that their pronouncements were heard and 
even taken seriously beyond the black press. With utmost seriousness, Du Bois 
comported himself in public since his teenage years as a representative of his race, 
while Schuyler gleefully stuck a finger in the eye of race hustlers—white and black—at 
every opportunity. So while these writers spoke for, to, and from within African-America 
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(a cultural location denoted by the color line), they also conjured a white, Western 
audience.  
 The tightrope-walk of the color line forced Du Bois and Schuyler to combat 
white supremacism among white audiences while exhorting black audiences 
simultaneously. Double-consciousness was for Du Bois (and Schuyler, though he may 
have resisted acknowledging it as such) a means to gaining insight into white 
supremacy and resisting it. Writing from that subject position—science-fictionally—was 
a means by which to force white readers to start from the same premises they did. That 
is, white and black audiences alike would have to reflect on their political subjectivity 
with skin color as the starting point. Writing Afrofuturist science fiction is a political act 
of lifting the Veil: a mind-meld that enables readers—of any race—to experience 
double-consciousness. 
 The liberating potential of this form of science-fictional prophecy comes with its 
own drawbacks. Jeremiads often develop science-fictional myths as resources for 
national revitalization. The nations within the nation literally went to war in Caesar’s 
Column and The Iron Heel so that the nations within the nation to whom those texts 
spoke could imagine themselves more clearly as the chosen people. Du Bois and 
Schuyler develop their engagement with the jeremiad in slightly different directions. Du 
Bois, too, is a mythmaker, and his myths are resources for Pan-African revitalization. 
Schuyler attacks myth as a mode of political revitalization, reframing that kind of 
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resource as a poisoned well. But he remains invested in revitalization of a kind, and the 
negative contrast of the jeremiad serves to bolster his science-fictional burlesque of 
race as the primary unit of political organization. Both authors, though, engage the 
jeremiad to make readers more keenly aware of the historical limits they face. Race 
itself reinforces those limits: an unfortunate (and perhaps inevitable, as Schuyler 
indicates) consequence of using race as the tool of liberation. Du Bois and Schuyler at 
least offer their readers the possibility of recognizing the folly of race, even if their 
narratives doubt the likelihood of that outcome. 
A Voice of One Who Cries within the Veil 
  
 The life and work of W. E. B. Du Bois were so widely acknowledged in his 
lifetime that, had he last been witnessed flying into the clouds aboard a flaming chariot 
rather than passing away quietly in his home in Ghana on the eve of Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s famous speech at the March on Washington in August 1963, the story would 
stretch plausibility but perhaps not credulity. None of his biographers or critics refrains 
from referring to him as a poet and prophet as well as a pathbreaking sociologist and 
propagandist.  Edward J. Blum, for example, casts him “in the mold of an Old 20
Testament Isaiah declaring vengeance of God against a sinful, neglectful, hateful 
world” (12). Upon hearing of his death, an old woman attending the march on 
Washington lamented, “It’s like Moses. God had written that he should never enter the 
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promised land” (qtd. in Biography of a Race 3). And, of course, even Du Bois himself 
explicitly acknowledged the prophetic mode of his Crisis editorials: “The jeremiads 
were needed to redeem a people” (qtd. in 478). Even prior to the Crisis, he was 
extraordinarily prolific. From the time he published his Harvard dissertation, The 
Suppression of of the African Slave Trade (submitted 1895, published 1896), Du Bois 
had authored The Philadelphia Negro (1899), The Souls of Black Folk (1902), The 
Negro in the South (1907, with Booker T. Washington), dozens of academic and 
popular articles, and the contents of two largely self-published magazines. All this, in 
addition to organizing and attending a variety of conferences and colloquies with 
intelligentsia—often serving as keynote speaker, too—invested in the fate of the 
colored world.  For all his accomplishments (and there were few people in America 21
whose curricula vitae could compare favorably), Du Bois found himself stymied 
professionally on several fronts, which informed and were informed by his growing 
radicalism. When he published John Brown in 1909, Du Bois signaled a major shift 
toward the prophetic as his primary mode of expression, a shift motivated in large part 
by his experiences over the course of the last decade and a half. His overt embrace of 
the mantle of the prophet (as Arnold Rampersad put it) defined his ex cathedra 
editorials throughout his tenure at The Crisis, and especially in the literary style of 
Darkwater. 
!112
 Du Bois’s decisive shift toward prophecy in 1909 coincides with his 
abandonment of academe for public propagandism. Rampersad calls John Brown “a 
study in the sociology of modern prophecy” (112), emphasizing the influence of 
Hippolyte Taine in Du Bois’s focus on the significance of Brown: his biography is less a 
historical intervention than a historiographical one. Du Bois employs the literary 
devices of naturalism to lend his narrative prophetic heft, though the text retains 
stylistic artifacts of his training under historians like Albert B. Hart and Gustav von 
Schmoller.  Nahum Chandler has more recently analyzed the way in which Du Bois 22
inflects John Brown with double-consciousness, rewriting this white revolutionary as a 
bearer of an essentially black messianic vision.  1909 was, if nothing else, a year that 23
decisively called for what we might identify as an Afrofuturist prophet, and Du Bois was 
primed for the role. 
 The better part of Du Bois’s career up to this point had entailed an attempt, in 
proto-Afrofuturist fashion, to address both white and black audiences prophetically 
from within the Veil. David Levering Lewis describes the infuriating circumscription of 
Du Bois’s work as a sociologist and public intellectual in the early 1900s. Despite the 
success of Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois had endured the denial of an education position 
in the nation’s capitol, thanks largely to Booker T. Washington’s meddling, the scuttling 
of a report on an economically depressed county for the U. S. Department of Labor, 
and the terror of not knowing until after it was over if his family survived the Atlanta riot 
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of 1906.  Additionally, Du Bois could perceive no material decrease in the level of 24
discrimination or violence directed at African-Americans throughout the decade, even 
with his sterling research and polished prose regularly being set before the eyes of the 
white elite. Though lynchings of black Americans had decreased somewhat since the 
spike famously documented by Ida B. Wells-Barnett in the 1890s,  the proportion of 25
anti-black lynchings in the South actually increased in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. More than a decade of good social science and sterling academic erudition 
were not uplifting the millions of African-Americans impoverished by enforced 
inequality or preventing their blood from being spilled by white racist crowds. Du Bois 
would have to expand his audience.  The formation of the NAACP afforded Du Bois 26
the opportunity to address most directly in prophetic mode the problems facing his 
people in the United States. Even within a prophetic register, addressing his audience 
required a tricky triangulation, and the savagery of white supremacist violence proved 
to be a particular challenge when addressing a double- or triple-audience.  
 In August 1908, white mobs rampaged through Springfield, Illinois, shouting, 
“Lincoln freed you, we’ll show you where you belong” (qtd. in Woodward 351). The 
perversity of Southern barbarity being exported to the North was enough to persuade 
white liberals like Oswald Villard, Mary Ovington, and Joel and Arthur Spingarn to 
organize in 1909 a National Negro Committee, which became the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People in 1910. Though militant in its advocacy for 
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integration and denunciation of lynchings in the South, the NAACP had to engage 
three publics: African-Americans, mostly educated, zealous for an aggressive champion 
of their interests; African-American leaders who, like Washington, accommodated white 
supremacy out of a kind of pragmatism; white moderates and liberals who would fund 
legal efforts and political campaigns designed to counter the worst impulses of 
America’s racist population. The result was an organization that was widely seen as 
militant but was nowhere near as radical as leaders like Du Bois wished it to be. In his 
official capacity of director for research, Du Bois was given the reins for the 
organization’s magazine, The Crisis. Du Bois was keenly aware of the interstices he had 
to work with in his audience. Though he wrote primarily for the black bourgeoisie—
moderates and radicals all included—Du Bois did not hesitate to use the aegis of the 
NAACP to engage white audiences in America and beyond. In October 1910, Du Bois 
wrote a scathing reply to a speech given by one of Booker T. Washington’s more 
reliable proxies at the time, published as “Appeal to England and Europe.” Du Bois 
roundly criticized Washington’s practice of overlooking blatant racial violence and 
unconscionable discrimination in favor of preserving a patina of interracial amity. He 
also signed the “Appeal” from “Headquarters, National Negro Committee” and under 
his title, “Secretary, National Afro-American Committee.”  Besides giving the distinct 27
impression that this was not just Du Bois, but the newly-rechristened NAACP throwing 
a glove at Tuskegee’s feet, it engaged—and enraged—white publics. While 
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sympathetic writers endorsed the “Appeal” to varying degrees, one wrote “of 
Professor Du Bois and his friends” thus: “They are educated, cultivated, refined and of 
high character. Their quarrel is that they are not white. It is a tragedy that they are not, 
but it is a great fault with some of them, that they nurse their wrongs too much rather 
than trying, like Dr. Washington, to improve the race in a practical way” (qtd.in Rudwick 
136-7). From the moment Du Bois began his career as a full-time propagandist, he thus 
wrote for “the darker races” of various political temperaments, but his prophetic 
critique also spoke to white audiences. As we see from the above response, white 
supremacists often reframed his critique in terms of his own skin color—they lowered 
the Veil. But the Veil could also be used as a starting point in Du Bois’s outreach to 
black audiences: something to lift, or from behind which to issue his jeremiads, a 
sanctum sanctorum accessible only the Negro clerisy. 
 So the central dilemma for Du Bois as a propagandist was whether to rend the 
Veil or appropriate it. For the publication of Darkwater in 1920, he developed a literary 
style that attempted to do both dialectically. Du Bois structured the book around 
diptychs, often balancing an allegorical fable or poem against an essay of social 
criticism. This technique commonly elicits critical analyses that connect it to modernist 
aesthetics and modernism’s implication in cultural imperialism. To wit, John Carlos 
Rowe finds in Darkwater “a postcolonial socialism built on a spiritual 
democracy” (207).   At stake for Rowe is how the style of works like Darkwater (and 28
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Souls and Black Reconstruction) provide a way to understand and resist capitalist 
neocolonialism by recovering counter-histories and futures. For him, Du Bois’s 
prophetic mode places African America at “the site of this crossing of past, present, 
and future, and thus it holds a privileged position as the origin of resistance to modern 
imperialism” (201). Reiland Rabaka similarly identifies Darkwater as a “critique of 
modernity”—that is, a critique of the idea that “when and where whites broke new 
ground, in whatever technical capacity and whichever area of existence, they did so on 
the graves of people of color” (24). Amy Kaplan, too, argues that the style of Darkwater 
“deploys modernist forms of incongruity, fragmentation, and discontinuity for the 
opposite effect” of European modernism: “to collapse distances and overturn the 
hierarchy between metropolis and hierarchy” (185).  
 A common theme running throughout these commentaries is that the literary 
style of Darkwater puts the Veil to use, even though it retains and depends upon racial 
tropes. Rowe regards Du Bois’s democratic tenor to be generally salutary, though he 
acknowledges the drawbacks of its Enlightenment positivism.  Kaplan trains her 29
attention more on the ambivalence inherent in a style that “charts the way that the 
anarchy of empire dissolves the boundaries between the domestic and foreign,” yet 
“imagines forms of transnational collectivity that go beyond the boundaries of colony 
and empire” (173). Rabaka’s term for it is “guerilla wordfare” (27). He contends that 
Darkwater demonstrates unequivocally that “unless and until the racial rulers relinquish 
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race and rid themselves of racism,” Afrodiasporic subjects must “cautiously employ 
race as a socio-political vehicle to counter racism and create anti-racist theory and 
revolutionary praxis” (40). Race in these readings is not something to get beyond; it is 
the necessary starting point for any productive (let alone revolutionary) political 
discourse. It is furthermore a starting point for unraveling the role race plays in 
maintaining racial hierarchies throughout the capitalist imperium. Unraveling race does 
not mean merely attacking the irrational bases of racism in white supremacist cultures. 
It means imparting, through literary style, the experience of the Veil to audiences both 
black and otherwise. In Afrofuturist terms, it means imparting the experience of more 
than just double-consciousness.  
 But seeing through the Veil—relying on it as a critical apparatus—precludes 
rending it. In his initial book proposal for Darkwater unearthed by Herbert Aptheker, Du 
Bois reasserted the centrality of the color line as the common thread sewing together 
all the social problems of the age. “The nation and the world think of their problems of 
work and wage, domestic service, government, sex, and education, and then envision 
the race problem as apart and beyond these,” whereas, in truth, “the color line shows 
itself, not as a separate problem, but directly as a problem of work, rule, sex, and 
training.” Explaining how the book’s structure addresses this bold agenda, Du Bois 
claims, 
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“In order to carry out this central thesis, the author has sought, first, to make 
clear, objectively, his own childhood, training and outlook upon the world as a 
Negro, so as to start from a definite, human point of view. He has tried, too, to 
indicate, rather than describe, the vast emotional content of this social problem 
by inserting between the arguments bits of poetry and fancy, which interpret the 
bewilderment, the disappointment, the longing, and the faith of millions of men. 
 The book, finally, ends with a brief philosophy of beauty and death, and a 
story and a hymn, looking toward human unity. (qtd. in Aptheker 148) 
The central dilemma Du Bois faced—appropriating the Veil or rending it—remained a 
paradox. The “definite, human point of view” is specifically “Negro.” Both the 
“arguments” and and “bits of poetry and fancy” are rooted in the color line, as they 
must be. For Du Bois, rending the Veil would be tantamount to ignoring the specific 
precarity of African peoples and the structures of ambivalence that characterize their 
experiences of oppression throughout the colonial world. Taken as a whole, Darkwater 
encompasses problems of sex, class, and international conflict. All of these vectors of 
oppression are, however, always already raced. Du Bois demonstrates, for instance, his 
socialist sensibilities in “Of Work and Wealth” and “Of the Ruling of Men,” his feminist 
sensibilities in “The Damnation of Women,” and his cosmopolitan sensibilities in “The 
Souls of White Folk.” But proletarian class consciousness cannot ignore the realities of 
the way capital plays the white working class against its black comrades; women’s 
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suffrage can accomplish nothing without acknowledging black mothers; the roots of 
the European World War were in the colonial scramble for Africa. The final story of 
Darkwater is “The Comet” because it is a story that, like the book, encompasses these 
themes as a whole. But it is science fiction. It underscores the implacability of the color 
line in the face of these other problems—problems that, in the story’s apocalyptic 
imagination, can be got rid of, if only for a time.  But when they return, it is because 30
they are first and foremost premised on the Veil. 
A Vaster, Mightier Thing 
  
 The story begins with a black bank messenger named Jim being sent to an 
underground vault by his white superiors, a job “too dangerous for more valuable 
men” (149). A comet sweeps near the Earth, and everyone in New York City is killed by 
its toxic tail except for Jim, ironically saved by his dangerous task in the vault, and a 
white woman named Julia, who had been developing pictures in her dark room. The 
messenger runs about the lifeless city with no one to whom he can bear witness before 
hearing her voice, “like the voice of God” (152). Though Jim is a “tall, dark 
workingman of the better class” (152-3), she is “rarely beautiful and richly 
gowned” (152), a banker’s daughter. Forced together by circumstance, Julia fears being 
sexually assaulted. When the black man and white woman attempt reaching the rest of 
the world via a dead operator’s switchboard, there is only silence. “It was as if she had 
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heard the last flicker of creation, and the evil was silence.” In the silence, “she was 
alone in the world with a stranger, with something more than a stranger,—with a man 
alien in blood and culture—unknown, perhaps unknowable” (155). Yet when they return 
to their commandeered car, they “move in a world silent and asleep,—not dead,” and 
“quick with the same startling thought,” they see a “vision of a mighty beauty—of vast, 
unspoken things.” 
 In this moment, they find themselves by the ocean—“the dark and restless 
waters”—and Jim asks, “The world lies beneath the waters now—may I go?” She 
replies, “No” (156). After saving Jim from his despair, they travel to the Metropolitan 
Tower, and this onetime stranger is now to her “a man—no more.” From the rooftop, 
they set off a rocket flare, earlier confiscated in a desperate plan to make contact. 
Contemplating their place in the cosmos, Jim and Julia experience a momentary 
transcendence of their race and class prejudices. “She was primal woman; mighty 
mother of all men to come and Bride of Life” (157-8), and as for Jim: “The shackles 
seemed to rattle and fall from his soul. Up from the crass and crushing and cringing of 
his caste leaped the lone majesty of kings long dead” (158). The moment of 
transcendence continues beyond even their sexual roles. “Silently, immovably, they saw 
each other face to face—eye to eye. Their souls lay naked to the night. It was not lust; 
it was not love—it was some vaster, mightier thing that needed neither touch of body 
nor thrill of soul. It was a thought divine, splendid” (158). Finally, “He lifted up his 
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mighty arms, and they cried each to the other, almost with one voice, ‘The world is 
dead.’ ‘Long live the’— (158)” 
 At which point the silence—which once seemed evil to Julia, which once 
signified her alienation from her companion—is broken by the honk of a car horn. The 
car belongs to her father and fiancé. After embracing her with relief, her father and 
betrothed take notice of Jim; they immediately ask Julia if she’d been violated. They 
believe her when she says Jim rescued her, so Julia’s father stuffs some cash in his hand 
by way of thanks and nebulously offers him a job. A forming crowd considers lynching 
Jim for the crime of fraternizing with a white woman, but they manage to restrain 
themselves. He is instead reunited with his wife, “brown, small, and toil-worn,” who 
arrives carrying their dead baby. Du Bois writes, “He whirled and, with a sob of joy, 
caught her in his arms” (160). 
 Rabaka reads this final scene as a rehearsed betrayal of African-Americans’ good 
faith in American society: a defeat at the tyrannical hands of America’s ever-resilient 
white supremacist caste system.  As Du Bois indicated in his proposal for Darkwater, 31
he wished to demonstrate the convergence of social problems on the color line. Even 
as “The Comet” critiques Julia’s racist assumptions, his portrait of her bears a striking 
similarity to, say, Ibsen’s Nora: a privileged white girl in a gilded cage. Despite her 
racism, she merits a chance for liberation. One may get the impression, at the end, that 
Julia’s restoration of white caste privilege is a return to her cage, perhaps with the gold 
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leaf noticeably flaking off. Nor does Du Bois exempt his fellow citizens in the North 
from the same murderous impulse as a Southern lynch mob. The horrible isolation of 
wandering a dead city is broken not by the demos rejoicing that there are two 
survivors, but anger that one of them is black. The cash buyout Julia’s father gives Jim 
is insulting on its face, but what of the job offer? Being a banker by trade, it is likely 
that the work vaguely offered to Jim would be no better than the position he had at 
the story’s outset: a messenger in name who in reality simply does work “too 
dangerous for more valuable”—read: white; read: educated; read: wealthy—“men.” 
Despite the apocalyptic social leveling, the denouement of “The Comet” clearly ties 
together the strands, which Du Bois had woven throughout the book, into a Gordian 
knot. Given the prophetic images in the climax, a vision of some “vaster, mightier 
thing,” that would have transcended body and spirit and which almost unified Jim and 
Julia in one voice, Du Bois unquestionably frames the ending as a betrayal of latent 
progress on all fronts. 
 Backsliding is, of course, a key motif of a jeremiad, and like most African-
American jeremiads, “The Comet” does not rely on a mythologized past as its measure 
of political progress. Instead, Du Bois prophetically evokes the possibility of a true unity 
based on equality. Because he has traced the color line through all of the interactions 
Jim has had with the dead city and Julia, its last living woman, up to this point, it is the 
primary hurdle that must be overcome. This does not happen simply because Jim and 
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Julia think they are the last humans on earth. It happens because they experience a 
prophetic revelation of what it means to be the last humans on earth. The moment of 
their almost-union is the only moment in the story in which the Veil is almost lifted. In 
their awareness of each other’s fullness, Jim and Julia experience—almost—a radically 
different form of double-consciousness, one in which they see each other and 
themselves, but as persons containing multitudes, not as categories of caste. It is this 
moment in which the Veil is almost moved beyond, almost gotten rid of. Du Bois 
cannot take that moment further. He sees through the Veil, darkly. The color line 
science-fictionally affords Du Bois the ability to imagine, concretely, a world without 
race. Unfortunately, it also insists upon the intrusive reality of his world: a world where 
the Veil produces the double-consciousness that enables such bits of fancy and poetry 
to be imagined in the first place. The Veil points the way toward political progress, but 
it ends with backsliding; it prevents political progress from being imagined within the 
American context. 
 Whether Du Bois attempts to imagine a specifically American context for 
liberation has been theorized in different ways. Eric Sundquist calls Darkwater “a kind 
of philosophical scripture, a militant cry from within the veil that fused the forms of the 
jeremiad and visionary lyric” for Pan-African consciousness (610). He locates Darkwater 
within the context of Du Bois’s Pan-Africanism. Du Bois had been active in promoting 
Pan-Africanism since at least 1897, when he presented “The Conservation of Races” to 
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the American Negro Academy; he had participated in the July 1900 Pan-African 
Congress in London as well as helped organize the 1911 Universal Congress of Races, 
and his 1915 volume, The Negro, strenuously boasted the accomplishments of African 
peoples and their civilization.  Pan-Africanism in the broadest sense of the term was, 32
in the early years of the twentieth century, a movement that recognized the 
overlapping political goals between all people of color whose subjugation by people of 
European descent was premised on a white supremacist racial hierarchy. This made the 
movement global in scope and heavily invested in decolonization.  Though Du Bois 33
was highly critical throughout most of his life of back-to-Africa movements such as 
Marcus Garvey’s,  he foregrounded the intersection of European colonialism and the 34
U. S. caste system in essays like “The Color Line Belts the World” in 1905, and 
developed a full-throated critique in “The African Roots of the War” in 1915. The latter 
essay was folded into Darkwater’s “The Souls of White Folk,” which elaborates on the 
role of white supremacy in creating the conditions for Pan-African solidarity. He warns 
in the essay against “great, ugly whirlwinds of hatred and blood and cruelty”—that is, 
the blowback against the colonizers. “I will not believe them inevitable,” he vows (29). 
In such writings, Du Bois prophetically demands equality on behalf of his black readers 
by evoking American promise while warning his white readers of a coming—and 
entirely preventable—social catastrophe. His jeremiad is not restricted to white and 
black Americans, though. Du Bois prophesies to the world. 
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  This somewhat modifies the American jeremiad’s initial formula, which posited 
the New World as a redemptive outpost for the rest of the world (that is, Europe, but 
the scope increased alongside the United States’ imperial ambitions). As we saw earlier, 
Bercovitch holds the jeremiad in deep suspicion because it transmutes dissent from the 
status quo into an affirmation of American exceptionalism. But the language of nation, 
as Glaude argues, was a way for the African-American jeremiad of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries to articulate political critique: to demand that the nation honor its 
founding promise and to exhort the public to positive, material action to fulfill that 
promise. In his own exegesis of the American prophetic literary tradition, George 
Shulman acknowledges the divisive role of the jeremiad, but argues that “we should 
also resist the fantasy of escaping the nation, which still is the organizing center of 
political life,” since American prophets “invoke and trouble national political identity by 
dramatizing what is costly, fantastical, and fateful in it” (25, emphasis in original). Part of 
the price paid by the United States, in Du Bois’s vision, was the human cost of empire: 
a cost dramatized by America’s legacy of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and social apartheid. 
Though often dramatized by images drawn from the national mythos, the America of 
Darkwater is submerged in a prophetic vision that unifies the world’s social problems 
through the color line. Thus the decimated New York City through which Jim and Julia 
peregrinate imagines the world’s problem of the color line—a social problem, one 
requiring metaphors like the Veil to encapsulate its capaciousness—in immutably 
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concrete terms. The city is American; the redemptive promise is racial; the prophecy is 
global. 
 Such ambivalence is troubling, as it should be. Sundquist perceives in Darkwater 
“a black ‘nationalist’ philosophy—rather, a vision with all the messianic overtones 
implicit in a story such as ‘The Comet’—that has both European and African intellectual 
roots and is specifically diasporic in its effects” (546). But Sundquist thinks that the 
ending of “The Comet” forecloses messianic hope, referring to it as an “antiprophetic 
turn” that “brings the hyperactive Pan-African rhetoric, which surges forth in waves 
throughout the volume, to a numbing halt” (618). He refers to William H. Ferris, who 
reviewed Darkwater in 1920. “Du Bois is a Jeremiah who lyrically sings the woes and 
lamentations of his people,” Ferris carps, “but not a prophet who brings a message of 
hope, not a Moses or Joshua who is bent on reaching the Promised Land… Dr. Du Bois 
has no constructive plan and programme” (345).  Apart from the feigned ignorance of 35
the numerous political positions Du Bois had been staking out during the last decade 
as editor of the Crisis, Ferris ascribes no productive function to the jeremiad. Sundquist 
rightly notes that “A Hymn to the Peoples,” which concludes Darkwater directly after 
“The Comet” is restorative and optimistic, but he neglects the contours of his own 
thesis regarding Darkwater’s Pan-African politics. If Darkwater maps out a way for 
peoples of color to imagine themselves united in an antiracist, decolonial struggle, how 
is it fruitless or antiprophetic to dramatize the stakes in a story that ends in backsliding? 
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Kaplan picks up on this element of “The Comet” in her own reading of Darkwater. Her 
interpretation of the “anarchy of empire” encompasses everything touched by 
American imperialism in 1919: 
This apocalyptic violence works as a metaphor that merges the carnage of 
European “civilization,” the “Red Summer” across the United States, the 
militancy of the black soldiers who “return fighting,” and the threat of 
anticolonial revolts at home and abroad. The comet brings the war home into 
the modern metropolis and into the heart of the black and white families. (207) 
Like Sundquist, she reads “Hymn to the Peoples” as a restoration of utopian hope, but 
the political reckoning with all those events signified by “The Comet” is a necessary—
and productive—prerequisite. As evidenced by her invocation of various historical 
phenomena within WWI’s milieu, she emphasizes the “transnational scope of 
Darkwater,” which “explores multiple forms of consciousness, not delineated solely by 
nation and race though informed by both, and routed instead through the dispersed 
locations and dislocations of empire” (184). Rather than Pan-Africanism per se, Kaplan 
sees the generative potential of “The Comet” that Sundquist missed. Yet she identifies 
the ambivalences of Darkwater as united by the “anarchy of empire”—a phrase taken 
from Du Bois’s “Hymn”—not by the color line.  
 Kaplan recovers a prophetic “troubling” from “The Comet” which in her view 
rends the Veil to reveal the face of the imperial metropole. But Du Bois explicitly 
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refuses that move. As a work of Afrofuturism, “The Comet” does explore multiple 
consciousness; it is informed by both nation and race; it does weave together the 
dispersed locations and dislocations of empire. Sundquist is right about its diasporic 
effect, even as Kaplan is correct to see it as generative. It is ultimately a specifically 
Afro-American prophetic critique, one that negates what is and transforms prevailing 
realities against the backdrop of the present historical limits.  Though unified science-36
fictionally by race, the prophetic critique of “The Comet” is not any less about empire 
or the Afrodiaspora, but it is also not primarily about them, nor is it irreducibly about 
how empire and the Afrodiaspora intertwine. And just because “A Hymn to the 
Peoples” is more explicitly utopian does not mean that “The Comet” does not contain 
the seeds of hope. In this jeremiad, Du Bois upholds his own earlier prophecy that the 
problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line. But he also 
demonstrates that it is a problem that the problem of the twentieth century is the 
problem of the color line. In Darkwater as a whole, but in “The Comet” in particular, Du 
Bois prioritizes the problem of the color line, but the seed of hope lies in the 
recognition of formulating the problem that way. He troubles it with science-fictional 
ambivalence. 
!129
George Schuyler, the Anti-Jeremiah 
  
 This particular brand of prophetic troubling was not sufficient for George Samuel 
Schuyler. A generation younger than Du Bois and much more the iconoclast, Schuyler 
had served time for going AWOL from the U. S. Army, rubbed shoulders with the 
tramps of Harlem who attended lectures like Marcus Garvey’s in libraries and on street 
corners, and cut his teeth as a columnist at A. Philip Randolph and Owen Chandler’s 
avowedly socialist The Messenger.  Du Bois had already endured Schuyler’s “Shafts 37
and Darts”—the name of the young turk’s column in The Messenger between 1923 and 
1925, aided and abetted by Theophilus Lewis from April 1924—for his Pan-African 
Congresses, his stentorian style, and lukewarm socialism.  Though Schuyler traveled in 38
socialist circles throughout the 1920s and wrote almost exclusively about race issues, 
he adopted the stance of what Jeffrey Ferguson calls a modernist trickster—someone 
who places his faith in the “skeptical intellectual orientation of modern life” (39). A 
particular target of Schuyler’s skeptical mockery was anything resembling the positivist 
racial chauvinism that undergirded white supremacist tracts like Madison Grant’s The 
Passing of the Great Race (1916) and Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color 
(1920), but also the romanticized Ethiopianism that had always haunted Du Bois’s work
—increasingly so after he finally set foot on Liberian soil in 1923.  Schuyler certainly 39
invoked what can be called race pride when it suited his rhetorical purposes,  but in 40
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general, he ardently opposed any attempt to describe or prescribe racial characteristics 
deterministically, whether or not the attempt was made by a person of color. While 
debate continues over the degree to which Du Bois fell into racial determinism,  41
Schuyler thought the Veil to be very flimsy indeed: as a metaphor and as a discursive 
social practice. The very romanticism that gave Du Bois’s prophetic critique such force 
was, in Schuyler’s view, detrimental to the fight for equality. As long as race set the 
terms of how to measure a people’s right to democratic participation, racial supremacy 
would always be at stake: combating a myth of Nordic supremacy with a counter-myth 
of African supremacy was a political dead end. The risk inherent in retaining the use of 
the Veil for the purposes of social critique, for Schuyler, was that it would always give 
white supremacism a framework, even if it rendered the scaffolding somewhat 
unstable. 
 The most infamous example of this, outside Schuyler’s novels, is the essay he 
wrote for the Nation in 1926, “The Negro-Art Hokum.” While often cited in connection 
with the Harlem Renaissance and “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain,” the 
essay solicited by the Nation’s editors from Langston Hughes as a sort of companion 
piece to Schuyler’s,  “Negro-Art Hokum” is less a broadside against the great Harlem 42
artists of that period than it is a clear warning against racial exceptionalism, however 
inadvertent. Justly notorious for his calculatedly outrageous claim that “the 
Aframerican is merely a lampblacked Anglo-Saxon” (14), Schuyler’s broader point is 
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that white and black Americans share the United States across a plurality of 
geographical and cultural vectors. Staking out a separate-but-equal sphere of cultural 
accomplishment would not bridge the divide between castes; racists would only co-opt 
the idea of “peculiar” Negro art to buttress their own claims of unbridgeable 
differences between whites and blacks (16). “Aside from his color,” Schuyler argues, 
“which ranges from dark brown to pink, your American Negro is just plain 
American” (14). Color was—or ought to be—beside the point, because when an 
African-American “responds to the same political, social, moral, and economic stimuli 
in precisely the same manner as his white neighbor, it is sheer nonsense to talk about 
‘racial differences’” (15). Schuyler was not blind to the realities of the racial caste 
system in 1920s America, and he routinely lamented the evils of white supremacy in his 
newspaper columns throughout his career. Even after his hard turn to the political right, 
which began in earnest in the 1930s with a virulent anti-communist streak and which 
led him to deride the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, Schuyler fatalistically 
acknowledged the endurance of white racism in the U. S.  Not that Schuyler did not 43
find value in hierarchy; he simply put more stock in effort and cunning than in patently 
absurd theories of racial supremacy. He knew that black Americans in the 1920s did not 
respond the same way to the same circumstances as white Americans, because he 
recognized the same pervasive, racist social dynamics as Du Bois. What he rejected 
was the possibility of transcendence hinted at in “The Comet,” in large part because 
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his view of human nature was more jaundiced. His fear that proclaiming the peculiarity 
of Negro art was “flattering to the white mob” makes sense when one considers the 
popularity of Carl van Vechten’s sensationalistic Nigger Heaven (1926) among both 
white readers and African-American literati like Charles Johnson, Walter White, and 
Hughes.  Not only was such flattery a capitulation to the first principle of racist theory44
—that races are fundamentally, irreconcilably different—but a capitulation to the lowest 
common denominator.  
 If the premise that Negro art was special flattered the white mob’s ideas of 
essential racial difference, Schuyler believed, it also flattered the black mob’s idea of 
exceptionalism. “While such reasoning may seem conclusive to the majority of 
Americans, it must be rejected with a loud guffaw by intelligent people,” Schuyler 
concludes (16). Schuyler makes a key distinction in his final claim. Earlier in the essay, 
Schuyler insisted that “your American Negro is just plain American.” Color is no marker 
of superiority or inferiority. Intelligence is. The average American of any color had 
already achieved the equality of being just as dumb as anybody else, whereas 
exceptional individuals of any color could only credit themselves for rising above the 
masses. In Schuyler’s opinion, the romanticized Afro-chauvinism of Du Bois erased that 
distinction with its insistence on the unique contributions of the Negro to world 
civilization—contributions only visible through the Veil. Du Bois’s Afro-American 
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prophetic critique was anti-intellectual and unrealistic. Schuyler therefore set himself 
the task of rending the Veil by lampooning the conventions of the Harlem Renaissance. 
As a City on a Happy Hill 
  
 Published in 1931, Black No More arrived at the high tide of the Renaissance, 
ironically  one of the movement’s more canonical texts while also being a document 
that excoriates its assumptions. David Levering Lewis uses it to frame the beginning of 
the end of the Renaissance, along with Wallace Thurman’s bitter, ambivalent 
valediction, Infants of the Spring (1932).  Schuyler knew or had passing acquaintance 45
with most of the folks involved in New York City’s black leadership, either as 
acquaintances or sparring partners, and finds places for most of them in his novel.  
 The novel’s protagonist, Max Disher, is a Harlem hustler who undergoes the 
titular procedure, “Black-No-More,” which gives him Caucasian features and color, 
motivated in large part because he was rejected by a white girl at a club. Freshly 
whitened, he goes South to take advantage of caste privilege and winds up becoming 
the brains (under the alias Matthew Fisher) behind the Knights of Nordica, a white 
supremacist organization revived by the Reverend Henry Givens, whose daughter, 
Helen, is the very same one who refused him at the novel’s outset. As Max gets rich 
stoking white racial anxiety over the Black-No-More treatment, the Harlem personalities 
make their entrance in caricatured forms as they scramble to adapt their own hustle to 
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the rapidly changing social landscape of whitened America. Most personalities are 
given the drive-by treatment in a summit convened by Dr. Shakespeare Agamemnon 
Beard, the novel’s primary Du Bois surrogate. Beard’s National Social Equality League 
rapidly disintegrates as more and more African-Americans, like Max, get the treatment 
and, now passing for white, require no race leaders to lead their race. 
 Over the course of the narrative, Max leverages Givens’s populist appeal into a 
viable presidential campaign as a Democrat candidate. He calls in Arthur Snobbcraft 
and Samuel Buggerie, a pair of pseudo-scientists on the order of Stoddard and Grant, 
to research the family tree of his father-in-law to burnish his racial bona fides. 
Unfortunately, they discover that virtually everyone who claims Anglo-Saxon or Nordic 
superiority actually has some trace of African blood in their lineage. As it happens, 
Beard—having lost his position as a race leader—has gotten the Black-No-More 
treatment, changed his name, and has been working for Snobbcraft and Buggerie on 
this very project. On the eve of the election, Republicans burglarize the genealogy 
results and release them to the public. The presidential campaign collapses, and 
Snobbcraft and Buggerie flee from racist Georgia mobs who are outraged that these 
white men were black all along; they disguise themselves in blackface to avoid 
detection; they arrive in a town—Happy Hill, Mississippi—whose citizens are itching to 
lynch a black man and they immediately seize the two “black” men; the quacks reveal 
that they actually have white skin and are spared; the mob then learns of their true 
!135
identities and lynches them anyway. Max and his family evacuate the country, and in 
the novel’s epilogue, he reads with amusement that Dr. Junius Crookman, inventor of 
the Black-No-More process, has published his discovery that recipients of the treatment 
are actually a bit whiter than white, jump-starting a craze for blackening treatments. 
 Appropriately for a no-holds-barred satire, Schuyler’s ending leaves no hope for 
ending the problem of race. Critics interpret the political regression at the end of the 
novel in different ways. Jane Kuenz sees Schuyler assessing the power dynamics 
inherent in whiteness being used as a litmus test for democratic participation, which is 
the only thing that grants a measure of popular control over a capitalist society. Even 
without black skin, “in the world of Black No More, ‘blackness’ can always reemerge 
within class in the form of a threat of alienated labor or as the comforts unavailable in 
this alienated world” (188). What Kuenz means is an alienated white world, where to 
desire to be in a higher color caste is itself “a really white thing to do” (176). Sonny 
Retman’s reading takes this insight even further, arguing that Schuyler discerned in the 
Harlem Renaissance a commodification of blackness. Just as capitalism had already 
found ways to exploit reproductive processes among white women and children on a 
biopolitical level, and just as slavery had attempted to reduce Africans to pure 
property, Black-No-More represents the possibility of treating blackness as a renewable 
resource—one whose market potential rivals even whiteness. “In other words,” Retman 
argues, “if new technologies enable new forms of black agency on the market, they are 
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inexorably tied to processes of commodification and hegemony” (1461). Retman is 
thinking primarily of the feedback loop of racial anxiety fostered by Max and 
Crookman. Max and his fellow whitened Negroes—not to mention Crookman—are 
able to profit from their whiteness only to the extent that blackness is something it is 
desirable to escape from. Max is able to go South to pursue his opportunities, and 
Crookman takes his business empire global. The more black folks escape across the 
color line, the more versatile blackness becomes as an exploitable resource.  
 This represents a perversion of Alain Locke’s New Negro, extending democratic 
participation within the U. S. and the cultural reach of the American metropole 
throughout the world—but always in connection with an emerging market opportunity 
for erasing blackness, rather than celebrating its potential for revitalization.  Locke 46
presented the New Negro as a vanguard of an emerging race-consciousness that 
would galvanize political revolution at home and abroad; Schuyler science-fictionally 
recasts the New Negro, via Black-No-More, as a sort of technology that would 
galvanize reaction. At the very least, one might escape one’s blackness, but one will 
never escape race and the varieties of racial experience. And as long as there are 
varieties of racial experience, there will be a market for cognitive fictions that exploit 
them. 
 Dana Carluccio uses the term “cognitive fiction” to refer to “an inevitable 
cognitive propensity to act as if such traits existed”—that is, racial traits (513). She 
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interprets both Du Bois and Schuyler as giving voice to a sort of nascent evolutionary 
psychological perspective on race and behavior. She contends that “evolution may 
have invented an inclination toward organizing the world as if race existed, rather than 
having invented a stable set of racialized traits” (518). This cognitive fiction, however, is 
no less real for being a fiction. The Happy Hill incident is a prime example. Snobbcraft 
and Buggerie exhibit no particular set of racialized traits other than skin color; the 
entire episode is a series of rapid turns of fortune’s wheel. The only thing that remains 
stable throughout the series of revelations about their identities is the way race is 
constructed and acted upon by the barbarous citizens of the town. In this scene, 
Retman claims, “we confront the horror of whiteness and the rituals and technologies 
of violence out of which it is constructed” (1458). Which is to say: the racial exploitation 
of capitalism is taken to its most logical extreme. After all, these peddlers of junk 
science had bought part and parcel into Max’s schemes, which traded on the 
intersection of white supremacy and technologies of the self. They brought this on 
themselves, but the cognitive fiction of race preceded their efforts. Carluccio argues 
that, rather than being manipulated by the exploitative logic of the market, Schuyler 
“stresses the social deception as an outlet for, or exploitation of, built-in 
compulsions” (532). It is almost as though nobody in this scene could help but follow 
through on the ritual. 
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 Each of these readings takes race for granted as a fiction. Schuyler clearly thinks 
it is, and Retman, Kuenz, and Carluccio agree. But Retman and Kuenz use the lynching 
scene to highlight the limits of the market as an arena for agency, and they seek to 
recover in Schuyler some ambiguity in the way he handles agency in a racist and 
capitalist society as well as critique his own propensity to celebrate the amoral agency 
of a character like Max. Carluccio, I think, hits closer to the narrative’s effect by 
theorizing a way that Schuyler illustrates a certain “stuck-ness” of this particular 
cognitive fiction: race. Max is able to escape the color caste. He “seems immune to the 
cognitive fictions of race,” Carluccio observes, “and his entrepreneurial acumen is the 
mark of it” (536). But does not Schuyler present Max’s skin the actual mark of his 
acumen? In the novel, he is the very first African-American to undergo the Black-No-
More process. We might say that he is an early adopter; that he got in at the ground 
floor. By virtue of his willingness to alter his physical being, he was able to get in with 
the Knights of Nordica, marry the woman who spurned him, almost win a presidential 
election for his racist father-in-law, and then escape with his riches and his family from 
the United States. The cognitive fiction of race is literally and metaphorically Max’s skin: 
it changes and adapts to circumstance. Race in Black No More, being at once a social 
construct and a technology of the self, is therefore science-fictional. 
 Schuyler’s science-fictional approach to race is ultimately a way for him to resist 
and critique the prophetic mode. Afrofuturism embraces race as a signifier, but one 
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that must be troubled and woven with the threads of double-, triple-, and quadruple-
consciousness. Not only is race a fulcrum of power, but Schuyler recognizes it as one 
that can be moved, almost as if in a shell game. He does not flinch from recognizing 
the evils of racism, but he sees power in being able to adjust one’s relationship to a 
caste system premised on racial hierarchy. It is Crookman and Max’s ability to see race 
science-fictionally—to get a handle on a materially real yet elusive object—that lets 
them profit from and manipulate it so effectively to their own benefit. Though the 
framework of the caste system remains firmly in place—Max and the white 
supremacists see to that—the African-American “race” evaporates, leaving a gap in 
America’s racial hierarchy. Given the chance, Schuyler argues, the average African-
American would prefer to escape his caste than fight to end racial discrimination. Race 
is a cognitive fiction so big and elusive that getting a handle on its varieties of 
institutional embodiments is an impossible task. Society, as such, will never end white 
supremacy, Schuyler argues. But by turning race into something that any individual can 
adjust and manipulate to his own benefit—that is a science-fictional way of really 
making it pliable. Taking a social construct and literally transmuting it into a technology 
of the self is a way for Schuyler to concretize it in a single fictional conceit—the better 
to handle as a fulcrum of power, and the better to penetrate with multiple vectors of 
consciousness. Even if escape from the caste system is ephemeral—which Schuyler 
believes it is—the latent potential for adaptation remains. 
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 By contrast,  Black No More depicts prophetic black leaders trying to keep 
African-Americans in their place within that system so that they can fulfill their 
redemptive mission. Their mission is to eradicate the system—in practice, though, that 
only grants the premise that the caste system, so long as it exists, is inescapable. The 
key illustration of this is, of course, the scene at the N. S. E. L. office, from which Dr. 
Shakespeare Agamemnon Beard publishes The Dilemma and “comely yellow 
stenographers with weak resistance” apparently comprise most of the staff (90), Beard 
appeals to the assembled Talented Tenth and solemnly introduces his first speaker, 
concluding with this passage: 
Before I gratefully yield the floor to Dr. Jackson, however, I want to tell you that 
our destiny lies in the stars. Ethiopia’s fate is in the balance. The Goddess of the 
Nile weeps bitter tears at the feet of the Great Sphinx. The lowering clouds 
gather over the Congo and the lightning flashes o’er Togoland. To your tents, O 
Israel! The hour is at hand. (92) 
Besides its lethal burlesque of Du Boisian prose and tropes, the passage stands out as 
a prophetic call to arms that ultimately, as we have seen, comes to nothing. Beard’s 
messianic grandstanding is the apotheosis of black America’s race leaders leading the 
race into a political cul-de-sac. “To your tents, O Israel!” clearly evokes the language 
described by Glaude, Harrell, and other theorists of the African-American jeremiad. But 
Schuyler has Beard reject this prophetic mode of discourse and go back to his scientific 
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training, which ultimately is much more helpful in defeating the white supremacists. By 
channeling Du Bois at his most jeremiadic and skewering his pretentions toward world-
historical redemption, Schuyler sets up Black No More as an anti-jeremiad. 
 His anti-jeremiadic purpose is most explicitly laid bare in the macabre face at 
Happy Hill. The backwater town has been perversely revitalized by the presence of Rev. 
Alex McPhule, who declaims how “other churches had grown soft and were flirting with 
atheism and Modernism which, according to Rev. McPhule, were the same thing” (205). 
The highly unorthodox McPhule has orgies and preys upon the fears of his flock in 
various ways, but ultimately decides that to cement his new church’s dominance, he 
must provide a providential sign, which must be “a nigger for his congregation to 
lynch” (208). He entreats his congregants by telling them of an angelic vision and 
“shaking his head and rolling his eyes” like “one of the Prophets of old.” Schuyler is 
not subtle: “The man was a natural actor and his voice had that sepulchral tone 
universally associated with Men of God, court criers and Independence Day 
orators” (210). There is no mistaking McPhule’s prophetic mode as anything other than 
jeremiadic. After the victims are castrated, gunned down, and set ablaze, even the ex-
Negroes who had undergone the Black-No-More treatment “began to yell and prod 
the burning bodies with sticks and cast stones at them. This exhibition restored them to 
favor and banished any suspicion that they might not be one-hundred-per-cent 
Americans” (218; emphasis added). Throughout this section, Schuyler rehearses with 
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liturgical precision the formula of the jeremiad. On its face, Schuyler’s anticlericalism 
and contempt for prophetic critique seems unmistakable. 
 But this violent scene is essentially the climax of the novel, and the centrality of 
jeremiadic discourse to Black No More’s critique suggests a dialectic that is borne out 
in one other key respect. Though Schuyler seems to hold no truck with Beard’s Du 
Boisian palaver, Beard himself is a vital minor player, and he serves as a kind of foil to 
Crookman. While Crookman rakes in the dough and eventually becomes Surgeon 
General, Beard takes Crookman’s treatment and puts his sociological training to work 
for the white supremacists who wind up lynched at the end of the novel. When asked 
by a former comrade what he’s been up to, he explains, “Now we’re trying to get the 
material in shape for easy digestion” (171). At the end of the novel, it is Beard’s 
digestible summary—meticulously researched and documented—which the 
Republicans steal and release to the masses in order to swing the election against 
Givens. Whereas the real-life Du Bois felt that his academic work had achieved almost 
no measurable political progress—leading him, in part, to move into full-time prophetic 
critique—Schuyler’s satirical version defeats white supremacy in the most ironic fashion: 
anonymously, empirically, and under the cover of white skin. Crookman, by contrast, 
reawakens the entire craze with his report that Black-No-More renders black skin “three 
shades whiter” (218): “To a society that had been taught to venerate whiteness for over 
three hundred years, this announcement was rather staggering. What was the world 
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coming to, if the blacks were whiter than the whites?” (219). Ferguson sums up 
Crookman’s position as “back where he started: somewhere in the ambiguous space 
between eliminating and exacerbating the race problem” (224). While Beard almost 
solves the race problem by proving through his research that, as Givens observes the 
morning after the election, “I guess we’re all niggers now” (193), Crookman undoes it 
all with his own. Yet Schuyler does not necessarily hold Crookman or even Beard 
responsible for the backsliding in the epilogue (if Schuyler can even be said to 
represent it as “backsliding,” per se, a jeremiadic concept he would likely reject). 
Neither version of Du Bois can be blamed, since both have either given up or never 
adopted a prophetic view of race. The problem remains with the masses and their 
jeremiadic way of thinking about social organization. 
 Ferguson points out that Crookman “appears to commit an act of symbolic 
genocide against his own people, but he also makes a similar threat to whites and to 
the whole dream of superiority by decent [sic]” (239). Since Schuyler does not consider 
eliminating race a sign of declension—for either the U. S. or black peoples—Beard’s 
prophetic fulmination, taken seriously, would set back political progress. It is no 
coincidence that Crookman, like Beard, shares many characteristics with Du Bois.  47
Both apply European education and advanced scientific ideas to America’s race 
problem; and, in Schuyler’s view, both stand to profit from such endeavors. The 
difference is Crookman’s entrepreneurial pragmatism, which stands in direct contrast to 
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Beard’s prophetic pontification. Beard is, it seems, finally cured of his prophetic habits, 
but people—white people, at least—are as susceptible as ever, as the Happy Hill mob 
demonstrates with stomach-churning efficiency. But there is a twist to Schuyler’s gimlet 
observation of this susceptibility. Within the novel’s context, Schuyler has his mob—
whipped up by a jeremiad—bump off his exponents of scientific racism. It is a cathartic 
episode in one sense, because the men primarily responsible for lending a veneer of 
scientific legitimacy to racist rubbish are destroyed by the ignorant mob whose 
prejudices they propped up. But it is also an incredibly jaundiced critique, because 
Schuyler suggests that this is how the caste system survives. It is not the discourse of 
science that ultimately preserves it and passes it down, but the discourse of prophetic 
critique—the jeremiad. To top it off, the lynching pulls other African-Americans, 
whitened by the Black-No-More treatment, into the ritualistic violence. They do it to 
prove that they are “one-hundred-per-cent-American.” There is one final irony to this. 
These are people who had already, in one sense, evaded the caste system by taking 
the treatment. But the uniformity of caste and race as a marker of American national 
belonging—as expressed in McPhule’s jeremiad—is what pulls them in and confirms 
them as members of that community. So the jeremiad does its work of containing 
potential political dissent, but explicitly on the basis of exterminating those who do not 
conform to the intertwined pillars of race and caste. 
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 For Schuyler, the jeremiad is a buttress that reifies the racist caste system in 
America, and though McPhule is the most extreme practitioner of its logic, he 
demonstrates in Beard’s early speech that African-American leaders struggle to escape 
its pull. Ferguson argues that Schuyler’s satire is an attempt to provoke “regeneration” 
via accepting the “necessary element of pollution and chaos at the center of a 
democratic culture staked on newness, dynamic movement, and the untapped 
possibility inherent in the lives of its lowliest elements” (214-15). Those lowly elements 
include not only Max, the protagonist, but all who attempt to harness the dynamism of 
race for profit and power: Beard and Crookman; Givens and his daughter; even 
McPhule. In a novel that lampoons prophetic discourse, and which treats race science-
fictionally, why is it that Snobbcraft and Buggerie are the only ones who pay the 
ultimate price for their attempt to manipulate the system to their advantage? 
 In essence, the hustlers who survive and thrive in Black No More’s America do so 
because they are hustlers. Snobbcraft and Buggerie are true believers, not hustlers. 
Moreover, their insistence on digging up the past to legitimate their claims is what gets 
them into trouble. They think that they can legitimate their myth empirically. As 
Ferguson argues, instead of reinventing themselves like everyone else in the novel, 
instead of moving forward, instead of doing something new, they hold onto a past they 
do not correctly understand. They backslide away from the future—rather, they fail to 
see race science-fictionally, which even the Rev. McPhule, in his benighted way, is able 
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to do. It is not to redeem his community that McPhule decides the town needs a 
lynching; it is to secure his own power base. It is a way to consolidate his gains, not his 
people’s. Schuyler’s fear for the New Negroes was that, instead of being genuinely 
new, they were instead attempting to recapture a past with which they had not 
adequately reckoned. For both the lynching victims in Black No More and the Harlem 
Renaissance artists Schuyler criticized in “Negro-Art Hokum,” the very concept of race 
as a stable, reliable measure of difference was antiquated and ran contrary to Schuyler’s 
understanding of America’s promise. Instead of eradicating the color caste system for 
the sake of a race, Schuyler contends that seizing opportunities to evade or escape it 
on the individual level are more effective. As Happy Hill demonstrates, the jeremiad 
works only if the African-Americans prove their “one hundred percent American”-ness 
by acting white. The fight for equality, for Schuyler, is meaningless in racial terms. Max 
escapes the color line because he is a genuinely New Negro, severed from his past by 
his science-fictional white skin. Another way to put it is that Max can save his own skin 
because he science-fictionally recognizes how his skin can save him. 
 This is the ultimate irony of Black No More: Schuyler essentially upholds the 
social necessity of race. Hustlers like Max, Givens, Du Bois, and himself always need 
some social structure to circumvent. Schuyler certainly does not endorse systemic 
racism, but he also sees no chance for overcoming it. What that means, though, is that 
Schuyler never succeeds in rending the Veil. While the idea that “we’re all niggers 
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now” implies that all Americans share a consciousness, the very concept of “nigger,” 
with all its connotations, only makes sense in a racially stratified society—something 
Schuyler never believed could be reformed or transcended. Ferguson argues that 
“Schuyler never escaped the dilemma of ‘twoness’ that Du Bois stated so 
profoundly” (61), and I agree. But I also think that his Afrofuturist anti-jeremiad goes 
beyond double-consciousness. The introduction of Black-No-More does not erase the 
sense of people born black that they are both “Negro” and “American.” After all, 
Max’s entire scheme hinges on shoring up America’s race problem. And the whitened 
Negroes who participate in the lynching of Snobbcraft and Buggerie are keenly aware 
of their double-agency in the midst of the Happy Hill mob. Yet the Happy Hill mob, full 
of people born white, is much more keenly aware of the potential “blackness” in its 
midst after that blackness has been rendered genuinely, literally unseeable (but not 
invisible). The science-fictionality of race in Black No More troubles “whiteness” for 
whites as much or more so than it does “blackness” for blacks. The more the 
concreteness of race is linked to skin color, the more it metaphorizes social relations in 
the U. S. It becomes an unassailable framework; the net result of Schuyler’s anti-
jeremiad, his resistance to prophetic critique, is a reification of the Veil. 
 In “The Comet” and Black No More, both authors recognize the social reality of 
race. Du Bois sought to transcend it, but his theorization of race did not permit him to 
imagine how. Schuyler thought it could be escaped, but only for a time, and only by 
!148
exceptional individuals. Du Bois, one could say, took the Max Disher option when he 
left the United States for Ghana near the end of his life. Schuyler stayed behind and 
posed for photographs with Richard Nixon. In the early 1930s, though, their dialectic of 
jeremiad and anti-jeremiad found potential uses for race by subaltern peoples. By 
science-fictionally troubling race, they both imagined the possibility of political 
revitalization, even though they were unable to see beyond the Veil to describe what 
such possibilities of renewal would be. In a culture saturated with “scientific” racism, 
Du Bois and Schuyler recognized that race itself was a science-fictional technology 
capable of determining which people would have the power to choose the future. They 
did not find a way entirely around it, nor could they find a way to eliminate it in their 
own contexts, but they recognized that being able to name and conceptualize the ways 
that race worked—getting a science-fictional handle on it—was a necessary 
component to any project of liberation.  
 This is in large part what marks these authors as Afrofuturists, but I think there’s 
something further to consider. Neither “The Comet” nor Black No More promotes 
black nationalism in its engagement with the jeremiad; not in the broadest 
Afrodiasporic sense, nor even in the narrower sense of the African-American jeremiad’s 
call for the nation to fulfill its democratic promise to all people. I think it important to 
linger on the ways in which both texts refuse that move. Neither Du Bois nor Schuyler 
could use race to imagine a path beyond race, but they were able to explore multiple-
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consciousness in their texts, conjuring both white and black audiences and forcing 
those audiences to reckon with the stakes of America’s race-inflected caste system. 
Though neither text shows its audiences a way to break down that caste system in toto, 
it is nonetheless important to note that instead of excluding the white readers, each 
folds them into their narratives. Du Bois and Schuyler provided readers of any race a 
way to science-fictionally imagine whiteness and blackness at the same time, which 
created at least one counter-history where the color line stitched two peoples into a 
future they would have to experience together.  
 See William M. Tuttle, Jr., Race Riot (1970), ch. 1 for a brief overview; Arthur I. Waskow’s From 1
Race Riot to Sit-In (1975) provides more detailed studies of the pogroms across the nation, all 
of which drew the NAACP into the aftermath. The late July riot in Chicago is perhaps the most 
notorious, but Walter White, for instance, later head of the NAACP, provided on-the-ground 
reports from rural Elaine, Arkansas, site of an early October riot, while “passing” as white. See 
Waskow, chs. 7 and 8.
 “Credo” was originally delivered in October 1904 at the first conference of what became 2
known as the Niagara Movement, a political network of black progressives opposed to Booker 
T. Washington’s accommodationist approach to white supremacy in the South and anywhere 
else in the United States where capitalist opportunism trumped civil rights advocacy. “A Hymn 
to the Peoples” was originally delivered in July 1911 at the Universal Congress of Races, a 
precursor to the Pan-African Congresses Du Bois organized after World War I. See Lewis, W. E. 
B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race (1993), pp. 297-322 on Niagara, and pp. 439-43 on Universal 
Congress of Races.
 See Gossett, pp. 261-63.3
 See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (1951).4
 See Stephen Marshall, The City on the Hill from Below (2012); see also George Shulman, 5
American Prophecy (2008). 
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 Eddie Glaude, Jr., Willie Harrell, Jr., David Howard-Pitney, and Marshall have all written on the 6
relation of Douglass, Baldwin, and King to the African-American jeremiad specifically; for 
Morrison, see Shulman, American Prophecy, ch. 5; for Obama, see Harrell, “‘The Reality of 
American Life Has Strayed from Its Myths’: Barack Obama’s The Audacity of Hope and the 
Discourse of the American Reclamation Jeremiad” (2010) and “A ‘21st Century Economic 
Agenda for America’: Barack Obama’s Pre-Presidential Economic Jeremiads” (2011), as well as 
Katherine Henry, “‘Slaves to a Debt’: Race, Shame, and the Anti-Obama Jeremiad” (2014).
 See further examples in Moral Evil and Redemptive Suffering (2002), ed. Anthony B. Pinn, 7
which collects sermons and speeches from key African-American figures throughout U. S. 
history that meditate on the theological implications of slavery and the black experience.
 See Origins of the African-American Jeremiad, esp. pp. 10, 23-29.8
 See pp. 54-55.9
 See Moses, Black Messiahs and Uncle Toms, ch. 3; also The Golden Age of Black 10
Nationalism, esp. pp. 23-25, 29-31. Glaude more specifically critiques Moses’s periodizing of 
black national language pre-1850 as being more mystical in its messianic tendencies (e.g. 
Alexander Crummel); Glaude reads it as much more pragmatic, more engaged with the 
immediate sociopolitical context. See Glaude, pp. 13-15.
 By “structure of ambivalence,” Glaude means “a social experience (that is still in process) 11
characterized by a sense of wounding, of being in but not of a nation that structures the 
experiences of African Americans” (174-75n46), a formulation drawing on Hortense Spillers, viz. 
Raymond Williams.
 Quoted in Moses, “Hero Worship, Du Bois, and Presentism,” p. 129. The line comes from 12
“The Nation’s Problem,” delivered 16 December 1889 in response to African-Americans of a 
more separatist persuasion. Douglass went on to insist, “There can be but one American 
nation” (qtd. in Biography of a Race 172). Moses highlights Douglass’s speech as part of the 
reformer’s longstanding assimilationist advocacy, in contrast to that of Crummell, who favored 
the colonization of Africa by Western-educated blacks, and of Du Bois’s position as outlined in 
“The Conservation of Races,” which was first addressed to the American Negro Academy in 
1897. In that paper, Du Bois took up Crummell’s sentiment that educated people of African 
descent had a particular role to play in civilizing the world, presaging his development of “The 
Talented Tenth” and his complicated role in promoting Pan-Africanism later on. See Harding, 
“W. E. B. Du Bois and the Black Messianic Vision” (1969).
 The scholarship drawing upon and critiquing double-consciousness and the veil is 13
unanswerably daunting in scope and volume. I am most indebted to the following discussions: 
Howard Winant’s “Dialectics of the Veil” (2004); Shamoon Zamiz’s Dark Voices (1995), ch. 4; and 
Eric Sundquist, To Wake the Nations (1993), ch. 5.
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prophetic calling. See Prophesy Deliverance!, pp. 30-31.
 This is especially true of musical production. See Eshun, More Brilliant Than the Sun (1998), 15
and Alexander G. Weheliye, “‘I Am I Be’: The Subject of Sonic Afro-modernity” (2003).
 See Yaszek, “An Afrofuturist Reading of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man” (2005) and 16
“Afrofuturism, Science Fiction, and the History of the Future” (2006), both of which contain 
much overlapping material. In this chapter, I quote from the 2006 article.
 In “The Salt of the Earth” (1902), London asserts that while Anglos are the current masters of the 17
world, they may give way to a fitter race in the future (114-15): “Disguise it though we may, though a 
good world it is yet a brutal one” (100). Berkove argues that London’s lifelong engagement with 
evolutionary theory tended less toward toward Spencerian determinism and more toward the potential 
of politics to trump eugenics; see “Jack London and Evolution: From Spencer to Huxley” (2004). 
Harpham also doesn’t dismiss London’s racism as tangential to his political philosophy, but he makes the 
case that London’s formulation of it was a particular strain—Spencerian-Nietzschean-Darwinist evolution 
as moral force—that was very American, but it had run its course by World War I.
 For instance, see Gregory Rutledge, “Science Fiction and the Black Power Arts 18
Movement” (2000). Rutledge’s reading of Delany’s Babel-17 credits it with expressing 
something Rutledge calls “transpositional cosmology,” which is, in my view, virtually 
indistinguishable from Du Boisian double-consciousness.
 Jeffrey Ferguson offers a good overview in The Sage of Sugar Hill (2005), his critical 19
biography of Schuyler; see pp. 96-103.
 See, for example, Vincent Harding, “W. E. B. Du Bois and the Black Messianic Vision” (1969).20
 For biographical information, I rely mostly upon Lewis’s magisterial two volumes, Biography 21
of a Race and The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963 (2000) and Elliott 
Rudwick, W. E. B. Du Bois: Propagandist of Negro Protest (1960). Manning Marable’s W. E. B. 
Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat (1986) and Gerald Horne’s Black and Red (1986) trace Du 
Bois’s intellectual history to frame him as a champion of Left politics to varying degrees, with 
Horne focusing on his decisive later turn toward Marxism. I also, of course, recommend Du 
Bois’s own autobiographical writings in Darkwater and Dusk of Dawn (1940), which are most 
productively considered alongside the historical evidence of his biographical interlocutors.
 See pp. 109-115.22
 See X—The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought (2014), ch. 3.23
 See Biography of a Race, chs. 12 and 13.24
 See Southern Horrors and Other Writings (1996).25
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 Though it is apparent in Lewis’s narrative of this period in chapters 12 through 14 of 26
Biography of a Race, Manning Marable emphasizes in chapter 3 of Black Radical Democrat that 
neither the publication of John Brown nor his move to the NAACP was a sudden rupture that 
neatly divided his previous, scholastic endeavors from his later career as a propagandist. Du 
Bois had been augmenting his academic efforts with essays in popular periodicals for years, 
and he continued to publish in academic journals long afterward. There was more continuity 
than not. If biographers tend to treat the move into full time activism as a natural chapter break 
or easy-to-hand periodizing event in Du Bois’s storied career, it’s in large part because Du Bois 
himself treated it as such. There is evidence in his autobiographical writings such as “The 
Shadow of Years” in Darkwater, in which he refers to 1909 as the beginning of “The Age of 
Miracles” (13). Marable also notes that as Du Bois deliberated giving up his position at Atlanta 
University, he led a series of appropriately “political and spiritual” prayers “in the great 
prophetic tradition of the black church” for students reflecting on what the career change 
would mean for his professional future and the future of his race: “Mercifully grant us, O God,” 
Du Bois intoned, “the spirit of Esther, that we say: I will go unto the King and if I perish, I perish
—Amen” (qtd. in Black Radical Democrat 74). I’ve retained the narrative convenience of 1909 
as a pivot point in large part because I believe that, for Du Bois, this career move was a 
meaningful embrace of a more explicitly prophetic role for himself, even if his mission remained 
the same.
 See Rudwick, pp. 133-35.27
 Rowe’s assessment of Du Bois’s work reflects an engagement with intersectional critical race 28
theory, even if Rowe does not explicitly identify it as such. He argues that Du Bois uses the 
experiences of African, African-American, and women subjects as an foundation for “invoking 
influential European ideas… then revising them” (209). The emphasis he puts on revision is 
that, rather than European civilization redeeming the fallen (colonized) world, it is the colonized 
subjects that may end up redeeming European civilization. But only if they coalesce around the 
decolonial project.
 See Rowe, p. 215.29
 Du Bois famously opened his 1905 essay, “The Color Line Belts the World” with the 30
observation, “We have a way in America of wanting to be ‘rid’ of Problems. It is not so much a 
desire to reach the best and largest solution as it is to clean the board and start a new 
game” (33). He goes on to imply that the other colonial powers as well think, to their peril, that 
America’s provincial “Negro problem” does not apply to them.
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 See Rabaka, esp. pp. 37-39. Several critics interpret the final scene as an expression of 31
political pessimism. In his ecocritical reading of “The Comet,” Lawrence J. Oliver contends that 
“in the wake of the natural disaster and death of the child, we may assume that they [Jim and 
his wife] will undergo the same struggle as the rest of the refugees and outcasts elsewhere in 
Darkwater” (81). Balfour reads it as a dialectical counterbalance to the utopian hope of “Hymn 
to the Peoples,” as Du Bois “cautions against the idea that racialized habits of thought and 
structures of power can fall away in a single stroke” (56). Ximena Gallardo C. also reads it as a 
fable of equality experienced then snatched away (221-22). Kaplan, like Eric Sundquist, 
connects the dead baby to the child of Matthew Townes and Princess Kautilya in Dark Princess, 
which realizes some of the hope of the “Hymn” that ends Darkwater, even if that possibility is 
not visible in “The Comet.” See Kaplan, pp. 207-12; Sundquist, To Wake the Nations (1993), 
esp. pp. 618, 621-23.
 On “The Conservation of Races” in Du Bois’s development of black nationalism, see Moses, 32
Golden Age, p. 101-2, 133-36. On his involvement in the 1900 London Congress, see Lewis, 
Biography of a Race, pp. 246-51; Immanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement (1974), pp. 
182-98; Rudwick, 208-10; Marable, Black Radical Democrat, pp. 39-40. On his involvement in 
the Universal Congress of Races, see Geiss, pp. 216-18; Lewis, Biography of a Race, pp. 
439-43; Rudwick, pp. 143-48. On The Negro as Pan-African historiography, see Aptheker, pp. 
123-42; Lewis, Biography of a Race, pp. 461-62; Marable, Black Radical Democrat, pp. 92-94.
 See Geiss, ch. 1, and George Padmore, Communism or Pan-Africanism (1971), chs. 6-8.33
 See Rampersad, pp. 147-9; Lewis, The Fight for Equality, chs. 2 and 4; Rudwick, ch. 9. More 34
illustrative of the feud’s tenor are the columns published in Du Bois and Garvey’s rival 
publications, the Crisis and the Negro World, respectively, between 1921 and 1924. High 
points include Garvey commenting in 1923 on Du Bois’s distinctive “French Beard”: “Surely 
that is not typical of Africa, it is typical of that blood which he loves so well and which he 
bewails in not having more in his veins—French.” For his part, Du Bois stated bluntly in 1924, 
“Marcus Garvey is, without doubt, the most dangerous enemy of the Negro race in America 
and in the world. He is either a lunatic or a traitor.” See Garvey, “W. E. B. Du Bois as a Hater of 
Dark People,” and Du Bois, “Marcus Garvey: A Lunatic or a Traitor?”
 Aptheker provides a sampling of the reactions to Darkwater, ranging from Southern hysteria 35
(the North Carolina Daily News of Greensboro compared Du Bois to a KKK leader for what they 
saw as his fulsome black supremacism) to critical praise. He notes the response of one Crisis 
reader, dated December 1922: “I have just been reading your ‘Darkwater’. The other night I sat 
up until two o’clock trying to break its spell. When one begins to see the Negro problem, as 
pointed out by our own people, one awakens to a fuller realization of life.” See Literay Legacy, 
p. 161n11.
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 My phrasing here is indebted to Cornel West, whose Prophesy Deliverance! (1982) helped frame my 36
initial thinking about Du Bois for this chapter. African-American tradition in particular, he argues, 
exemplifies what West calls “prophetic pragmatism,” which is uniquely democratic because it emerges 
from the shared experiences of black people in response to evolving, particular forms of oppression. See 
also his The American Evasion of Philosophy (1989), ch. 6. West succinctly comments elsewhere that he 
perceives the historical record as “black progressive movement going hand in hand with other progress” 
(Prophetic Thought 109), a premise taken up by the contemporary Black Lives Matter movement. See 
“The Postmodern Crisis of Black Intellectuals” in Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times (1993) and 
Alicia Garza, “A HerStory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement.”
 I rely heavily for historical background on Michael W. Peplow and Jeffrey Ferguson’s critical 37
literary biographies of Schuyler.
 The African-American socialists were quite critical of Du Bois for his politically tactical 38
embrace of the United States’ entrance into World War I, as well as his refusal to back Socialist 
Party presidential candidates; for his part, Du Bois criticized the Socialist Party for being 
insufficiently attentive to the particularity of white supremacy in the United States, especially 
with regard to the prevalent racial discrimination in trade unions. While the editors of The 
Messenger and the Crisis had substantial differences regarding political strategy, U. S. Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer was quite happy to treat them as equally radical in 1919, just as 
Marcus Garvey was content to blame them equally for their tacitly coordinated campaign to 
get him deported in 1924. See Philip S. Foner, American Socialism and Black Americans (1977), 
chs. 13 and 14.
 Ethiopianism was a term for a providential view of history that gave Africa—and its peoples39
—the leading role in redeeming Western civilization. See Moses, Golden Age, ch. 6. On Du 
Bois’s first visit to the African continent, see Lewis, Fight for Equality, ch. 4.
 See Ferguson’s discussion of how social theorists J. A. Rogers and Lester Ward influenced 40
Schuyler’s thinking on the subject of race and social evolution, pp. 138-42. Ultimately, Ferguson 
contends that black chauvinism was only useful to Schuyler to the extent that it inverted white 
supremacy. Future readers, in short, can read Schuyler as inconsistent or hypocritical, or simply 
adept at rhetorical compartmentalization.
 Kwame Anthony Appiah’s critique of race in Du Bois’s thinking in “The Uncompleted 41
Argument,” originally published in a special issue of Critical Inquiry edited by Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr. in 1985, then collected in the same editor’s anthology, Race, Writing, and Difference 
(1986), is canonical. In that essay, Appiah contends that Du Bois never quite moved beyond the 
biological racial essentialism first intimated in “The Conservation of Races,” though not for lack 
of trying. Appiah later appended his reading of “Conservation,” emphasizing the German 
idealist influences on Du Bois’s thinking and arguing that there was more slippage in Du Bois’s 
ideas of race, and thus that the trajectory of Du Bois’s theorizing of race might have led away 
from conflating biology and culture. See Lines of Descent (2014), esp. pp. 83-93.
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 Lewis provides a good overview of the context and stakes in chapter 6 of When Harlem Was 42
in Vogue (1984), esp. pp. 191-92. Sonny Retman’s reading of Black No More also draws heavily 
on a nuanced appraisal of how Hughes and Schuyler’s apparently contrasting perspectives on 
Negro art. See “Black No More: George Schuyler’ and Racial Capitalism,” esp. pp. 50-51.
 In his 1966 autobiography, Black and Conservative, Schuyler contended that African-43
Americans “need more optimism and less pessimism”: “Once we accept the fact that there is, 
and always will be, a color caste system in the United States, and stop crying about it, we can 
concentrate on how best to survive and prosper within that system. This is not defeatism but 
realism” (121-22).
 The endorsements of the novel by these African-American critics were, understandably, 44
given with some qualifications. See When Harlem Was in Vogue, pp. 180-9.
 See When Harlem Was in Vogue, ch. 8.45
 See Locke, “The New Negro,” originally published in 1925. Locke heralds the urban 46
migration of African-Americans in the early twentieth century as the avant-garde of a modernity 
defined by a cosmopolitanism deeply shaped by African-American experience.
 Ferguson expands on the parallels in depth; see pp. 222-29.47
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CHAPTER THREE. Imagining Technocracy: E. E. “Doc” 
Smith’s Lensmen and Isaac Asimov’s Foundation, 
1935-1955 
Great Galaxies! 
  
 Of the myths that have endured through American history, the notion that 
progress may be measured by our civilization’s command of technological 
advancement is quite durable indeed. Faith in the power of scientific technique is at 
least as old as the European Enlightenment, and celebrations of mechanical prowess 
certainly fixed themselves ineradicably in the public imagination after the Industrial 
Revolution. Scientistic positivism runs through the American psyche like a 
transcontinental railroad, and its perhaps most strident expression was given voice by 
the space opera authors published in the science fiction magazines of the 1930s and 
‘40s. 
 Less than ten years. That’s how long it took to get from Hugo Gernsback’s 
formula for “scientifiction” to the the fully-fledged space opera. Or, perhaps, longer—
depending on whether Gernsback is afforded the privilege of being the originator of 
“science fiction” as we know it. In the editorial for the April 1924 debut issue of 
Amazing Stories, Gernsback defined scientifiction as “a charming romance 
!157
intermingled with scientific fact and prophetic vision” (3). By the time George Schuyler 
had finished Black No More, pulp magazine writers such as Edmond Hamilton, Philip 
Nowlan, and Edward Elmer “Doc” Smith had honed the tropes of spaceships, ray guns, 
bug-eyed monsters, and cosmic conflict to an art. At the time, nobody would have 
classed Schuyler in the same literary tradition as someone like Nowlan, whose short 
story “Armageddon 2419 A.D.” (1928) was the basis for the Buck Rogers comic strip. 
But science fiction was at a critical stage in developing a coherent literary identity of its 
own, and the boundaries were being drawn. 
 Early editions of Amazing Stories and other sf pulps often reprinted novels and 
stories that were considered canonical milestones for science fiction. Besides 
masterworks by H. G. Wells, Edgar Allan Poe, and Jules Verne, Gernsback and his 
editorial cohort also republished dime novels and short stories—texts of often 
undistinguished literary character, but very much models of the type of fiction 
Gernsback wished to see from his contributors. Critical opinion since the earliest 
literary histories of sf has been unkind (with some justification) in its estimation of such 
texts’ literary merits.  Yet these texts were vital to the understanding of science-1
fictionality that developed in dialogue among writers, editors, and the reading 
audience both before and during the 1920s and ‘30s. Editors like Gernsback and John 
W. Campbell, Jr. deeply valued the combination of venturesome spirit, engineering 
knowhow, and creative application of emerging scientific knowledge on display in 
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Victorian sf, and they proudly published stories that exemplified these virtues. Science-
fiction pulp magazines thus represent a vital link in the continuity of modern progress 
as a civilizational ideology. 
 This chapter examines two iconic space opera series which originated in the 
pages of the pulp magazines. E. E. “Doc” Smith’s Lensmen ran from 1934-1954, mostly 
serialized under the Campbell’s editorship in Astounding Science Fiction. Over the 
course of this saga, humanity ascends to galactic leadership, led by a family of 
particularly hardy and psychically gifted superheroes. With the support of 
transcendental aliens, the interplanetary space corps plays a decisive role in destroying 
a civilization of corrupt extradimensional entities, inaugurating an Arthurian-esque reign 
of peace and prosperity. The Lensmen stories cemented Smith’s reputation as the pre-
eminent practitioner of space opera of his time, simultaneously guaranteeing him 
canonical status in sf literary history and sealing his fate as a scapegoat for once and 
future fans who begrudge science fiction’s status, pace Smith, as a disreputable, 
juvenile literature. Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series overlapped chronologically with 
Lensmen in its serial publication in Campbell’s Astounding from 1942 to 1949, reaching 
a wider audience starting with the publication of the stories as a novel trilogy from 
1951-53.  Asimov’s series enjoys a critical and popular eminence lost to Smith’s. The 2
stories originate with a mathematics genius named Hari Seldon, whose innovative 
science of “psychohistory” predicts the decline and fall of the Galactic Empire. He 
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sequesters two “Foundations” full of civilization’s best and brightest, foreseeing that 
their interdictions at critical junctures in course of galactic events will exponentially 
reduce the length and severity of the coming dark age. Though Seldon’s project more 
or less succeeds, Asimov continually interrogates his premise, finally settling on the 
idea that Seldon secretly appointed a cabal of technicians of the mind to give history’s 
telos nudges in the right direction. Though Lensman resonates powerfully with 
jeremiadic themes, the Foundation trilogy evokes the jeremiad most explicitly. 
 In this chapter, we will examine how Smith and Asimov’s engagements with the 
jeremiad ultimately offer visions of hierarchic control. The fact that they are both space 
operas means that they rely on tropes—interstellar space ships, ray guns, mental 
superpowers—most commonly thought of as comprising “sci-fi” in the popular 
imagination. We will see that it is, perhaps surprisingly, the last of those tropes—mental 
superpowers—that most typifies these series’ ideological orientation toward command 
and control.  
 Our task in this chapter is to untangle these series’ positivism—a jeremiadic 
optimism—and how the Elect are able to usher their civilizations to the covenantal 
future. To do this, we will first examine the degree to which space opera as a distinct 
science-fictional subgenre embodies positivist faith in technological progress, which is, 
in space opera, equivalent to civilizational progress. In exploring the roots of this 
phenomenon, we will see that technological advancement includes the refinement of 
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techniques of social control; indeed, this form of sociology is the pinnacle of scientific 
achievement. This positivism blended with a political movement at the time called 
technocracy. We will then examine how the scientific discourse of the pulp era was 
steeped in theories of the psionic potential of the human mind—fringe science that 
attempted to validate the existence and applications of mental powers such as 
telepathy mind control. In the context of technocracy—which proposed scientifically to 
manage society’s positivist trajectory with maximum efficiency—the discourse of psionic 
powers was a way for Smith and Asimov to science-fictionally portray the Elect bringing 
civilization’s covenantal promise to fruition. But the faith these space operas display in 
positivist, technocratic progress ultimately upholds an authoritarian elitism that 
perpetually threatens to undermine democratic politics. 
Spectres of Positivism 
  
 When a sf fan named Wilson Tucker dubbed the “outworn spaceship yarn” as 
space opera in 1941, it was a play on “horse opera” westerns, specifically American 
stories whose own roots lay in nineteenth-century dime novels.  Patricia Monk notes 3
that the frontier adventure parallels oft-cited by critics of this subgenre link the tropes 
to violent colonial conquest: gunslinging lawmen, marauding outlaws and alien 
savages, fast pacing and turgid plotting, etc.  These tropes are augmented with sundry 4
other technological wonders, not least of which is the spaceship itself. Already familiar 
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to readers of Verne and Wells, the spaceship is considered by sf author and scholar 
Adam Roberts to be sf’s sine qua non—it is the icon of interplantary voyage, which is in 
his view the ur-trope of the science-fictional dialectic. In his account, Roberts traces the 
trope of the interplanetary (or, more broadly, inter-worldly) voyage back to Greek and 
Roman satire, with post-Renaissance layovers in works like Johann Kepler’s Somnium 
sive Astronomia Luminaris (1634), Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726), Voltaire’s 
Micromégas (1750), and Giacomo Casanova’s Icosameron (1788).  In space opera, the 5
civilizing mission of the dime-novel frontier adventure is thus rooted in motifs and 
ideological conflict that stretch back to the first half of the nineteenth century and 
beyond. As shopworn as the plots and wafer-thin characterizations of space operas 
may have been by 1941, they expressed concerns that were the bleeding edge of 
public debate in a nation which had elbowed its way to the front of the world stage. 
America’s cultural roots in the myth of the “New World,” whose non-native pioneers 
crossed  over from the “Old World,” harmonized adroitly with the evolution of the 
horse opera into spacefaring adventure at the dawn of the American Century.  
 But that mission is an outgrowth of an industrial society stretching toward its 
apex. Monk argues that space opera is less a subgenre than “an attitudinal bias” that 
“reveals an authorial mindset which sees the extraterrestrial universe in holistic terms as 
both knowable and manageable, just as writers of the models from which it derives had 
seen the terrestrial world” (300). Roberts notes that these stories appeared in the 
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pages of mass-market magazines at precisely the same time that the Atlantic colonial 
powers had had their first major reckoning with the economies of scale that helped 
make World War I an industrialized, mass-scale slaughterhouse. Rather than simply 
place the sf pulps comfortably in the “low” end of a cultural dichotomy with emergent 
“high” modernism, Roberts argues that the pulp authors were key voices in a literary 
dialogue that recognized the fragmentation of shared reality even as it sought to create 
a constructive monomyth for the future.  Serial stories of the 1930s in particular 6
“captured precisely the hectic sprint of time towards the unknown” (93). Thus space 
opera retains social engineering as part of its ideological chassis, even if its authors 
expressed it in the tropes of the romantic adventure. But they did so in a way that 
presumed that that unknown could be made known—and made useful—by application 
of science. In other words, space opera as a science-fictional mode is emblematic of a 
very nineteenth-century kind of technological positivism that was endemic to the pulps, 
and which continues to haunt sf like a pedantic specter. 
 Auguste Comte did not arrantly conjure this specter from the pages of his Cours 
de Philosophie Positive (1830-1842), but positivism as such he certainly did. Comte 
developed a program for a new discipline of sociology, in his view the highest stage of 
scientific development, which studied the historical human being for the purpose of 
curing his social ills. In his introduction to the 1974 anthology of essays grappling with 
the relationship between positivism and sociology, Anthony Giddens articulates a set of 
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suppositions that positivist sociologists make, which presume that they can discern 
scientific laws in the operations of human society and apply their scientific conclusions 
to solve entrenched problems.  The problem of gathering and interpreting sociological 7
data from within the society under scrutiny is addressed by the sequence of selected 
essays, and it foreshadows the work continued by critics of scientific discourse such as 
Bruno Latour, who insists that science is always social, always political.  8
 In other words, the mastery over our material universe promised by nineteenth-
century natural science was extended by Comte and his sociology over the domain of 
human affairs. No shortage of ecocriticism, for instance, has rightly noted that the 
distinction between Humanity and Nature was always a false one, and that humanity’s 
understanding of nature has always been social.  Mary Pickering argues, however, that 9
Comte’s extension of mastery over nature into mastery of social dynamics was part of a 
project to hold industrialism—and the the fragmenting, atomizing division of labor 
(with its attendant individualist “egoism”)—in check. Comte’s sociology was an attempt 
to reinstate a holistic conception of society. In this conception, not everything could be 
made known, and that is why he extolled the necessity of developing an interpretive—
sometimes speculative—paradigm.  Ironically, Comte’s project of reinstating holistic 10
harmony was supplanted by an often-uncritical faith in measuring social progress by a 
society’s degree of industrial-technical sophistication. Critical theory, as expounded by 
the sociologically-rooted Frankfurt School and its heirs, lives on as an exemplary 
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outgrowth of this founding dilemma in the discipline Comte invented, wrestling with 
the consequences of what theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer famously 
termed “the dialectic of enlightenment.”  But positivism in the narrower, colloquial 11
sense of the attitudes identified by Giddens became a byword for the ideology of 
nineteenth-century natural science, often justifying appeals to scientific authority to 
resolve moral and political questions. More significantly, positivism came to connote a 
faith in human social progress, a telos intimately bound to and driven by scientific 
advancement. 
 Not all Americans in the early twentieth century adopted this telos as a 
framework for narrating the United States’ westward course of empire—a course often 
conflated with its progressive arc through history.  The onrush of technological 12
development stemming from the late eighteenth century has always had a fraught 
legacy in American letters, especially where it bears upon the errand into the 
wilderness.  But even within the precursors to American “scientifiction,” positivism is 13
not adopted uncritically. In a narrative tonic distilled from this dialogue in the late 
nineteenth century, a can-do engineer who travels back in time to the middle ages uses 
modern science to dominate the kingdom with the miracle of modern industrialization, 
only to have his mighty works blow up in his face at the end. A Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court (1889) is whimsical and caustic (that is, Mark Twain at his best), but 
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it can also be read as a trenchant critique of positivist logic taken to its extreme 
conclusion. 
 The application of scientific theory to practical problems gave rise in the 1920s 
and ‘30s to a kind of cult of the engineer.  Despite the warnings and critiques by 14
authors ranging from Twain to Ignatius Donnelly to George Schuyler, Americans 
remained generally optimistic that the blessings of technological advancement would 
outweigh its curses.  In the ferment of Taylorism, engineers gained prestige as heuristic 
wonder-workers—not only could they build bridges, railroads, and canals, but they 
could troubleshoot and scientifically manage social problems.  Herbert Hoover won 15
the presidency in 1928 in no small part due to his reputation as “The Great Engineer.” 
But when Hoover’s pro-business engineering solutions failed to end the Depression, 
many Americans entertained the possibility of something called technocracy.   16
 “Technocracy” in the 1930s articulated a slightly different set of political 
assumptions than those now associated with it. At this stage, the term did not 
specifically describe an approach to centralized, democratic government which makes 
decisions based on expert advice from within and without the official state apparatus, 
nor was it a business management system that seeks to incorporate and consolidate 
the innovations of workers at every level of the corporate structure through an adaptive 
bureaucracy.  These later developments have some roots in the technocracy I discuss 17
here, but some of those roots were diagnosed even earlier by sociologists such as Max 
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Weber, and the implementation of technocracy in public and private sectors varied by 
country.  Initially conceived as a research program into domestic American industrial 18
energy expenditures since the early 1800s, the Committee on Technocracy made 
waves in 1932 because of the radical diagnosis it offered for the current economic 
catastrophe. The committee members synthesized the managerial paradigms of 
Frederick W. Taylor and Henry Gantt with Thorstein Veblen’s critique of industry, 
business, and the price system.  The technocrats argued that capitalist valuation, 19
coupled with efficient, high-energy technology’s displacement of industrial workers, 
was largely responsible for ongoing inequalities and economic volatility.  Only by 20
appointing a bureaucratic elite of engineers to manage the increasingly complex social 
system could the nation hope to maximize the potential of its technologically-advanced 
infrastructure. Like many political polemicists, technocrats thought of themselves as 
presenting a genuinely new third way beyond the progressive and reactionary 
dichotomy that had botched things. Because they focused on economic solutions, and 
because those solutions were located in better management of markets and 
infrastructure—modern technologies—technocrats often presented their program as 
apolitical. This apolitical posture stemmed from the nineteenth-century discourse that 
construed science as objective and rational; it was thoroughly positivist. 
 In the U. S., this positivism could take a distinctly jeremiadic form. Howard Scott, 
one of the most radical exponents of technocracy, proclaimed in 1936 that, because 
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they are structured around a presumed “economy of scarcity,” the governments of 
North America were rendered obsolete by the “economy of abundance” promised by 
modern technology. “Technology marches on,” cried Scott. “The political governments 
of the United States and Canada are beseeching Providence for economic absolution 
for the sins of the Price System, and Providence tenders them droughts and floods and 
even more technological equipment” (9). The only logical solution, in sum, was to 
place governance in technocratic hands. He concluded his jeremiad with familiar 
heraldry, invoking Franklin Delano Roosevelt only sardonically:  
This continent has no choice but to lead the march of civilization. The 
opportunity is given to no other Continent… This Continent will have its 
rendezvous with destiny within the next decade, and upon this generation of 
Americans will fall the competent and orderly achievement of a new civilization. 
This generation of Americans has the technology, the men, the materials, and 
the machinery for its accomplishment” (24).  
When Scott referred to “Americans,” he capaciously included all North Americans—but 
he only ascribed revolutionary political potential to science and engineering elite. And 
the triumphal telos he invested in “the march of civilization” was inextricable from 
accelerated technological development.  
 Though Technocracy as a revolutionary political movement never got off the 
ground, its pronouncements were lightning rods which added sparks to an ongoing 
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discourse about the nation’s historical trajectory in terms of science and industry.  21
Leading intellectuals such as John Dewey and Charles Beard had written extensively 
about the necessity of interweaving science with America’s democratic institutions since 
the twenties or earlier.  Meanwhile, Lewis Mumford cautioned that unthinking 22
dependence upon technique and the machine often strengthened exploitative political 
structures.  Nor did America’s presidents neglect the issue. Hoover commissioned a 23
wide-ranging survey of Americana that included a chapter on technology,  while at 24
least three major investigations into the social problem of technology were conducted 
by the United States government between 1937 and 1941, not to mention a 1936 
documentary produced by the government on the origins of the Dust Bowl.  Through 25
all this, the brand of positivist discourse that emerged from the Progressive Era tended 
to retain a veneer of benevolent, apolitical authoritarianism which coupled neatly with a 
professionally-engineered and efficiently-managed manifest destiny. 
 The jeremiadic vision of world-historical redemption starting with a city on a hill 
in the New World blended almost seamlessly with the pulp era’s technological 
positivism, because the politics of technocracy—whether associated with the 
movement or simply a faith in the soteriology of applied engineering solutions to social 
crises—wove them together. For Hugo Gernsback, both “prophecy” and “progress” 
were part of his triangulation with the social applications of modern technology. The 
positivism which began with Comté, filtered down through sociology, and took on a 
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mechanical cast under technocratically-minded Americans found expression in the 
editor’s vision of “scientifiction” stories. About these, Gernsback prophesied in his 
1926 editorial, “Posterity will point to them as having blazed a new trail, not only in 
literature and fiction, but in progress as well” (3). Intriguingly, Pickering describes 
Comté’s advocacy of “scientific fiction” in order to “free scientists from being slaves to 
direct evidence”—not as a way of undermining empirical truth, but because “purely 
abstract rationalist rules not only made scientific research less flexible but came 
dangerously close to metaphysical practices” (37). Even the progenitor of positivism 
saw value in science-fictionally concretizing materially real but abstract-seeming 
concepts. But Pickering also notes that Comté’s concern with maintaining flexibility of 
the imagination was mainly to ensure the capacity of his sociologists to better manage 
the whole. While Comté did not believe it was possible for anyone, even his positivist 
elite, to know everything, he wanted to leave room for blazing new trails into the 
unknown precisely because such imagination would facilitate tighter control and thus 
ensure civilizational progress. Had he been a scientific engineer rather than a 
clergyman on a providential errand, John Winthrop might have said something similar 
about the Puritans’ colonization of the North American wilderness.  
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Lensing the Future 
  
 E.E. “Doc” Smith’s Lensman space opera—sometimes referred to as the Galactic 
Patrol saga—is the embodiment of pulp science fiction’s positivism par excellence. 
Though only retroactively folded into his Galactic Patrol storyline later on, E.E. Smith’s 
Triplanetary began publication in 1934 on the heels of his immensely popular Skylark 
space opera.  The Skylark of Space and its sequels had established Smith as master of 26
the space opera starting with its publication in Amazing Stories in 1928, and it opened 
outer space adventure to truly cosmic proportions. Smith himself was a chemical 
engineer by trade,  and in the Gernsback era, his doctorate earned him credibility as a 27
purveyor of science fiction. (Hence the moniker “Doc” Smith.) The plot of Triplanetary 
mainly concerns two converging storylines: in one, we thrill at the swashbuckling 
derring-do of humans attempting to foil the plot of alien invaders trying to confiscate 
Earth’s iron resources, at the cost of unspeakable collateral damage; in the other, we 
gape in amazement at engineers solving the problem of interstellar transportation with 
the invention of “inertialess” flight (read: warp drive), accompanied by mountains of 
technobabble. Eventually, using their superior warp drive, Earth delivers an apocalyptic 
superbomb to the aliens’ home planet, forcing a peace treaty and paving the way for 
humanity’s ascent to cosmic dominion. Repurposing this story’s heroes in Galactic 
Patrol, he later added a prologue reframing Triplanetary’s story as merely the opening 
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gambit in a much larger war between alien races with no less than the prospect of 
civilizational progress itself at stake.  28
 While it is eerie to consider the historical doppler effect of Hiroshima in 
Triplanetary’s denouement, it is not the reason why Smith used this adventure to frame 
his Lensman saga. The development of the inertialess drive turns out to be far more 
important than anything else in the Triplanetary—it’s a technology capable of 
annihilating space much in the manner of nineteenth-century railroad. The ability to 
traverse unimaginable amounts of space in spectacularly-reduced time is prerequisite 
to any space opera, which expands the amount of explorable (and conquerable) 
frontier exponentially. Smith’s crucial insight in developing his Lensman saga was this: 
with all that conquerable space, a method of instantaneous communication is essential 
to any attempt at civilizing it. Inventing a method of high-speed travel, in other words, 
is not enough to civilize the frontier: a method of networking both the outer fringe and 
recently-civilized interior with the metropole is the only way to exercise effective 
hegemony. Enter the Lens. 
 Described as an iridescent lens worn like a wristwatch, Lenses are a sort of 
“pseudo-life” uniquely designed for each Lensman, which kill anyone but their 
designated wearer if removed (Vol. 1, 499-500). The Lens exists beyond known physical 
science, but it consolidates the power of the Galactic Patrol to exercise command and 
control over two galaxies. A sizable portion of Galactic Patrol, Gray Lensman, and 
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Second Stage Lensman follows the dashing hero, Kimball “Kim” Kinnison, as he 
develops greater facility with the Lens’s powers. At first, the Lens serves as a badge of 
authority and a means of instantaneous, literally universal communication via telepathic 
link. However, Kim discovers that the Lens also allows him to mind control other life 
forms—including people, dogs, and worms—and to kill with a thought. He also 
discovers that he can use his Lens to spy on anyone anywhere in the known cosmos. 
Lenses are built by Arisians, an ancient, disembodied race wholly dedicated to 
ensuring the rise of civilization as a bulwark against their enemies, the Eddorians. 
Though both races have incredible psionic powers, the Arisians are more or less pure 
mind, while Eddorians are hideous, foul monstrosities. Arisians are portrayed as 
democratic and communitarian, while Eddorians are violently hierarchical and 
individualistic. Eddorians are invaders from another dimension, seeking to colonize our 
universe as part of a megalomaniacal imperialist plot, while Arisians seek to protect the 
flourishing of our cosmos’ native species. To this end, they have created Lenses, which 
effectively serve as training wheels to wean the universe’s various civilized species into 
higher evolutionary stages. 
 The most powerful mentation is one only available to the Kinnison progeny: a 
precognitive ability that Arisians call the “Visualization of the Cosmic All.” It is not 
perfect, as we will later discuss, but it is what enables Arisia to conduct its eons-long 
civilizing mission so successfully, accounting for almost every possible variation in 
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causal probability in the known universe. Visualization of the Cosmic All is the 
culmination of the psionic powers facilitated by the Lens. Without the Lens’s ability to 
sustain the panoptic network of the superpowered samurai caste, the Galactic Patrol, 
heralds of Arisia, could not function effectively—and civilization would collapse. 
  Civilization is held in a state of perpetual crisis thanks to the Eddorians’ 
machinations, which are channeled through a criminal syndicate named Boskone. The 
Patrol’s efforts to eradicate Boskone and the syndicate’s strategies to counter the 
Patrol’s powers of psionic surveillance drive most of the series’ subplots. Echoing the 
government’s Prohibition era attempt to rejuvenate American society by eliminating 
alcohol, the Patrol expends most of its effort attempting to exterminate thionite, an 
addictive drug that gives users utterly realistic dreams which cater to their “EVERY 
DESIRE” (Vol. 1, 338). Along with the thionite black market comes political corruption 
and pirates operating with impunity. Once Boskone discovers the Patrol’s ability to 
“Lens” thoughts and events from any distance, it develops thought-screens to thwart 
the Lensmens’ superpowers. Kim therefore spends a lot of time undercover—as a 
meteor miner, a fence, a far subordinate Lensman, a Boskonian pirate, even a space 
opera novelist —leading the more perceptive Boskonian underbosses to recognize 29
the existence of a particularly skilled espionage agent and going to great lengths to 
capture or kill him. The high-tension cat-and-mouse gamesmanship leavens a 
conventional romantic adventure with ever-increasing strains of paranoia, as the levels 
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of Eddorian/Boskonian infiltration are revealed to have rooted themselves deeper and 
ever deeper into society. 
 Already, several jeremiadic tropes are evident in this extended summary of the 
six-book series. The Arisians’ guidance serves a providential function, and humanity’s 
commitment to uphold the civilizing mission set out for it evokes the covenantal 
promise. Earth itself serves as a city on a hill, and though the interplanetary alliance 
includes several alien species, it is humans who are the truly Elect, because it is 
ultimately a human family—the Kinnisons—which carries forward the torch of cosmic-
historical redemption from the Eddorian corruption. The Eddorians’ Boskone itself is 
rooted in vice—backsliding—which continually undermines the stability of the galactic 
order. The significance of the Lens in this context is how it buttresses the cosmic caste 
system and centralizes control. Nonhuman species may be part of the alliance, but 
Smith joins together racial caste identity to the technocratic hierarchy symbolized by 
the Lens. At first, the Galactic Patrol masters the material universe through engineering, 
but it then maintains social control through the Lens. 
 The jockeying for intergalactic starts in Triplanetary, as we have seen, with the 
twin developments of warp drive and a destructive superweapon—Smith just escalates 
from there. The Patrol’s interminable battle with Boskone, which formally commences in 
Galactic Patrol (originally published in 1937-38), involves an arms race entrenched in a 
civilizational contest of technical mastery. Because Boskone is an ideology as well as an 
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organization, its conflict with the Patrol is not merely cops-and-robbers;  it is a clash of 30
civilizations. Boskone “was a culture already inter-galactic in scope,” we learn in Patrol, 
“but one built upon ideals diametrically opposed to those of the civilization 
represented by the Galactic Patrol. 
It was a tyranny, an absolute monarchy, a despotism not even remotely 
approximated by the dictatorships of earlier ages. It had only one creed—“The 
end justifies the means.” Anything—literally anything at all—that produced the 
desired result was commendable; to fail was the only crime. (588) 
Boskone’s ethos explicitly justifies, for Smith, the mutual commitment to total war. In 
describing one deep space battle, for instance, he writes, “Victory of itself was not 
enough. This was, and of stern necessity had to be, a war of utter, complete, and 
merciless extinction” (611). In Gray Lensman (originally published 1939-40), Smith 
again describes the struggle as “one of ruthless, complete, and utter extinction” (Vol. 
2, 23). In this saga, this is unavoidable; it is necessary for the health of society and for 
the eventual success of the civilizing mission. Technological mastery equals civilizational 
superiority. Entire worlds are ultimately simply resources to be suborned to the 
civilizational conflict playing out across two galaxies. It is the elite Lensmen who have 
sufficient imagination and can-do to regard everything in the universe as raw material. 
As Port Admiral Haynes, Kim’s superior officer, observes offhandedly after using the 
Sun itself as a weapon against a Boskonian phalanx comprised of planets converted 
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into space ships, “Not bad-looking planets; maybe we can use them for 
something” (Vol. 2, 282). Such is the tenor of an elite caste capable of wielding planets 
like medieval flails. So it is that the climactic battles in the series often end with 
spectacular scenes of apocalyptic violence such as the Patrol clapping two planets 
together into a third (Vol. 2, 239) or hurling planets into a sun, forcing it to go 
supernova, all to destroy a single base (Vol. 2, 705). Such scenes resolve a clash of 
ideology as a competition of military-industrial knowhow. It is tempting to view this 
approach as science-fictional anticipation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1940 
declaration that America “must be the great arsenal of democracy” (qtd. in Kennedy 
469). 
 Such a reading should be approached with caution. Though FDR had been 
plying the electorate with appeals to support America’s allies against the fascists since 
at least 1935, when the first Neutrality Acts were passed, Smith’s saga is not a 
straightforward allegory. Nor is presenting a science-fictional clash of civilizations as a 
dialectic of technological advancement unique to Smith or 1930s sf. Andy Sawyer 
writes that Smith’s paranoid vision of civilizational conflict “offers a sense of the infinite 
sublime which is at the heart of sf’s ‘sense of wonder’” (506), an “other world” where 
“the great moral metanarratives of Totalitarianism versus Democracy can be observed” 
in transformed state (508). Smith repeatedly presents the series’ theme as such. Space 
opera, with its cosmic scales of time and space, is ideally suited to narratives of 
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civilizational struggle. But Adam Roberts, in commenting on Smith’s penchant for 
“colossal” scale in his Skylark series argues that he “takes the fantasy of the individual 
empowerment of Will to a hyperbolic and extraordinarily distasteful extreme” (81-82). 
The struggle is not a mere arms race played out against an empyreal backdrop. It is an 
apologia for technocratic control as manifest destiny. 
 By the time Galactic Patrol was published, the general public in the United 
States had only recently overcome its ambivalence toward electronic 
telecommunication technology. Numerous “wire thrillers” from the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries had dramatized suspicion of the telegraph and telephone; 
images of the spider and octopus conflated in popular imagination the reach of 
telecom networks with the encroachment of faceless corporations into the life of the 
nation. Robert MacDougall argues that the Bell corporation’s sustained propaganda 
campaign, commenced in 1907, decisively reconciled in the following decades 
American attitudes toward corporations, telecom tech, and economic progress within 
the framework of the nation. Time and space had been effectively annihilated by the 
midpoint of the nineteenth century by technologies like railroads and telegraph;  it 31
took until the early twentieth for Americans to process that fact in any meaningful way. 
In this context, Smith introduced his Galactic Patrol: a paramilitary governmental 
organization whose mission was to bring stability to the galaxy, but whose members 
could not be everywhere at once, nor interact effectively with citizens who speak in 
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totally alien languages. “But how—how—can a legal process work efficiently—work at 
all, for that matter—when a man can commit murder or a pirate can loot a space-ship 
and be a hundred parsecs away before the crime is even discovered?” gripes Virgil 
Samms in First Lensman (Vol. 1, 260, originally published 1950). Samms is responsible 
for ensuring the efficient operation of the Patrol, with protecting its citizens, and with 
ensuring its productive expansion. He recognizes that a technological society must 
have a means of coordination if it will succeed, and most especially the Patrol must 
have that means if they are to eliminate vice and corruption from society. The means of 
command and control he procures—the first Lens—signifies the moral and political 
authority of combating backsliding. Smith explicitly argues that such authority properly 
belongs only in the hands of the best and brightest, people of sterling character and 
physical vigor. The authority to conduct surveillance, bend people’s will to the needs of 
the state, and to kill untraceably with but a thought—this authority belongs to the caste 
of scientist-supermen who wear the Lens. 
 More specifically, and more suggestively, it belongs to the Kinnisons, who are 
the product of the Arisians’ millennia-long eugenics project. As early as Galactic Patrol, 
Kim suffers a literally crippling defeat and winds up in the fleet hospital, where he’s 
nursed back to health by Clarissa MacDougall (whom Kim affectionately dubs “Cris”); 
she becomes his fiery love interest and, eventually, wife. In contemplating the pairing 
of nurse-and-patient Haynes holds an extended conversation with Surgeon-Marshal 
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Lacy, the attending physician. Both comment approvingly on the “perfect skeleton” 
possessed by both specimens (646), and Haynes decides that if a woman must fall for 
Kim (as any woman, of course, must), he does not “want him to have such a good 
chance of making a dive at something that doesn’t rate up” (648). In Gray Lensman, 
Haynes and Lacy toast their success as surreptitious matchmakers, with Lacy still in awe 
of their physical superiority: “Man, what a pair of skeletons!” (Vol. 2, 38). Over the 
course of the series, Haynes and Lacy use Galactic Patrol funds to bankroll Kim and 
Cris’s wedding and honeymoon, and when the blessed event finally occurs in Second 
Stage Lensmen (originally published 1941-42), it is staged as a marriage of state, 
televised “to every planet of Civilization,” with viewing figures “too fantastic to be 
repeated here” (487). Upon completion of the vows, “as Kinnison kissed his wife, half a 
million Lensed members were thrust upward in silent salute” (488). Thus the ruling 
caste of the Galactic Patrol, already the upper institutional echelon of civilization, treats 
Kim and Cris as a prince and princess, with royalty flowing through their very veins—or, 
we might say, bred in their bones. 
 Though the ceremony is symbolically and politically important to the Galactic 
Patrol, it is even more vital to the Arisians’ master plan. Mentor, the Arisian emissary to 
the Patrol—who is primarily responsible for dispensing Lenses and training Lensmen in 
their use—tells Kim and Cris that their union “is not merely permissible; it has now 
become necessary” (482). The five Kinnison children, introduced in Children of the Lens 
!180
(originally published 1947-48), at last discover the truth of their provenance. Mentor 
explains that the purpose of the “breeding programs” set up by Arisia for the galaxy’s 
races was “to eliminate as many as possible of their weaknesses and to concentrate all 
of their strengths.” At one point, he tells one Kinnison daughter that she carries “the 
genes of every trait of strength ever known to any member of your human race. 
Therefore, while in outward seeming you are human, in every factor of importance you 
are not; you are even less human than am I myself” (567). That is, they are truly and 
spectacularly superhuman. The Kinnison children are physically perfect, nigh immortal, 
and “have a destiny, the nature of which your mind,” explains Mentor, “is not yet 
qualified to receive” (568). In fact, the children have been bred for a dual purpose. 
Most proximately, Arisia intends for them to deliver, together, the psychic death-blow 
to Eddore. The children, naturally, succeed in this endeavor. More distantly, but no less 
importantly, the children are to evolve into a new species of cosmic guardians to 
replace the Arisians, so that when the next threat emerges to destroy civilization itself, 
civilization will have been made ready. In sum, the Galactic Patrol has been designed 
from time immemorial by godlike beings to establish a hierarchical caste system across 
all civilized worlds so that its eugenically advanced guardians could take their rightful 
place at its apex. This is the logic of technological positivism coupled with the 
jeremiad’s world-historical redemptive mission and pushed to its cosmic extremity. 
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 The soteriological promise of the Lensmen must contend with a society 
constantly in danger of backsliding, and only people with their rectitude and mental 
fitness are capable of rising to the challenge. Second Stage Lensman, for instance, 
begins moments after the end of Gray Lensman, with Mentor halting Kim and Cris on 
their way out the door to get married. The Arisian encourages him to look again at his 
supposed victory against the latest iteration of Boskone, pushing him to recognize that 
the organization has once again wriggled free of his grasp. “I should have seen them,” 
reflects Kim. “Little things, mostly, but significant. Not so much positive as negative 
indices” (266). Mentor’s prompt for Kim to look more closely at the details—a paranoid 
reading practice, one might say, in the vein of that which Donnelly practiced back in 
1890—only makes sense in a narrative where a civilization’s guardians must attend to its 
internal virtues and vices, not just its external threats. Indeed, the structure of the series 
establishes the interplay between internal corruption and external threat. Just as the 
Galactic Patrol manages to mop up Boskone’s bases in its own galaxy, it discovers in 
Second Stage Lensmen that Boskone has for some time been operating out of a 
second galaxy! This external galaxy, too, is soon brought under the aegis of the 
Galactic Patrol. Haynes vows, “‘We’ll civilize ‘em!’” (Vol. 2, 399), and indeed, in true 
settler colonial fashion, the Patrol “imported millions upon millions of men, with their 
women and families” (407-408); Smith records that “the invaders”—that is, the Patrol—
began to “allow—yes, foster—free speech and statutory liberty; they suppressed 
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ruthlessly any person or any faction seeking to build a new dictatorship, whatever its 
nature, upon the ruins of the old” (393). Yet even once both galaxies have been 
successfully colonized, there emerges a “Civilization-wide epidemic of revolutions and 
uprisings for which there seems to be no basis or justification whatsoever” (502). 
Keeping order on that scale—stoking the light of civilization on an intergalactic scale—
can only be done by Lensmen. It can only be done by a caste specifically suited to the 
purpose. In jeremiadic fashion, only the Elect can carry that torch. 
 Even though Arisia has the power to predict and control future events, it cannot 
do to omnisciently, and neither can the Kinnison progeny. The five Kinnison children 
destroy the Eddorian threat once and for all, but backsliding remains a danger. Mentor 
leaves the children with this message: 
The time may come when your descendants will realize, as we did, their 
inadequacy for continued Guardianship. Their visualizations, as did ours, may 
become imperfect and incomplete. If so, they will then know that the time will 
have come for them to develop, from the highest race then existing, new and 
more competent Guardians. (730) 
In one of Smith’s most effective stylistic moves, Children of the Lens is bookended by a 
message from the eldest Kinnison child, Kit. In the final passage of the book, he 
addresses civilized people in a future time of crisis: “You already know that Civilization 
is again threatened seriously. You probably know something of the basic nature of that 
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threat… Know now that the task of your race, so soon to replace us, will be to see that 
it does not fall… Prepare your mind for contact” (731). The burden of knowing 
“something of the basic nature of that threat” is placed on the future—it lies beyond 
the power of the Kinnison kids’ visualization. But visualization is adequate to the task of 
recognizing when the crisis will come, and of recognizing the potential inherent in 
whatever species is destined to assume the mantle of guardianship. The Lens is the 
ultimate symbol of stewardship of the galactic city on the hill, and while the problems 
of one generation are necessarily not those of the next, the need for stewardship 
remains a cosmological constant. 
 The only institutional bulwark capable of preventing societal decline, the only 
one capable of managing emerging crises, is the moral and political institutionalization 
of the Lens. This is the meaning of Kim and Cris’s “necessary” marriage and the 
transcendence of their children beyond humanity. It’s also the meaning of the Galactic 
Patrol itself. Alexei and Cory Panshin argue, “Smith’s stories, with their mastery of the 
macrocosm and visions of higher levels of possible being, simultaneously served to 
sum up Age of Technology science fiction and laid the groundwork for the modern 
science fiction of the coming Atomic Age” (228). The Lens itself, as Kim is told as he is 
about to join the Cadet Corps, is “not essentially scientific in nature. It is almost entirely 
philosophical” (Vol. 1, 499). Kim discovers in Gray Lensman that he no longer needs his 
Lens on him to use his mental powers (Vol. 2, 80), and his children are born with the 
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ability to manifest their own Lenses (Vol. 2, 505). Much like space opera itself, as 
Patricia Monk’s argues, the Lens could be thought of as an attitudinal bias—but one 
only materially effective when applied by people of superior character and expertise. In 
this, the Lens prescribes technocratic control. 
 Taken as a philosophical approach to the cosmos, the Lens science-fictionally 
makes society—its individuals and groups—as malleable as nature’s raw material. 
Manipulation of the masses—that is, literally planets and populations—is what the Lens 
is for. It is there to facilitate technocratic control. On a civilizational level, nothing is 
beyond the reach of the technological positivism embodied by the Lens and its psionic 
wielders. Brian Aldiss glibly dubs this “the logical development of Gernsbackian 
thought, the infinite extension of technology for its own sake, the glamorous disease of 
gigantism” (209). Let me reframe his comment a bit. The near-infinite expansion of 
scale in Smith’s Lensmen is an extension of a pulp-era technological positivism that 
regarded the natural world as a reservoir of near-infinite resources. It is also an 
extension of an industrialized, networked society whose rapidly expanded size and 
increasing diversity could only be managed by communications technologies that 
defied the capacity of the human imagination. The science-fictional conceit of the Lens 
is a way for Smith to project his fantasy of authoritarian control over an increasingly 
networked society—an increasingly networked global society—onto a technocratic 
elite whose civilizing mission derives from the discourse of the jeremiad. We have 
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already seen how technological positivism fed into the space opera of the science-
fiction pulps, but the political authority of the Lens which we have charted derives from 
an even more specific offshoot of this discourse. The idea that the minds of the masses 
could be controlled or surveilled through modern technology, was not new, but the 
specificity of the Lens as a science-fictional way to imagine those technologies of 
technocratic control ties into the role of psychic—or psionic—abilities in scientific 
discourse at the time, particularly in the stories edited by John W. Campbell, Jr. 
Terra Incognita, a Half Inch Back 
  
 Wherever psionics are semantically involved in propping up political power, it is 
likely to be the case that they signal a site of contested authority. Parapsychology never 
gained the traction with the scientific community that its advocates felt it deserved, but 
it always enjoyed a certain amount of cultural currency. In 1930, Dr. J. B. Rhine began 
conducting experiments at Duke University which were meant to establish scientific 
data confirming the existence of extra-sensory perception, or ESP. His faith in his 
research conveys a whiff a positivism. “In this more secure approach,” he wrote in New 
Frontiers of the Mind (1937), “we rely upon neither the proofless revelation of the 
primitive priest nor the unverified speculation of the ancient philosopher” (3). Rhine 
looked askance at “the circumscribing law of mind” that restricted sensory capacity to 
the five material senses, declaring of this arbitrary boundary line, “whether we like it or 
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not, the old frontier must go the way of Newtonian mechanics in the light of 
relativity” (269). Like many revolutionaries, Rhine attempted to accomplish by 
declarative fiat the overturning of established theories and practices in favor of a new 
paradigm. But the still-relatively young scientific establishment was fully capable of 
striking back at the parapsychological insurgency. 
 In his ESP: A Scientific Evaluation (1966), a thorough debunking of the most 
prominent parapsychological research to date, C. E. M. Hansel wrote that his review of 
the literature was merited in part because it had infiltrated the scientific establishment 
to such a degree that “investigations are in progress in numerous university 
departments… and higher degrees are awarded in the topic” (4). And a paper 
published in Philosophy of Science in October 1938 expressed concern about the 
philosophical premises of parapsychological research. In it, H. Rogosin accused Rhine 
and his cohort of taking “psychological thought in the direction of the anti-materialistic 
doctrine of philosophical idealism” (482). He claimed that “in the history of science, 
which is coextensive with the history of civilization, the immaterial does not exist. 
Whatever is scientific, is to be considered as true by definition: Truth and Science are 
equivalent” (475). Here seems to be a parallel positivism to Rhine’s, just one more 
heavily invested in materialism. Both vectors have their historical roots in the 
establishment of science as an institutional discipline in the nineteenth century. 
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 Historically, natural science had most often been a gentleman’s pastime, but the 
1800s saw an explosion of interest on the part of amateurs and aspiring professionals 
alike. Martin Willis characterizes Victorian-era science as “a wide range of practices and 
beliefs without strict boundaries or accepted regulations, a melting pot of discordant 
models of the natural world struggling for supremacy and legitimacy” (11). It took the 
better part of a century for coteries of learned individuals, interested government 
reformers, and dedicated entrepreneurs to build the foundations of the scientific 
establishment currently ensconced in universities and corporations and fueled by a 
labyrinthine ecosystem of grants and capitalist ventures. Within the nineteenth 
century’s burbling stew of quasi-scholarly discourse, a number of intellectuals and 
naturalists pursued paranormal research as part of the general push toward an 
episteme rooted in modern scientific investigation.   32
 The legitimacy of parapsychological research, even in these heady days, was 
often questioned by skeptics, which prompted the formation in England of the Society 
for Psychical Research in July 1882.  Roger Luckhurst argues persuasively that 33
telepathy specifically is a useful “device for traversing the knowledge networks of the 
late Victorian era” (4). As coined by Frederick Myers in the pages of the Proceedings of 
the Society for Psychical Research, the “scientific” phenomenon of telepathy became a 
way for Victorian thinkers to organize their knowledge of the world, however that 
knowledge was derived. As it turned out, parapsychology was successfully banished to 
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the margins by the beginning of the twentieth century, but not before it had taken root 
in science fiction. Stories by Edgar Allan Poe, Henry Dummond, Edward Bellamy, and 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton all featured telepathy and other parapsychological tropes.  34
These and other Victorian texts struck an uneasy balance between mind and matter, 
spirit and materialism. Perhaps even more than later sf texts, they insisted upon a 
materialist explanation for paranormal phenomena.  In contrast to the fear of 35
interlocutors like Rogosin, psychical researchers of the Victorian era often sought to 
domesticate occult knowledge under the discipline of natural science. Rhine’s effort in 
the 1930s to bring ESP, telepathy, clairvoyance, etc. into accepted scientific discourse is 
a direct extension of this ethos. But the basic contest over what constitutes legitimate 
science remained at issue, and that contest informed the struggle for interested parties
—such as science fiction writers—to acquire cultural and political currency by invoking 
the authority of science. 
 The science fiction of the 1930s and 40s reflects the tense negotiation between 
the materialism of natural science—held so dear by Rogosin—and the yearning for 
something more expressed by Rhine. In his taxonomy of “psi fi,” Peter Lowentrout 
argues that sf writers grew less concerned with integrating mental powers into a 
materialist paradigm by the end of the 1950s. Instead, psionics were “all implicitly 
grounded in a radical and transcendent unity of being”—a metaphysical, theophanus 
kind of psi fi story (399). By contrast, he classes Lensmen with the “biological radio” 
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stories of the forties and fifties, in which the psionic power is explained as a 
“somatically-based talent” (392-3). Lowentrout’s categorical distinctions signal, for him, 
the ways that the texts construe plausibility in their cultural contexts. Biological radio 
psi fi assumes that mental powers inhere in the physical makeup of the person. 
Metaphysical psi fi assumes that “a fictional world of epic proportions without a point 
of transcendence is counterintuitive, finally less persuasive than one which includes the 
transcendent” (394). As times change and new technologies are developed, the 
paradigm of plausibility changes as well.  The distinctions Lowentrout draws do not 36
fully capture the thrust of Smith’s use of psionics, because Smith’s vision is finally 
metaphysical in the sense that he means it—though the Lensmen certainly possess 
“biological radio” talents, they represent for Smith a transcendent appeal to cosmic 
order and civilizational redemption. 
 The Panshins’ articulate precisely this appeal in the series. Though they find 
Smith’s Lensmen series to be “dull” (227), they herald 1930s science fiction as a beacon 
of hope, as striking a note of optimism in a nation awash in narratives of civilizational 
decline:  
In that hour of political and economic desperation, with the whole world 
apparently falling into collapse, a handful of exploratory writers had flatly denied 
the inevitability of the decline and fall of Western man. Instead, these bold 
visionaries had foreseen man bursting free of the bonds of Earth and leaping 
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lightly to the stars… So powerful would men become that they might destroy 
whole planets with nothing more than a seeming child’s toy or the pure 
overwhelming power of their thought. Out of the nothingness of space, they 
might produce anything their hearts desired. And there would even come a day 
when ancient alien races saluted humanity for its maturity and breadth of vision, 
and men served as the guardians of the galaxy. (346-347) 
Lensmen is, in this view, absolutely a transcendent, metaphysical kind of psi fi story—
albeit one rooted in cosmogonic eugenics, in a Manichean vision of intelligent design. 
More importantly, Smith’s science-fictional negotiation of the material and spiritual 
through his use of psionic supermen taps into a discourse with roots in nineteenth-
century natural science in order to present a new kind of technocracy: one whose 
technical mastery of the universe is signified, in the Lens, by mastery of the mind. As 
we have seen in Lensmen, this science-fictional negotiation builds technocracy into a 
jeremiadic errand into the wilderness. 
 Perhaps the greatest apologist for this technocracy was John W. Campbell, Jr., 
who championed the union of technological positivism and psionic potential in the 
pages of Astounding Science Fiction. When Campbell took over as editor-in-chief of 
Astounding (ASF) from F. Orlin Tremaine in 1938, he immediately set about expanding 
the literary potential of science fiction. Besides publishing seminal stories by genre 
luminaries such as Robert A. Heinlein, Clifford Simak, A. E. van Vogt, Frank Herbert, 
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and (as we’ll see) Isaac Asimov, Campbell championed sf as a vital and necessary mode 
of social prophecy. Aldiss compares Campbell’s ASF to an orchestra: “Space travel was 
the major chord, with war and telepathy as minor ones” (221). With Campbell as 
conductor, his magazine provided the overture that prepared the Western world for the 
Space Age, an era in which technological development demands continuity and 
expansion. Aldiss continues, “The Manhattan Project, involving specialists from many 
countries, drove the lesson home,—but the lesson is foreshadowed in science fiction 
before it emerges in society” (224). Campbell had made much of the fact that ASF 
predicted the atomic bomb before Hiroshima, having published Cleve Cartmill’s 
“Deadline” in March 1944—a story so scientifically accurate that government agents 
interviewed the editor and author to establish whether or not they were national 
security risks.  If sf had prepared the way for atomic physics, Campbell hoped that sf 37
would be the forerunner of a revolution in parapsychology, too. 
  In his 1953 essay, “The Place of Science Fiction,” Campbell reviewed the 
seismic shift of atomic energy and sf’s role in helping society grapple with its political 
implications. Allow me to quote two illustrative passages from that essay: 
The culture we live in today accepts the need and the inevitability of change. 
But only gradually is it beginning to recognize, too, the vital necessity of 
discussing the nature of the change that are desirable before making them and 
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trying them out. Science is the magic that works; it contains no moral or ethical 
judgments whatever. (15) 
In other words, if we don’t anticipate probable technological changes in our fiction, we 
will be that much more unprepared to deal responsibly with their dangers once they 
become a reality of daily life. This is the role he claimed for sf with regard to the Cold 
War. Science fiction’s role, in Campbell’s opinion, is to assume the kind of moral 
authority that science lacks. In practice, this means political authority. He then took it a 
step beyond atomic energy. 
Human thought, not atomic energy, is the most powerful force for either 
construction or destruction in the human universe. It is this aspect that science 
fiction is exploring today—the most dangerous and most magnificent of all terra 
incognita still lies a half inch back of your own forehead. Naturally, that is the 
next great area of exploration for science fiction! (21) 
It is vital here to bear in mind the scope of the Manhattan Project and the infrastructure 
necessary to bring nuclear power to fruition in the years leading up to Hiroshima.  In 38
this essay, Campbell does not grapple with the institutional prerequisites for the 
success of the nuclear program, nor would he necessarily be inclined to do so. As 
Albert I. Berger argues throughout his literary biography of Campbell, ASF’s editor-in-
chief was a reactionary—an authoritarian and an elitist—but he balked incessantly at 
the prospect of institutionalizing technological progress in the form of government 
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programs or private corporations.  But Campbell’s suspicion of the demos always 39
trumped his rankling against the elite. Berger summarizes Campbell’s conviction that 
“technology was the source of a better life for all, the prime mover of human history; 
therefore, the machine must be kept running”; the social machine therefore “must 
become as predictable as physical laws, despite the contemporary absence of a true 
science of sociology to make it possible” (175-176). Lensmen enshrined its telepathic 
supermen at the very apex of an overtly stratified caste system whose political authority 
rests primarily upon a technologically positivist evolutionary arc. And that political 
power rests explicitly in the hands of a technocratic police state. Though its leaders are 
not quite engineers and scientists per se, they are the only ones capable of managing 
the apparatus, which makes them technocrats above all else. 
 Like parapsychology itself, science fiction during this period sought legitimacy as 
a literary form, and Campbell was at the forefront of that quest. As his essay suggests, 
Campbell sought to legitimize science-fictional literature on an essentially prophetic 
basis. More than being able to predict the future, Campbell claims for sf a unique 
moral and political authority that science itself could not claim. But it is also sf’s 
penchant for accurately tapping into scientific inquiry and theory—such as nuclear 
physics—for its narratives that makes it, in Campbell’s view, relevant to society. In 
circular fashion, Campbell relies upon society’s embrace of technological positivism in 
order to argue that technologically positivist science fiction has the authority to critique 
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technological positivism. In the context of the crisis of political legitimacy scientists 
faced after America inaugurated the Atomic Age by dropping two atomic weapons on 
Japan, this kind of claim makes a kind of prima facie sense. It is as straightforward as 
claiming that art can be a critical reflection on society, as boilerplate as one can be in 
justifying the social role of the artist. Weirdly, though, Campbell then stakes sf’s unique 
claim to authority on human thought—which is to say, parapsychology. Psionics. Of all 
the science-fictional conceits that he could invoke to legitimate the political authority of 
his literary domain, Campbell chooses the “terra incognita… a half inch back of your 
own forehead.” In the pages of his magazine, explorations of psionic power were 
prophecies about the untapped potential of the human mind to reshape the very fabric 
of the social order. These prophecies tied the pinnacle of human scientific achievement
—the final fulfillment of civilizational redemption, the ultimate realization of positivism
—to the fringe scientific discourse of parapsychology. The badge of political and moral 
authority, the Lens, is a science-fictional emblem of this discourse.  
 As it happens, Campbell—a former test subject of Rhine, it may be worth 
mentioning —published a series of stories in ASF between 1942 and 1950 that 40
reflected his concerns much more subtly. These stories told of imperial decline and fall 
and the city on the hill that serves as a beacon of hope in the new dark ages; it was a 
series about civilizational crises and the providential plan that guides the chosen 
community toward its redemptive destiny. The city on the hill, populated entirely by 
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scientifically-minded people, works throughout the interregnum to exert counter-
hegemonic influence from the margins. It succeeds brilliantly. And then, one day, it is 
discovered that the civilizational guardians actually responsible for its success possess 
incredible psionic power. 
Seldon’s Jeremiad  
  
 There were three key influences on Isaac Asimov’s development of the original 
Foundation stories in the 1940s. First was Edward Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire (1776-89), upon which the young Asimov meditated one day on his way 
to a meeting with Campbell. A history buff, he’d long cherished historical novels and 
wanted to write one—a galactic variation of Gibbon struck him as potentially 
interesting.  Second, as he mused on a science-fictional plot device for how to bring 41
this off, Asimov reflected on the laws of gas molecule behavior, which he learned from 
classes at Columbia University: “The randomness of their motion works out to the point 
where you can predict the total behavior of the gas very accurately, using the gas 
laws… We know these things even though we don't know how individual molecules 
behave” (Ingersoll et al. 70). Finally, there was Campbell himself, who persuaded 
Asimov not to write a story about decline, but about the birth of the new empire.  The 42
resulting trilogy is perhaps the most classically jeremiadic space opera ever written.  43
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 In Foundation (1951), a mathematician named Hari Seldon in a far-future 
Galactic Empire invents an advanced statistical model that he calls “psychohistory.” His 
model predicts that the Empire will fall, and the ensuing anarchy will cause a dark age 
that lasts for 30,000 years. Facing exile for daring to question the invulnerability of the 
empire, Seldon proposes establishing a pair of Benedictine-esque colonies: one, 
dubbed “Foundation,”on the planet Terminus, at the outermost rim of the empire; and 
a second on a vaguely-defined “Star’s End.” In the Foundation project, men and 
women of learning will pool the accumulated knowledge of the millennia into an 
Encyclopedia Galactica, which will reduce the dark age to a mere thousand years. 
Within fifty years, Terminus begins to face a series of existential crises as the barbarism 
resulting from the empire’s collapse threatens its security. It is at this point that we learn 
the true purpose of the Foundation, as revealed by a holographic recording of Seldon, 
timed to appear at specific points in Foundation’s history: the Encyclopedia project was 
a sham meant to force the renascent civilization through a series of crises, “and in each 
case,” Seldon’s recording calmly informs his legatees, “your freedom of action will 
become similarly circumscribed so that you will be forced along one, and only one, 
path” (94). However, Seldon cannot reveal the path to victory, nor the science of 
psychology, lest his psychohistorical calculations be thrown off. His legatees must 
simply have faith in his plan. “But whatever devious course your future history may 
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take,” Seldon concludes, “impress it always upon your descendants that the path has 
been marked out, and that at its end is a new and greater Empire!” (96). 
 For the rest of Foundation and the first half of Foundation and Empire (1952), 
the descendants face a series of “Seldon crises” which clever protagonists resolve by 
exploiting the structural weaknesses of the military and economic forces arrayed 
against Terminus. After each crisis, the gathered doubts about whether there is a 
correct path to victory transform into cumulative faith in the probability—nay, the 
inevitability—of success. The mayors of Foundation do, as Seldon importuned, impress 
upon their descendants the rightness of Seldon’s Plan.  A direct conflict with the 
Empire’s mightiest general ends up being neutralized in Foundation’s favor by the 
overdetermination of macroeconomic and political forces—metaphorized by “the dead 
hand of Hari Seldon” pointing toward the future (96). 
 Then the Mule arrives and throws everything into chaos. As the next Seldon 
Crisis dawns, the statesmen of Foundation complacently expect to emerge from the 
fray once more on the right side of history. When Seldon’s hologram appears once 
again on schedule, though, his predictions are skewed by the Mule’s conquest of the 
galaxy. The Mule, it turns out, is a mutant with incredible empathic powers, able to 
adjust the “emotional balance” of entire populations (253). A small band of Seldon 
Plan loyalists travel to Trantor, former seat of the imperium, to search the archives for a 
clue to the location of Star’s End: the Second Foundation. They narrowly manage to 
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prevent the Mule from discovering it, but his unpredictably effective conquest forces 
the Second Foundation not only to reveal its existence, but its purpose: to serve as the 
stewards of psychohistory’s calculations. “‘It’s the more important of the two,’” declares 
the psychologist responsible for nearly discovering its location. “‘It’s the critical one; 
the one that counts!” (261) Beyond serving as the keepers of the psychohistorical 
flame, Second Foundation has also developed psychological science to the point 
where they, too, possess something like the Mule’s power—the ability to manipulate 
the emotions of others. Second Foundation’s desperate ploy to thwart the Mule’s 
autocratic ambitions succeeds, but at the cost of alerting First Foundation that 
Terminus is not the real crux of the Seldon’s scheme. Instead, Second Foundation has 
been manipulating First Foundation all along—all as part of the Plan.  
 Reactions to this revelation vary wildly. Terminus was taken unawares once by 
Seldon with the Encyclopedia Galactica, and again in Second Foundation (1953). Some 
Foundation citizens form a secret cabal with the intent of ferreting out Second 
Foundation and preventing it from “adjusting” them any further (179-81, 253). Their 
efforts drive most of the plot in the last half of Second Foundation. Other citizens, 
though, simply rely upon Second Foundation to carry through the inevitability of the 
Seldon Plan’s success. A Foundation combat engineer being interviewed during 
wartime discounts the enemy’s faith in victory: “‘Even if things got too bad, that’s when 
I’d expect the Second Foundation to step in. We still got the Seldon Plan—and they 
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know it, too’” (235). The intense self-awareness of the Seldon Plan’s mechanisms 
threaten to cause a sort of Heisenberg reaction in the psychohistorical calculations, so 
the Second Foundation executes yet another desperate mission to convince First 
Foundation’s citizens that 1.) they can’t be “handled” by Second Foundation, and 2.) 
that Second Foundation therefore is not the prime mover of galactic history. The ruse 
succeeds, and it is revealed to the reader that the masters of mental science have 
actually been based on Trantor the entire time—the “‘social opposite end of the 
Galaxy’” from the stultified, weak-minded mandarins of the dying empire (277). The 
trilogy thus ends with Seldon’s Plan apparently put back on track with no one but 
Second Foundation’s leaders the wiser. 
 Much like First Foundation’s citizens, Marxist critics have not liked the idea that 
they’re being handled. Charles Elkins accuses Asimov of “vulgar Marxism”: however 
Seldon’s Plan is understood—as a predictive formula or an agenda carried out by 
psychically-powered overlords—Elkins contends that Asimov’s brand of historical 
determinism denies true agency both to individuals and the masses, which “is the very 
essence of slavery” (34). Angus Taylor also perceives “vulgarized Marx” in Foundation. 
He sniffs, “No doubt it is too much to expect philosophical profundity from fiction that 
is sold in supermarkets and intended above all as entertainment” (64). But Carl 
Freedman notes that Asimov’s psychohistory resolves the “practical exigencies of 
periodical publication,” giving “the trilogy the mulitsecular sweep that the plot 
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requires. The Seldon Plan itself is allowed to function as, in effect, the protagonist of 
the story” (130). Freedman by no means excuses Asimov through this observation, 
noting that psychohistory, “like all versions of positivism, is essentially contemplative 
rather than transformative and dialectical,” with the masses reduced to a passive role. 
“The artificial separation between knowing subject and known object leads as 
contemplative epistemologies almost invariably tend to, towards the investing of all 
meaningful agency in an elite and aloof clerisy” (133-134)—Second Foundation being 
the prime example of the latter, and very much presented by Asimov as 
characteristically technocratic. These critics are right to note the elitism inherent in the 
series, whether it is embodied by Seldon and the mayors in the earlier chapters of the 
series or the empaths of Second Foundation in later chapters. But it’s also worth 
keeping in mind that Asimov’s historiographical models were primarily Gibbon and 
Arnold Toynbee, not Marx.  As Freedman observes, Seldon’s “quasi-actuarial 44
prediction of the future” (136) is “the reduction of science to nineteenth-century 
positivism” (133), not a meaningful engagement with historical materialism. 
 Rather than trying to map psychohistory onto a Marxist dialectic (vulgar or 
otherwise), it is more useful to read psychohistory as the melding of quasi-actuarial 
prediction (as Freedman shrewdly puts it) with providential historiography to produce a 
transcendent technological positivism. In Foundation, the Encyclopedia Galactica entry 
on psychohistory defines it as “that branch of mathematics which deals with the 
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reactions of human conglomerates to fixed social and economic stimuli…” with 
references to “Seldon’s First Theorem” and the “Seldon functions,” etc. (19). But the 
way Seldon speaks of his Plan is, as evidenced above in his hologram’s dialogue, 
jeremiadic in a classic sense: promising a trial of the faithful in a time of crisis, but also 
promising eventual triumph if his legatees place faith in his psychohistorical calculations
—which is to say, the founding covenant of the Foundation remnant. The apogee of 
purely providential thinking comes in Foundation and Empire, as a former imperial 
courtier ruminates, “‘There was a dead hand pushing all of us; the mighty general and 
the great Emperor; my world and your world—the dead hand of Hari Seldon” (96), 
acknowledging, “I can’t prove anything; I haven’t the mathematics. But I appeal to your 
reason” (98). Reason here retains the human-centric undertone of Enlightenment 
philosophy, which saw no necessary contradiction between religion and reason.  45
Civilization as a whole is history’s protagonist, but only the Elect can usher the story to 
its triumphant conclusion—the Elect being the inhabitants of that celestial city on a hill, 
Terminus. The errand into the wilderness was initially conceived of as a way to redeem 
the Old World from the periphery of civilization, and the arc of the Foundation trilogy 
adheres closely to that model.  46
 Faith in Seldon’s Plan is, for the First Foundation, a science-fictional device in 
itself, a kind of feat of applied scientific engineering that feeds a positivist ideology. 
Maxine Moore notes that Asimov’s fiction generally presents technology as “another of 
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many servant-gods” which humanity simultaneously reveres and despises—a 
contentious relationship predicated upon the determining role it seems to play in our 
development. “Asimov,” she says, “as a matchmaker who weds Moses to Calvin, 
Einstein officiating, has, in the New England tradition, postulated a massive philosophy 
based on fixed fate” (103). What she means by this is that Asimov’s seeks to derive a 
liberal humanism from his determinist historical philosophy, and he leans upon his 
science-fictional technologies—such as robots or psychohistory—to do so. American 
evangelicals who have inherited the cultural theology of the Puritans retain a practice 
of “occupation”: a sense of urgency to prepare for a future about which they believe 
they have certain knowledge. Rather than contemplation, apocalyptic faith promotes 
active promotion of readiness for the End.  In the Foundation trilogy, the primary 47
struggle is always over what shall be done in the face of impending crisis. Even after 
the surety of the Seldon Plan is established, the struggle then shifts from ascertaining 
the correct course of action (or non-action) to determining the proper way for the 
Foundation to occupy itself until the Plan comes to full fruition and redeems the galaxy 
from the barbarism of the interregnum. This shift happens gradually over the course of 
the first two novels, until the gravity of the Mule’s threat becomes apparent. While 
Freedman rightly notes the largely contemplative stance of providential historiography, 
in the Foundation series, it is only the masses that occupy that role, while the 
technocrats of both First and Second Foundation exercise a great deal of agency, with 
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Seldon’s dead had serving as the ultimate technocratic metonym. The gradual shift 
from the First Foundation’s technological positivism to the Second Foundation’s 
technocratic positivism registers an evolution in the series’ conception of the role the 
ruling caste must play in guiding the city on the hill toward the goal of its covenanted, 
redemptive mission. 
 At first, it is the Foundation’s superior technology that gives it the ability to exert 
its counter-hegemonic influence. From the periphery, the tiny dust mote of Terminus 
cultivates a priestly aura with its advanced technology in order to cow its neighbors, 
then innovates a flourishing mercantile trade network, amassing wealth and privilege 
enough to build up its military. Once the Mule upsets Seldon’s Plan, though, the 
emphasis on technology shifts from the physical sciences to the mental. The Panshins 
say that the intrusion of the Mule upon the Foundation series marks a point where sf 
had “cast off the appearance of science-beyond-science which had served it through 
the modern scientific era, and presented it in the shining new raiment of 
consciousness-beyond-consciousness,” ostentatiously claiming, “We may understand it 
as the sign of the start of a whole new era in the social and psychic development of the 
Western World” (630). This is not quite accurate. 
 What the emergence of the Mule and the revelation of the Second Foundation 
signify is a shift in the focus of technological positivism. Space opera had provided a 
canvas on which to paint spectacular scenes of civilizational conflict, often with a focus 
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on rocket ships, ray guns, and strange, new worlds. In Lensmen, these tropes represent 
most of the action, yet Smith built his series around the establishment of an elite caste 
which represented the next, higher stage of human development. Civilizational conflict 
was ultimately represented by an arms race not of physical might but of willpower and 
the capacity to wield a state apparatus—the Galactic Patrol—effectively. The 
technology of the Lens made the Patrol’s dominance possible, thus redeeming the 
entire cosmos. The Kinnisons themselves, however, are but the apex of a centralized, 
authoritarian hegemon. Their mental superpowers are the sign of their superiority and 
fitness to rule, and their dominion is enforced and facilitated by the Patrol’s mastery of 
the material universe. For Smith, these overlapping magisteria—material and mental 
control—are isomorphic and located in the same small, elite caste. The Lensman saga 
thus science-fictionally registers a cruder, overtly authoritarian technocratic ideology, in 
which engineers simply are the best equipped to manage the socioeconomic structure 
of society by virtue of their command of the universe’s material forces.  
 Asimov adds a little more complexity to the technocratic formula. By Seldon’s 
design, the First Foundation is restricted to mastery of the material universe; the 
Second Foundation is restricted to mastery of the mind. The First Speaker of the 
Second Foundation explains that in Seldon’s vision, “the First Foundation supplies the 
physical framework of a single political unit, and the Second Foundation supplies the 
mental framework of a ready-made ruling class” (Second 127). Asimov parses his 
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hierarchy much more finely than Smith and makes it clear that those with the highest 
psychological training are those guiding the course of history—and thus also guiding 
the material control of the universe. Smith fairly consistently cleaves mental to material 
power throughout Lensman. Asimov feels his way toward an embrace of the mental 
power paradigm over the course of the stories that comprise the Foundation trilogy, 
but like Smith, he presents each new installment as a revelation of a technocratic logic 
that had been there all along. Even if the introduction of the Mule and Second 
Foundation signals a shift in focus, Asimov retroactively recognizes (or reorganizes) the 
series as having been about command and control over the mind. Without the advent 
of the Mule, the Foundation series might have been simply a more urbane 
recapitulation of the themes explored in Lensmen, as his scientist-heroes bring to 
fruition a plan worked out in advance by a technocratic mastermind. Like the Kinnisons, 
who have been bred for generations for their roles as cosmic-historical redeemers, the 
Foundation mavericks would simply have fulfilled the Seldon Plan because they are the 
Elect and because their City on a Hill must survive. But First Foundation does not 
engage in active technocratic control in order to bring Seldon’s Plan to fruition. Instead, 
the engineers of Second Foundation are the ones constantly nudging history along the 
right path. They might not possess the material engineering prowess of First 
Foundation, but they are the ones who set the table for the engineers of Terminus. 
Without their guidance, no feats of science and engineering would be necessary or 
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possible. The psionic masters of Second Foundation exert centralized control over 
people, primarily—everything else follows from that, including the fulfillment of 
Seldon’s jeremiadic covenant. 
 Science and technology in Second Foundation are a blend of technical knowhow 
and emotion. Second Foundation’s clerisy all contribute anonymously to something 
called the Prime Radiant, which allows the Plan continually to be updated and revised 
according to advanced mathematical formulae. But, the First Speaker cautions, “A 
Speaker must not only be aware of the mathematical intricacies of the Seldon Plan; he 
must have a sympathy for it and for its ends. He must love the Plan; to him it must be 
life and breath. More than that, it must be even as a living friend” (20-21). For Second 
Foundation’s chief engineers, the future is not inevitable; it is a living, breathing entity 
that must be tended and cared for. Humanity is history here, as Freedman and David 
M. Hassler observe, and it must be looked after. All science and technical 
accomplishment point toward that one end. What the technicians of Second 
Foundation practice, in effect, is sociology in the classic, Comtean sense of the term. 
The Right Side of History 
  
 As we have seen from their chronological overlap and the convergence of both 
series in the pages of John W. Campbell’s Astounding Science Fiction, the period 
stretching from the Depression to the postwar years showcased a profound interest in 
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managerial control over industrial society. The science-fictional expression of this 
interest was the development of institutions through which powerful telepaths could 
exert control over the patterns of social life. The only ones capable of gaining a firm 
grasp of the socioeconomic turbulence seemed to be those with the ability to cut 
through the noise and direct human energies where they would be utilized most 
efficiently. Both Smith and Asimov embrace the logic of sociological control through 
the device of a psionic clerisy. Psionic power was a way to represent, science-fictionally, 
the political, moral, and scientific authority of an elite caste; it was a way to extend the 
authority of technological positivism into the realm of those who could prophetically 
narrate the consequences of applied technique—namely, those with the power to 
manage the massive communication infrastructure that would power postindustrial 
society. People like John W. Campbell, Jr. thought that such experts might well be 
science-fiction writers themselves. But in the words of cyberneticist Norbert Wiener, it 
would simply those who would best recognize and utilize the potential human use of 
human beings.  48
 In his essay, “Social Science Fiction,” Asimov praises the “heights” to which 
Smith and Campbell brought space opera, and suggests that such adventure stories 
have their place in acclimating young readers to more sophisticated sf: “space opera, 
unlike horse opera, is not a dead end” (170). Asimov contends, “Science fiction is the 
literature of social change, and it treats social change as the norm” (189). He situates 
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the inevitability of social—political—change within the legacy of the Industrial 
Revolution. Politically, science fiction has the potential to make the politics of 
“technological advance” (167) more legible than political discourse itself: “while 
changes in political affairs often hit us at an abstract and rarefied level, technological 
changes always hit home, right in the bread basket” (166). The responses to change in 
Lensmen and Foundation place political authority in the hands of qualified mental 
technicians—sociologists who are able to alter the social fabric through direct 
apprehension of the minds of the populace. In a society where expert management of 
social needs increasingly called for psychosocial insight and canny prediction of 
political fallout from geopolitical decisions, psionic power was a science-fictional way to 
represent those who could science-fictionally apprehend the complex dynamics of 
civilization. 
 The increasingly visible roles of both the federal government and corporations in 
managing the political affairs of a populace too dispersed and too diverse to imagine 
itself as anything other, perhaps, than a federation of worlds made technocracy—with 
its inherent authoritarianism—a viable political alternative in the 1930s and 40s. 
Beyond technocracy per se, the critiques of technology in the 1950s and 60s 
accounted for the mission creep of the managerial class and their intersection with 
phenomena such as mass culture and propaganda.  Those are certainly tools used in 49
social management, but the emphasis in these series is on the nature of the ruling 
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caste itself and what grants it authority. In Lensmen, it is only by yoking the psionic 
strength of the entire Patrol that the Kinnison children are able to defeat Eddore; in 
Foundation, the Second Foundation works collectively and anonymously to update 
Seldon’s Plan and put it into action. It is not enough to possess telepathic technique—
that technique must be coordinated and institutionalized. 
 The Lensmen operate openly from within the governmental hierarchy; the 
Second Foundation operates invisibly from seemingly everywhere and nowhere, but 
they coordinate their actions. In a nation so large that its telecommunication networks 
were initially seen as a threat to local autonomy, Lensmen and Foundation assure their 
audiences that the real source of power is located—if not somewhere—with some one 
or some group. This recognition can spur paranoid quests for hidden conspiracies. The 
Lensmen or the Second Foundation are essentially the form of political control that 
Jack London’s protagonists sought to overthrow in The Iron Heel, only London lacked 
the grammar to articulate it as Smith and Asimov did. The caste system is utterly 
central to the narratives of these series; unlike the critique of caste offered by Du Bois 
and Schuyler, Smith and Asimov affirm its value. Civilization itself is unimaginable 
without its ruling caste. 
 Space opera is a mode of science fiction uniquely suited to depicting 
civilizational conflict. Not everyone agrees that the Foundation trilogy qualifies as 
space opera,  but I endorse Patricia Monk’s claim that the Foundation series 50
!210
“incorporates to the utmost effect space opera’s characteristics of scale and 
multiplexity” (310), especially as it pertains to the civilizing mission of expressed by the 
jeremiad.  The relation of scale to multiplexity really comes into focus, though, when 51
considered in the context of technological positivism in the early/mid-twentieth 
century. Unlike previous jeremiads we have examined, Smith and Asimov do not 
engage in criticizing the ruling caste, but they make it easier to imagine that if such an 
elite caste exists, it is on the right side of history. How can we tell if it is? The answer 
might as well be another question: If the ruling caste weren’t on the right side of 
history, then why does it already wield so much power over us? Anyone can be part of 
an organization. Anyone can be part of a civilization. Not just anyone can discharge the 
duty to preserve and expand that organization, that civilization, through each 
successive crisis. If we prevail through whatever happens to be the current crisis, then 
that must mean the right people were in control.  
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CHAPTER FOUR. Imagining Exodus: Ayn Rand’s Atlas 
Shrugged and Walter M. Miller, Jr.’s A Canticle for 
Leibowitz, 1955-1960 
Banishment and Return 
  
 The biblical book of Jeremiah brims with passages prophesying the fall of the 
kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Fall they do, and God’s chosen people are carried off 
into Babylonian captivity. All those warnings and lamentations delivered by the 
weeping prophet—for what? Nothing the people could do at this point would change 
the course of events. Besides passages prophesying the fall of Israel and lamenting its 
decline, the book also brims with passages in which God promises eventually to call his 
people home, to restore them to their land, to renew the covenant that they broke, but 
which he always will honor. Jeremiah’s purpose is to prepare God’s people for their 
exile, to let them know in no uncertain terms why they are being banished for a time. 
The prophet establishes the terms of the reflection God wishes his people to undertake 
during their exile so that, when they undertake the exodus back to the land promised 
to them, they will do so with right minds and renewed commitment to the ways of the 
Lord. In this respect, one of Jeremiah’s functions as a prophet is to frame for the people 
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what is most important about the mass exodus into exile and the exodus out of 
captivity back to the Promised Land of their ancestors. 
 We have encountered the motif of exodus repeatedly in the narratives examined 
so far. In Caesar’s Column, it is when Gabriel Weltstein takes the refugees from the 
great conflagration to his plantation in Uganda. The settlers of the First Foundation 
make an exodus to Terminus. The motif is arguably present even in The Iron Heel, 
where the revolutionary vanguard figuratively have made their way across the centuries 
to the utopia occupied by Anthony Meredith as he scribbles his annotations on Avis 
Everhard’s manuscript. Surprisingly, George Schuyler’s Black No More even depicts an 
exodus of sorts, as the vast majority of African-Americans who get Dr. Crookman’s 
treatment leave their race and caste behind; the flight of Max Disher and his family 
represents, in a small way, yet another form of exodus. Only in the most distant way do 
W. E. B. Du Bois and E. E. Smith engage with the motif. For Du Bois, deliverance for his 
people out of bondage to a Promised Land forms the yearning that powers Darkwater 
and its penultimate story, though nothing in the story itself until the final scene depicts 
a mass movement of people. And even then, it is a return to New York City of all the 
prejudices and institutional racism from which Jim and Julia’s had almost escaped. In 
“The Comet,” the exodus is more of an ironic subversion of the hopes with which the 
African-American jeremiad typically invests it. Smith’s galactic heroes sometimes 
engage in settler colonialism and imperial conquest, but that is taken in stride as part 
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of civilization’s march. Like London’s revolutionaries, the exodus of the Lensmen takes 
place through the millennia, achieving a pax technocratica that itself will eventually 
give way to further civilizational crisis. 
 For my final chapter, I would like to concentrate our focus on the motif of exodus 
in two texts which were published contemporaneously, but which illustrate vastly 
different prophetic visions of exile and restoration. Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1957) 
stands as her most comprehensive polemic, a monumental tome whose primary 
argument is on behalf of the moral authority granted to every individual who, beholden 
to no other, embraces his own rational, creative potential. This novel’s exodus is the 
withdrawal of the world’s leading artists and captains of industry into a Rocky Mountain 
refuge where they let the world’s welfare state(s) fall to apocalyptic shambles without 
their creative genius. Walter F. Miller’s A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959) charts the rise 
and fall of civilization after nuclear holocaust from the perspective of an abbey, 
dedicated to the preservation of knowledge, in the southeastern North American 
continent. Miller mourns the passing of civilization (though not uncritically) and offers 
two alternate images of hope at the novel’s conclusion, one of which is explicitly an 
exodus to the stars. In high jeremiadic fashion, Rand’s protagonists emerge from their 
city on a hill to forge a new world from the blighted wilderness. Miller’s monks more 
ambivalently board a rocket which is an ark for the species, though signs of life remain 
on the homeworld, even without the church’s spiritual guidance. 
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 The fact of an exodus occurring in each novel is clear enough, but the purpose 
and implications of the exodus are what establish its significance in each text’s 
engagement with the jeremiad. From what sort of captivity are the chosen people 
being delivered? Who is doing the delivering? To what kind of land do they go, and 
what are they meant to do with that covenanted inheritance? In the book of Jeremiah, 
the exile into Babylonian captivity is meant to humble a wayward, stiff-necked people. 
Rand’s heroes are also stiff-necked; they are worshippers of the individual self, and it is 
they who undertake an exodus in order to teach the world a lesson. Miller, in contrast, 
sends his chosen people into exile with lessons learned, but without a land to which 
they are meant to return. The way each of these prophetic novels science-fictionally 
frames its exodus ultimately reveals how each author construes the covenant and the 
true meaning of errand into the wilderness. 
The Only Prayer She Knew 
  
 In the wake of The Fountainhead’s success in 1943, Ayn Rand had attracted a 
coterie of young acolytes, who ironically referred to themselves as “The Collective.” 
Headed by Nathaniel Branden, Rand’s protegé, lover, and impresario, the Collective 
became, at worst, a cult, or, at best, a highminded echo chamber.  Though the 1
fundamental plotline and characters had been pretty well fleshed out since 1946, it 
took Rand a decade to complete Atlas Shrugged, during which time she had testified 
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before the House of Un-American Activities Committee and broken publicly with 
former allies or fellow travelers in the political Right, such as Isabel Paterson and Milton 
Friedman.  In this first decade of the Cold War, Rand had become particularly 2
disenchanted with the heightened emphasis on religion in response to godless 
communism, especially as represented by William F. Buckley, Jr. and his National 
Review.  Always a champion of individualism since she started making a name for 3
herself in conservative circles during Wendell Wilkie’s presidential campaign in 1940, 
Rand had nonetheless been an enthusiastic participant in the national ferment of right-
wing activists and intellectuals that coalesced around opposition to the New Deal and 
Soviet-style communism in the 1930s and forties. She even penned a jeremiadic tract 
titled “To All Fifth Columnists,” which urged “organization against organization” in 
order to fight totalitarianism at home and abroad.  But by March 1957 when she put 4
the finishing touches on her Atlas Shrugged manuscript, she had withdrawn from the 
conservative movement she had helped foster and ensconced herself securely at the 
apex of the adoring salon which met regularly in her New York City apartment. The 
members of the Collective comprised for Rand a social world apart, and Atlas 
Shrugged was the crowning literary achievement of her self-imposed exodus. “They 
were with her to celebrate when she wrote the last pages of [John] Galt’s speech in the 
fall of 1956,” writes Jennifer Burns, “and were the only ones who understood its 
significance to her” (Goddess 160). 
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 And just who is John Galt? This question begins Atlas Shrugged, and it takes 
1,168 pages fully to realize that he is a Nietzchean avatar of creative destruction and 
Rand’s idealized embodiment of Aristotelian reason. At first, it is not even clear that 
Galt is a real person; the question, “Who is John Galt?,” serves the same rhetorical 
function of “So it goes” in Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five (1969). We later learn 
that when an engine manufacturer attempted to seize control of his invention—“a 
motor that would draw static electricity from the atmosphere, convert it and create its 
own power” (Atlas 289)—Galt realized that the “looters” of the world will always leech 
off of men with superior minds while claiming that it is the creators who are the 
parasites. He decides to turn their logic against them. “I propose to show to the world 
who depends on whom, who supports whom, who is the source of wealth, who makes 
whose livelihood possible and what happens to whom when who walks out” (741). So 
begins his quest to persuade the ablest minds in the world to go on strike against the 
looters and moochers. 
 Though Galt is the prime mover of Atlas Shrugged’s plot, the protagonists are 
Dagny Taggart and Hank Rearden. Dagny runs a family-owned railroad, which her 
brother, James, is busy running into the ground on behalf of the welfare state. Hank is a 
steel magnate whose newest alloy of his own invention is unmarketable to anyone but 
Dagny. (Because everyone else fears trying anything new.) When she orchestrates the 
construction of a new transcontinental line built from Rearden Steel—thus proving its 
!221
excellence—the government attempts to confiscate his formula. Meanwhile, Dagny 
and Hank—who become lovers for a time—try to foil Galt by reaching the creators 
before he can persuade them to go on strike. Dagny and Hank believe that they can 
save their businesses—and, incidentally, society—if only the other creators would stay 
and fight. Eventually, when Rearden rejects the “Steel Unification Plan”—a backroom 
deal brokered by a bureaucrat named Wesley Mouch—the looters stage a riot at his 
steel plant, and he joins Galt’s strike. Dagny is the last holdout, only joining the strike 
when she must rescue Galt—with whom she, of course, also falls in love—from the 
state’s torturers. The book ends with the industrialists of the world retreating to a Rocky 
Mountain refuge to let everything fall apart. They then emerge to seize control of 
mankind’s destiny in the name of their own creative ambitions, symbolized by the 
American dollar sign. 
  Appropriately, recent critical discussion of Atlas Shrugged tends to focus on the 
novel as an apologia for capitalism. Andrew Hoberek devoted a chapter of Twilight of 
the Middle Class (2005) to the novel, arguing that Rand situates her industrialist heroes 
within a more generalized cultural anxiety among middle-income earners in American 
society. This anxiety had its source in the transition of middle-class identity from 
nineteenth-century property-owners to twentieth-century white-collar proletarians. 
Rand’s emphasis on “property” as being primarily the product of the mind—as 
opposed to being a product of a wholly-owned business or perhaps a plot of 
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productive land—allowed readers to regard their intellectual work as a badge of 
property ownership while extending empathy to wealthier owners of various properties, 
intellectual and otherwise. Myka Tucker-Abramson argues that Rand turns the volatility 
of global capitalism into a source of stability, displacing the anxieties such volatility 
produces onto the welfare state and its attempts to resolve the problems of urban 
racial segregation and blight. Atlas Shrugged thus “refigures the creative destruction of 
capitalist modernity into a process of personal salvation, one that if submitted to will 
lead to a stronger, more flexible, more tensile human subject and… a more modern, 
profitable, and healthy city” (87). The rhetoric of healthier cities, though, partakes of 
racial dog-whistles. The fitness of the “stronger, more flexible human subject” is 
thereby associated with the phenomenon of white flight to the suburbs.  Like Hoberek, 5
Stacey Olster notes Rand’s attention to the transition from property to income; rather 
than its racial aspects, she focuses on its misogyny. She foregrounds the significance of 
Dagny and her succession of lovers: starting with her childhood friend, Francisco 
d’Anconia (heir to an international mining company), then Rearden, and finally Galt. 
The mutual esteem in which these übermenschen hold each other is cemented by the 
fact that they have each, in turn, loved and been loved by Dagny, who, “much like the 
gold standard… [becomes] a medium of exchange among them, each of whom, with 
exemplary grace, cedes her to the other in a paradigm of free trade practices” (302).  
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 Inherent in this Lockean provenance, Olster observes, is the violence that makes 
possession of property possible. In Rand’s world, though, such violence is a testament 
to the mettle of possessor and possessed—the moral stature of the authentic creator.  6
It is healthy and purifying. Rearden watches with “detached, impersonal pleasure” as 
one of his guards calmly, confidently guns down the rioters at the gate of his steel 
plant, imagining him as “a hero of Western legend,” enjoying “the sight of the 
competence and certainty with which men of that distant age had once combatted 
evil” (Atlas 996). In this moment, what gives Hank pleasure is to observe an employee 
doing a job well—a job protecting Hank’s property against the faceless hordes. But his 
pleasure is linked to a mythological conception of the frontier, replete with colonial 
implications.  So it is that a paid employee becomes a symbol of stability, a bulwark 7
against the instability of the collectivist masses, an object of admiration for the actual 
property owner who will presently abandon the guard to his fate when Hank finally 
joins Galt’s strike. The relationship here between employer and guard is essentially that 
of a latter-day robber baron and his enforcer. Rand draws the violence of nineteenth-
century capitalism—and its expansion into the American frontier—into the twentieth 
century and valorizes its deployment on behalf of intellectual property owners. 
 This frontier mythos pervades the novel, and not only in Hank’s vicarious 
gunfighter fantasy. In one early scene, Dagny contemplates a statue of her ancestor, 
Nathaniel “Nat” Taggart, who founded Taggart Transcontinental Railroad. Rand coyly 
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frames “his battle to build it… [as] a legend, because people preferred not to 
understand it or to believe it possible” (59). So the narrative Rand presents of this 
nineteenth-century robber baron gets to play fast and loose with its facts and Dagny’s 
interpretations. It is said that “no penny of his wealth had been obtained by force or 
fraud,” but, apparently without contradiction in Rand’s view, he reputedly “murdered a 
state legislator who attempted to revoke a charter granted to him.” The charge was 
ultimately never proved, but, Rand wryly notes, “He had no trouble with legislators 
from then on. With her permission, Nat “pledged his wife for security for a loan from a 
millionaire” after throwing “down three flights of stairs a distinguished gentleman who 
offered him a loan from the government” (60). Nat Taggart’s emblem adorns the 
engine on the maiden voyage of the John Galt Line—the railway she builds with 
Rearden Steel—and when she sees people turned out to watch the passing of the train, 
she reflects, “It was like the age when Nat Taggart moved across the country, and the 
stops along his way were marked by men eager for the sight of achievement” (243). 
Like her revered ancestor, Dagny even has the opportunity to murder someone
—“Calmly and impersonally” (1148), Rand assures us—a guard who simply stands in 
her way during the rescue of John Galt near the novel’s end. After the rescue, the 
rescuers board a plane and head back west to their Rocky Mountain refuge. Inside the 
speeding airborne machine which bears her and her comrades in their exodus from 
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what remains of American civilization, at last shaking the dust of the looter state from 
her heels, Dagny takes time to reflect. 
She looked ahead. The earth would be as empty as the space where their 
propeller was cutting an unobstructed path—as empty and as free. She knew 
what Nat Taggart had felt at his start and why now, for the first time, she was 
following him in full loyalty: the confident sense of facing a void and of knowing 
that one has a continent to build. (1159) 
Turning anew to the “empty” frontier—to the standards set by a more heroic, 
pioneering generation—and looking ahead to a revitalized future: these are all 
hallmarks of the jeremiad. Old Nat Taggart, incidentally, is even “from somewhere in 
New England” (59)! The strike is no less than another errand into the wilderness, one 
explicitly framed by the manifest destiny that delivered American Indians to mass 
slaughter on behalf of the robber barons who wanted access to their resources: robber 
barons like Nat Taggart, whose statue dominates the concourse of the Taggart 
Terminal. 
 “To look at that statue whenever she crossed the concourse,” Rand writes of 
Dagny’s communion with the past, “was the only form of prayer she knew” (59). 
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Going Galt 
  
 Rand was never less than explicit about her admiration for the ethos she 
ascribed to the nineteenth century. In her Romantic Manifesto (1969), Rand called the 
pre-World War I world “the last afterglow of the most radiant cultural atmosphere in 
human history” (8), because the “nineteenth century was guided, not by an Aristotelian 
philosophy, but by an Aristotelian sense of life” (86, emphasis in original).  What made 8
the nineteenth century so wondrous were its two influences on what she called 
romanticism: “Aristotelianism, which liberated man by validating the power of the mind
—and capitalism, which gave man’s mind the freedom to translate ideas into 
practice” (86). Aristotle was for her the avatar of reason—as opposed to the alleged 
mysticism of Plato—and the free market consequently a place where reason could 
operate as unfettered as humanly possible. Though Rand was reticent to acknowledge 
the genealogy of her own philosophical and literary ideas, she always claimed Aristotle 
as her chief influence.  Near the beginning of her work on Atlas Shrugged, Rand 9
averred that her “personal crusade” was “not merely to fight collectivism, nor to fight 
altruism,” but that she was “out after the real cause; the real root of evil on earth—the 
irrational” (qtd. in Goddess 100).  
 While Atlas Shrugged is, among other things, certainly a paean to what Rand 
would have considered a life lived reasonably, its purpose was much more utopian. “It 
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was Aristotle who said that fiction is of greater philosophical importance than history,” 
she wrote in her Manifesto, “because history represents things only as they are, while 
fiction represents them ‘as they might be and ought to be’” (169).  It is worth quoting 10
at some length Rand’s own conception of her fiction’s purpose, which is that 
man needs a moment, an hour or some period of time in which he can 
experience the sense of his completed task, the sense of living in a universe 
where his values have been successfully achieved. It is like a moment of rest, a 
moment to gain fuel to move farther. Art gives him that fuel. Art gives him the 
experience of seeing the full, immediate, concrete reality of his distant goals. 
 The importance of that experience is not in what he learns from it, but in 
that he experiences it. The fuel is not a theoretical principle, not a didactic 
‘message,’ but the life-giving fact of experiencing a moment of metaphysical joy
—a moment of love for existence. (171) 
Rand’s philosophy of literature carries resonances of Ernst Bloch, a German philosopher 
associated with the Frankfurt School whose Principle of Hope (3 vols., 1954-59) is one 
of the central texts in utopian studies. The utopian impulse in Atlas Shrugged, “like a 
beacon raised over the dark crossroads of the world, saying: ‘This is possible’” (172), is 
instantly recognizable as an expression of Bloch’s Not-Yet—though Rand’s idea of 
paradise is diametrically opposed to the world beyond the horizon yearned for by the 
old socialist visionary. Bloch would undoubtedly view Rand’s utopianism as misguided
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—it fails to comprehend the totality of what the world might and truly ought to be, 
hidebound by selfishness and capitalist individualism—but still no less an expressed 
yearning for a better tomorrow. 
 In his essay for Kenneth Roemer’s anthology, America as Utopia (1981), Lyman 
Tower Sargent includes Atlas Shrugged among the handful of notable capitalist 
eutopias (specifically good places, as opposed to Thomas More’s pun, which conflates 
“good” and “no” place),  but Roemer himself specifically classifies it as an example of 11
utopian fiction which “hasn’t been completely swallowed up by science fiction,” further 
insisting in no uncertain terms that it “should not be classified as science fiction” (235). 
Even so, such offhand classifications appear sporadically, though usually in popular 
sources, and often without much exposition.  Sf authors John Scalzi and David Brin 12
have subjected the novel to extended critique,  and both P. Schuyler Miller and John 13
W. Campbell reviewed the book in 1958 in the pages of Astounding Science Fiction. 
Miller grumbled that Rand was “a rank outsider” blundering into the SF community like 
“a rank greenhorn” (147), though at least she included Rearden Metal, “the super-
invention that any SF novel needs” (148). Campbell was more favorable, declaring it 
“science fiction in the same sense George Orwell’s 1984 was,” but “more important; 
Orwell described what tended to happen. Ayn Rand describes, with powerful accuracy, 
some of the forces that make disaster happen… and what the methods used by the 
destroyers are” (152). Here, of course, Campbell refers to the looter state bureaucrats
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—the real destroyers—not the plutocrats.  Broadly speaking, there is little question 14
that Atlas Shrugged is science-fictional, but, as indicated by Miller’s remark, much of 
the discussion focuses on technological innovations, such as the subplot involving an 
atomic bomb-like superweapon which ultimately destroys its looter overseers, or 
Rearden’s new alloy—or on the apocalyptic climax itself. But the most significant 
science-fictional device in the novel, as Robert Hunt notes, is in its mythological 
approach to history, and this frames the utopian meaning of the protagonists’ 
withdrawal to their Rocky Mountain refuge, their exodus from a hopelessly corrupted 
socialist world. 
 Rand’s novum is her mythic vision of America’s past, which supplants our actual 
history. In the first volume of Principle of Hope, Bloch introduces the concept of the 
Novum, by which he means any genuinely new development in human society that 
helps drive revolutionary change.  As I discussed in the introduction, Darko Suvin 15
borrowed this term to describe the science-fictional element that drives the cognitive 
estrangement he theorizes as central to any understanding of science-fictionality. Hunt 
duly indexes the aforementioned various technological tropes in Atlas Shrugged, but 
his most crucial insight is that Rand rewrites American history so as to clear the board 
for her heroic remnant. He notes that Rand has purged her fictional world of all real 
corporations, individuals, any “invention, movement, system, or theory—including 
communism, fascism, evolution, or relativity—that can be attributed to one person,” 
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and “any other event of the twentieth century or of any preceding century.” In sum, 
“Despite their geographic ties to the factual United States, Rand’s people actually live 
in a version of that familiar science-fictional setting, the alternate universe” (86).   In the 
universe of Atlas Shrugged, Rand’s utopian vision of what might have been and what 
ought to have been blend with what was. Hunt characterizes the isolationism of this 
science-fictional United States as “far more than an economic one. Rand’s America is 
cut off from its past—our past. She has rewritten American history to fit her vision of the 
apotheosis of capital” (85-86). 
 As a science-fictional subgenre, the alternate history has been subject to a 
considerable amount in scholarly attention in the last few decades.  Unlike sf stories 16
that project their narratives into the future, alt-histories are frequently set in a version of 
the past or present that has turned out differently because of an alteration of a 
particular event in the timeline known to our own reality. In The Alternate History: 
Refiguring Historical Time (2001), Karen Hellekson sketches out a taxonomy of alt-
histories, ultimately privileging what she dubs the “genetic” type, because it is 
primarily concerned with the fact of an alteration and tracing the effects of it. I am less 
concerned here with fitting Atlas Shrugged into Hellekson’s taxonomy than with 
focusing on the political stakes she identifies as inherent in the alt-history as a science-
fictional narrative. The purpose of this kind of novum, she argues, is to foster “the 
enriching realization that history is something that it is possible for an individual to 
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shape. The psychological effects of reading the alternate history are important: it could 
have happened otherwise, save for a personal choice” (110). Though Hunt is right that 
Rand has created is an alternate universe, it is not clear what specific event(s)—what 
point(s) of divergence—in the past led to the present depicted in the novel. One may 
as well ask, “Who is John Galt?” And that is the point. Minding the spirit of Aristotle’s 
dictum, Rand is not a historian, she is a romantic artist; history, what really happened, is 
hers to rewrite to her own purpose. In order to create a world as it ought to be, she 
creates a world as it ought not to have been. The backsliding by degrees that has 
gotten the world into its mess is the work of generations, of any number of people who 
compromised their integrity, whom it is nearly impossible to hold to individual account. 
 Rand’s depiction in her novel of bureaucratic mission creep on the part of the 
government and the complacency of moocher corporations pointedly reinforces the 
theme that people—individual people—have chosen in the course of perhaps two or 
three generations to surrender their free will and creative powers. To Rand, that’s how 
collectivism works. Contemporary Americans reading Atlas Shrugged would recognize 
in her looter villains the right-wing caricature of the New Deal brains trust and their 
corporate partners.  This was an era when conservatives spoke of a “fifth freedom” of 17
economic liberty, especially freedom from government interference in the private 
sector.  In Atlas Shrugged, the United States is surrounded on all sides by People’s 18
States; it is the last bastion of free enterprise and individual liberty, and Rand offers no 
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explanation of how this happened. But these things, as the saying goes, don’t just 
happen. And in the novel’s arguably most infamous passage—one which, as Gary 
Weiss observes, was likely in Whittaker Chambers’s mind when he wrote that he could 
hear Rand hissing from almost any page, “To the gas chambers, go!” —Rand spends 19
in excess of twenty pages detailing how the mismanagement of the bureaucratic 
stooges and the daily habits and attitudes of train passengers are all complicit in a 
social turning away from reality. The price of the mass turning away from moral 
principles—the backsliding—is paid by the people aboard a stalled passenger train 
who suffocate to death in a tunnel; the tunnel then collapses in an explosion when a 
second train collides with it. The episode decisively reaffirms Dagny’s commitment to 
her family’s business and, by extension, the irrational civilization that chooses to let 
such things happen. Having detailed the various faults of the passengers as they ride 
into the tunnel, Rand concludes, “These passengers were awake; there was not a man 
aboard the train who did not share one or more of their ideas” (Atlas 607). They knew, 
Rand implies, exactly what they were doing. The precipitate historical crisis in Atlas 
Shrugged is no less than the aggregate of choices made by people who should have 
known better, and who bear final responsibility for the disaster befalling them.  
 This theme clearly exemplifies Rand’s jeremiadic mode, but it also exemplifies 
what Hellekson identifies as the taxonomic root of the alternate history: the agency of 
personal choice. But rather than attempt to identify a single point of divergence from 
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the established historical timeline, Rand simply submerges it in the collective guilt she 
assigns to every character in her novel except John Galt, his strikers, and the robber 
barons of the nineteenth century. Rand’s science-fictional alternate history and her 
jeremiadic purpose thus reinforce each other. Campbell astutely noted that Rand uses 
the methods she ascribes to the moochers, and the train accident is a case in point. 
Rather than identify each passenger by name or contextualizing their accountability 
(which would, admittedly, stretch the very possibilities of the novel form), she simply 
indexes them as social types, not individuals. Thus she ascribes nonspecific, collective 
guilt to the disaster victims much as she eradicates any specific point of divergence in 
her alternate history. Only her hyper-individual protagonists are even capable of truly 
feeling guilt, but her project is to liberate them of responsibility—or guilt—to anything 
or anyone beyond themselves.  
 The guilt they feel is, Rand argues, the most evil form of social control—a sense 
of obligation to others beyond oneself. One of the chief ironies employed by Rand in 
Atlas Shrugged is that the looters’ backsliding—making an idol of collective 
responsibility—is what ultimately destroys them. Like an angry Old Testament god, 
Rand gives her backsliders what they wants. The train car passengers who worshipped 
collective responsibility are given it in the ghastly accident scene. But she contrasts that 
sense of social responsibility with true ownership, which can only properly belong to 
the individual. The emotional climax of the book is when Hank finally realizes that his 
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fight to save his company has been rooted in a sense of social responsibility, leading 
him inexorably toward matyrdom. But “the soul and essence of his enemies: the 
mindless face of the thug with the club,” which he glimpses during the riot at his steel 
plant, is the image that wakes him from his own slumber (997, emphasis mine). “He felt 
a peculiar cleanliness. It was made of pride and of love for this earth, this earth which 
was his, not theirs.” An individual who lacks enough mind to even truly possess his own 
body is a non-person. Better to forsake social obligation and embrace mastery of one’s 
own self. Post-epiphany, Hank regards himself as a “living motor,” an image which fills 
him with “the sense of his own superlative value and the superlative value of his 
life” (997). It is at that moment of self-purification that he receives absolution. He is 
finally ready to take John Galt’s oath: “I swear—by my life and my love of it—that I will 
never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine” (731, 
1069). Now fully in possession of himself—and mentally in possession of the “earth 
which was his, not theirs”—Hank is finally free to realize his creative potential, imbuing 
his creations with the life of his mind. Rand calls for individuals to shed their guilt over 
failing to live up to social responsibilities; she importunes them to embrace true 
ownership instead. And the Rocky Mountain refuge is the only place in the world where 
Galt’s disciples, who have withdrawn their animating genius from the world, are free to 
exercise their mastery as they see fit. 
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 Known as “Galt’s Gulch,” the enclave in the Rockies is, as Rand titles one of her 
chapters, a utopia of greed. Until the apocalyptic fall of civilization at the novel’s end, 
Galt’s Gulch functions for the makers of the world as a yearly retreat. In this place, they 
ply their trades and get paid for them (in gold, of course), then return to the world 
incognito, to work menial jobs disconnected from their vocations. Carl Abbott observes 
that the Colorado Rockies often served in early twentieth-century tourism propaganda 
as a place of unspoiled wilderness, a site of frontier rejuvenation, even though the 
frontier was now closed. “Sf novelists imagine Colorado in four overlapping, 
sometimes intersecting ways,” he argues: “as a remnant society or site, as an isolated 
refuge or hiding place, as a place of redemption, and as a place to reconstruct a better 
social system.” All four elements, of course, are classically jeremiadic. He also reminds 
us that Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier was “a process rather than a place,” but that 
“science-fictional Colorado… is often pictured in terms of static isolation” (224). He 
slots Atlas Shrugged into this mold, but he neglects Rand’s obsession with dynamism, 
often represented in technological motifs. Even in Galt’s Gulch, a verdant valley which 
serves as a sort of morally pure respite from the oppression of the collectivist world, is 
nowhere near the embodiment of an epoch of rest.  
 Machine imagery and the dynamism it symbolizes suffuse Rand’s utopia. Dagny’s 
first sight upon awakening from a plane crash in the valley is Galt’s face, which “bore no 
mark of pain or fear or guilt,” and eyes that are described “as if his faculty of sight were 
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his best-loved tool,” “the deep, dark green of light glinting on metal” (702). Everything 
in this valley glitters: The birch leaves (702), the waterfall (705), the windows (706), the 
roofs (798). When Dagny is examined for physical damage after her crash by the 
Gulch’s resident physician, she feels “as if her body were an engine checked by an 
expert mechanic” (711). Upon inspecting Francisco’s copper mine, she reflects that this 
“was the story of human wealth written across the mountains”: 
a few pine trees hung over the cut, contorted by the storms that had raged 
through the wilderness for centuries, six men worked on the shelves, and an 
inordinate amount of complex machinery traced delicate lines against the sky; 
the machinery did most of the work. (792) 
Even the concerto of a composer impresses Dagny with its “controlled violence and 
the mathematical precision”; it has “the stern discipline of business” and “the radiance 
of engineering” (784). Then there is the iconic image of the solid gold dollar sign in the 
center of town, a “beacon” in the rays of sun, but one “like some transmitter of energy 
that sent them in shining blessing to stretch horizontally through the air above the 
roofs” (706). As Hunt notes, all of this is of a piece with the whole novel, a narrative 
Futurist Manifesto. Because Rand values dynamism—movement, speed, action, action, 
action—Galt’s Gulch is the antithesis of static. Its inhabitants cycle through it like a way 
station, a place of temporary withdrawal for a remnant engaged in occupation until the 
exodus.  More importantly, it is pure; the copper mine which Dagny surveys with 20
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approval is a mark of the moral goodness being actively cultivated in this garden.  In 21
Atlas Shrugged, it is the masters of the universe, the dynamos,  who have the power, 22
privilege, and moral imperative to withdraw their favor, and their strike is the means by 
which they prove it. 
 Their Promethean prerogative finds unlikely expression in gold-embossed 
cigarettes made by one of the strikers. After contemplating Nat Taggart’s statue, Dagny 
stops to buy cigarettes and the vendor introduces the motif with Rand’s characteristic 
bluntness: “‘I like to think of fire held in a man’s hand. Fire, a dangerous force, tamed at 
his fingertips… When a man thinks, there is a spot of fire alive in his mind—and it is 
proper that he should have the burning point of a cigarette as his one 
expression’” (Atlas 61). In the scene where Galt explains the strike, just after he 
completes his monologue, is this description: “The windows were now sheets of 
darkness, reflecting the dots of lighted cigarettes. He picked a cigarette from a table 
beside him, and in the flare of a match she saw the brief sparkle of gold, the dollar 
sign, between his fingers” (741). The first demand Galt makes, naturally, after being 
rescued from his torturers: “‘Give me a cigarette’” (1155). To smoke a cigarette is a 
mark of enlightenment (the pun is Rand’s, not mine), and in Rand’s novel, the creators—
the enlightened remnant—can be spotted easily enough by simply looking for a 
crisply-rolled, gold-dollar-sign-embossed cylinder of smoldering tobacco perched 
between their fingers. The cigarette tip, like those dots in the darkness, is yet another 
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gleaming, glittering testament to the each individual genius who comprises the 
remnant retreating to the Gulch: a thousand points of light, one might say. 
 The agency of this remnant is underlined by the fact that the way has been 
cleared for them to exercise their agency. An emblematic example is the passage 
mentioned in the previous section, where, after rescuing Galt, Dagny contemplates the 
fall of civilization while dreaming of Nat Taggart. The world is become a blank slate, 
thanks to the strikers, an empty wilderness. She revels in the confidence of “facing a 
void and of knowing that one has a continent to build.” As Hunt argues, though, Rand 
has cleared the way for them science-fictionally by wiping away the particulars of 
American history, the better to showcase their personal choice and dynamism. Setting 
Atlas Shrugged in an alternate timeline where the aggregate choices of the multitude 
have led a once great nation into terminal decline is Rand’s jeremiadic indictment. The 
exodus Rand maps out for her enlightened remnant is modeled on the science-fictional 
history of this alternate cosmos: her remnant withdraws only temporarily into Galt’s 
Gulch, their city on a hill, and their exodus from a corrupt, dying civilization where the 
producers are treated as slaves is as through through a purifying wilderness, finally 
returning to a Promised Land. In Rand’s jeremiad, though, the city on a hill is not the 
final destination; it is the place of temporary exile. But it is not any god that will deliver 
them from their captivity. Not even John Galt would claim as much for himself, messiah 
though he may be. They have delivered themselves from a backsliding world, and they 
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are the ones meting just punishment to it. The science-fictional conceit of the alternate 
universe erects a teleological structure for their exodus: a place from which they have 
come (in the past) and a place toward which to go (in the future). It is the myth of 
progress reframed. Unburdened by guilt or the particulars of history, and resolute in 
their commitment to their own superiority, the exodus of the overmen lays waste to the 
world while birthing a new mythology of self-actualized greatness. 
 Atlas Shrugged pins its jeremiadic structure on the exodus, and the exodus is an 
exaltation of individual will, even as the individuals who undertake the exodus utterly 
cleanse the legacy of every nation—American included—from their shared future. 
Rand’s well-established penchant for Nietzschean heroes here reaches its zenith,  with 23
the exodus itself of the strong men of the world destroying civilization so that they may 
live free and die guiltless. Though she drew on the nineteenth-century American 
mythology of manifest destiny, the conquerors who descend from Galt’s Gulch are not 
setting out to restore the United States. In the “void of darkness and rock” hides “the 
ruins of a continent,” not America. “‘The road is cleared,’ said Galt. ‘We are going back 
to the world,’” he says—not the United States. And in the novel’s final line, Rand 
completes her science-fictional task of wiping away America on behalf of the capitalist 
elite. “He raised his hand and over the desolate earth he traced in space the sign of 
the dollar” (1168). Rather than a society, it is the earth itself—the malleable source of 
material for making—over which Galt traces the dollar, literally a floating signifier in 
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space. Caesar’s Column ended with the remnant building utopia in the mountains and 
walling themselves in for the foreseeable future until the world was ready to receive 
enlightenment. John Galt and his compatriots’ errand into the wilderness revitalizes 
civilization, but that civilization is decoupled from the myths of the American republic 
or even the idea of nationhood itself. Instead, the capacity to exert one’s will upon the 
universe is established as the final arbiter of social standing in a community of entirely 
self-interested individuals. Not even history can place limits upon the endless 
possibilities afforded to the Elect of Rand’s alternate world. The Promised Land of Atlas 
Shrugged is itself a science-fictional thought experiment, where every chosen one is 
Prometheus, exodus from captivity is always an exercise of supreme individual will, and 
the burning ember of ambition is always lit, glittering in the dark, in the cancerous haze 
gathered round the tip of a gold-embossed cigarette. 
And the Quest for the Holy Grales 
  
 The stories that Walter M. Miller, Jr. revised into A Canticle for Leibowitz 
coincided in their publication with a series of lectures delivered to young monks at the 
Atheneum of Saint Anselm by Dom Jean Leclercq on the subject of spirituality, 
learning, and literary expression in medieval monastic culture.  The lectures were 24
given between 1955 and 1957, with a book adapted from them published in the latter 
year; an English translation first appeared in 1961. In a controversial passage in the 
!241
epilogue of the book, Leclercq argues that the mysticism of the most enduring 
medieval monastic literature derives from the authors fitting contemporary literary 
forms to the inspiration derived from their holy meditations. “Whatever literature is 
needed, experience raises to its own level. Consequently, a higher type of sincerity is 
apparent in the writings of the mystic even amid the forms appropriate to the various 
periods, sometimes to our confusion. We are so prone to judge the ancients by the 
standards of today” (266). In his review of the first American edition, Giles Constable 
argues that Leclercq’s “somewhat uncompromising view of the dependence of 
literature on experience… leaves little room for the sympathetic insight of the author 
into events and emotions he has not himself experienced” (139). Constable’s quibble, 
however, was registered with consideration for a general audience, and the context of 
Leclercq’s argument is that sometimes the monks drew on rhetorical forms that were 
themselves controversial—that is, not suitably sacred in themselves—in the medieval 
period. Leclercq was attempting to recover the urgent spiritual truth of writings 
presented in generic modes not commonly associated with the church.  
 I would like to suggest the task of untangling the critical reception of Miller’s 
Canticle in its immediate historical context has something in common with the recovery 
undertaken by Leclercq in his lectures. Miller had only been a Roman Catholic for 
about a decade when the first novella was originally published, but he had been 
writing science fiction stories since the early 1950s. Despite the religious tropes 
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invoked by several of the authors—Donnelly and Du Bois, especially—none of the 
literary output we have examined so far is particularly religious in nature, and most of 
these authors were quite hostile to religion—particularly Schuyler and Rand, though 
London and Asimov also had no use for it. Many classic science-fictional novels have 
been openly mystical or religious in nature—C. S. Lewis’s Space trilogy  bears the 25
imprint of Christian allegory, while Frank Herbert’s Dune saga, inaugurated in 1965, 
offers an evolving and sometimes ambivalent critique of prophetic politics—but the 
idiom of sf, as we have seen Darko Suvin argue in the introduction, tends toward 
materialism. Canticle is the rare science-fictional text that places its engagement with a 
particular faith tradition at the center of its narrative without subverting it as part of the 
text’s thematic arc. At least, that what I must establish in order to explicate how I read 
Miller’s engagement with the exodus motif. The science-fictionality of A Canticle for 
Leibowitz is not commonly associated with the Church, but unlike the other texts we 
have examined so far, I do not believe we can make sense of its jeremiadic qualities 
without first firmly establishing whether or not its basic assumptions are primarily 
religious or secular. 
 Originally published as three novellas in Fantasy and Science and Fiction, the 
novel’s three sections trace roughly 1,800 years of civilizational rise and fall after a 
twentieth-century nuclear holocaust. The first section, “Fiat Homo,” chronicles a young 
monk’s discovery of a cache of esoteric materials in a fallout shelter in the desert. 
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Brother Francis’s abbey, home to the Albertian Order of Leibowitz in what used to be 
Utah, was founded by the eponymous scientist-turned-monk for the purpose of 
preserving knowledge in the time after the nuclear holocaust—known as the 
Simplification—when hordes of people tried to destroy all instruments, records, and 
people of learning, whom they blamed for developing the weapons of mass 
destruction responsible for the apocalypse. The artifacts the monks safeguard are 
known as the Memorabilia, and their original significance has been largely lost. Francis 
spends fifteen years illuminating a copy of a blueprint found in the shelter, and when 
Leibowitz is canonized, Francis journeys to New Rome to deliver his illumination and 
the original blueprint to the Pope. On his journey there, his illuminated copy is 
confiscated by bandits. On his journey back, he is murdered by mutant cannibals. The 
second section, “Fiat Lux,” is set roughly 600 years later, and it tells the story of an 
irreligious renaissance man called Thon Taddeo Pfardentrott, cousin to a local warlord 
named Hannegan, who comes to the Abbey to recover the Memorabilia, from which 
the monks have gleaned enough understanding by this point that one of them has 
fashioned a crude electric light. Taddeo’s technical approach to sacred objects sows 
discord among the monks, but the head abbot, Dom Paulo, eventually grants Taddeo 
permission to take what he needs, though not before cautioning him against his 
reckless pursuit of knowledge unchecked by wisdom. Book II ends with Hannegan 
turning his cousin’s technical innovations to militaristic ends. Set a further 600 years on, 
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“Fiat Voluntas Tua,” the final section, depicts the desperate final days of human 
civilization as it careens toward nuclear holocaust once more. Near the abbey, mercy 
killing camps identified by their Green Star have been erected to euthanize people 
suffering from the effects of fallout. While the abbot, Zerchi, wrestles with his 
impotence in confronting the moral degradation embodied by the Green Star camp 
next to his abbey, one of the younger monks, Brother Joshua, has been selected to 
lead an exodus offworld, one authorized by the pope for the sake of saving a remnant 
of the human race from the impending catastrophe. As the starship Quo Peregrinatur 
leaves Earth, the abbey is destroyed in the final phase of the second nuclear 
apocalypse. Zerchi, trapped under rubble, is given one final communion by a two-
headed mutant who, prior to the blast, had been known as Mrs. Grales. In life, Grales’s 
second head had seemed asleep, a mere freakish appendage, a mutation bestowed by 
the apocalyptic cycle initiated long before the novel began; now, her second head, 
named Rachel, blesses the dying monk and wanders off into the post-apocalyptic 
landscape.  26
 As one of the most remarkable novels of science fiction produced in the 
twentieth century,  there are two broad contours of scholarly interpretations of its 27
nature. One contour is rooted in David Samuelson’s erudite critique of the novel from 
his 1975 dissertation-turned-monograph, Visions of Tomorrow: Six Journeys from Outer 
to Inner Space. Samuelson diligently indexes Miller’s extensive utilization of Catholic 
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religious imagery and tropes alongside his science-fictional imagery and tropes, paying 
particular attention to the motives and mindsets of the religious characters in Canticle. 
His project is to validate the literary qualities of sf, and to that end he privileges the 
aspects of Miller’s novel that favor ambiguity and ambivalence. Near the end of his 
analysis, Samuelson privileges a supporting character from “Fiat Lux” known only as 
the Poet, an anarchic provocateur staying at the abbey. He highlights a passage where 
Dom Zerchi reads “a satirical dialogue in verse between two agnostics who were 
attempting to establish by natural reason alone that the existence of God could not be 
established by natural reason alone.” The dialogue is between a “Poet” and a “Thon,” 
and they ultimately conclude: “Non cogitamus, ergo nihil sumus” (Miller 304). 
Samuelson argues that, like the characters in the satiric verse, Miller also “is denying 
the reader ‘any conclusion of certainty,’” and that he presents all of his characters “with 
a sense of irony suggesting they are all agnostics; those religious persons whom we see 
going beyond mere fear and ritual in their thinking are doubters, as all the non-
religious persons appear to be” (268). Thus the ultimate message of Canticle, 
Samuelson contends, is that both religious and scientific paradigms are both limited in 
their perspective on the true nature of the cosmos; Miller therefore structures a 
narrative “in which each discipline is seen as inadequate from others’ 
perspectives” (269). 
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 Many subsequent scholars have followed through on this characterization of A 
Canticle for Leibowitz as a dialectic or synthesis between science and religion, typically 
emphasizing Miller’s skepticism, and usually with an emphasis on the relationship of 
scientific progress in a Cold War context. After Hiroshima, American culture went 
through rapid series of contortions in its efforts to assimilate the specter of the 
mushroom cloud. During this period, political and cultural institutions tried to channel 
fear of imminent nuclear annihilation toward either the Soviet Union and its communist 
brethren or into an optimism about the wonders that nuclear science could unlock for 
humanity’s (read: America’s) benefit.  As we saw in the last chapter, science fiction 28
earned mainstream credibility for having “predicted” the atom bomb and offered 
prophetic visions of how to deal with its political ramifications. There is simply no way 
to read A Canticle for Leibowitz without reference to anxieties about nuclear war and 
the debate about how much culpability for potential catastrophe the scientific 
establishment ought to share with the politicians ultimately responsible for pushing the 
red button, or not. Michael Alan Bennett discovers in the theme of individual 
responsibility a way for Miller to resolve the problem of science’s amoral advancements 
in knowledge and technique. Robert Scholes and Eric S. Rabkin describe the novel as 
an amalgamation of “science and religion into a modern humanism” (226). Gary B. 
Herbert characterizes Miller’s cyclical vision of history as a twist on Hegel’s “bad 
infinite,” in which humanity is doomed always to progress but never to transcend 
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history, always learning to manipulate the “nonmoral Logos” of a wholly material 
universe but not growing into its own potential. He thus reads the novel as hopeless. 
David Seed offers a more historicist reading, arguing that Miller’s ambivalent, 
postmodern treatment of religious and scientific signifying systems subverts American 
self-assuredness during the Cold War. David J. Tietge reframes this ambivalence in 
Foucauldian terms, arguing that Miller treats science and religion as discourses vying 
for dominance in that Cold War cultural climate. 
 These critical readings therefore emphasize Miller’s skepticism, either as a 
scientific stance or as a suspicion of scientifically-acquired knowledge. A key motif of 
the novel, for instance, is the unreliability of historical memory. When Brother Francis 
discovers the fallout shelter near the beginning of “Fiat Homo,” among the sacred 
objects he discovers are a shopping list for pastrami, sauerkraut, and bagels, and a 
reminder to pick up an I.R.S. tax form alongside the blueprint that becomes his life’s 
work to replicate. But when he examines the filled-out 1040, with the tabulated 
numbers punctuated by a “damn!” Francis can “find no fault with the abominable 
penman’s arithmetic, at least, although he could deduce nothing about what the 
quantities might represent” (27). The fact that Saint Isaac Edward Leibowitz apparently 
owed the I.R.S. a great deal of money is totally lost on him. Similarly, the learned Thon 
Taddeo greatly upsets the monks in “Fiat Lux” by condescendingly lecturing them 
about the history of present-day humankind’s evolution from a “servant species” on the 
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basis of a “fragmentary reference” (232); Dom Paulo recalls that an old church patrician 
had classified that “fragment of a play, or a dialogue… as ‘probable fable of allegory. 
But perhaps the thon would care little for the evaluations of the Venerable Boedullus, 
when he can make his own” (233). Taddeo has, it turns out, mistaken Karl Čapek’s 
R.U.R. (1920) for a historical document.  And then, in “Fiat Voluntas Tua,” when Zerchi 29
reads the Poet’s satirical verse, he reflects that “No one, indeed, had ever found 
evidence that such a person… had ever lived,” and he suspects that “the thin book of 
verse had been penned by one of the secular scientists who had visited the abbey to 
study the Memorabilia at about that time” of the Hannegan conquest (303).  
 Seed suggests that the novel’s structure science-fictionally calls attention to 
these ironies; they are part of Suvinian cognitive estrangement. Miller’s concern with 
demonstrating “an awareness of how texts are constituted, circulated, and 
validated” (260) is a fundamental part of his effort to subvert the political power 
derived from the competing epistemes of his era. Such moments as those summarized 
above “involve the reader in revising his/her sense of the real at the beginning of each 
section” (268), thus destabilizing the reader’s own political equanimity. But that’s not 
what actually happens. Attentive readers, by recognizing the errors of historical fact 
that Miller dramatizes, are made more stable in their own understanding of the 
narrative’s historiography. Rather than a narrative strategy to induce doubt and 
skepticism, the novel actually invests the reader with interpretive authority denied to 
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the characters, affirming that truth exists, even if, as Samuelson suggests, characters’ 
perspective is limited. It is a narrative strategy that reduces the reader’s own skepticism 
with regard to the text while also making the reader mindful of one’s own limited 
perspective. Accordingly, Miller’s strategy trains readers to value the epistemic humility 
displayed—intentionally or not—by his monks, who never quite adopt the agnosticism 
of the Poet. 
 Critical emphasis on the productive tension between religion and science is 
entirely warranted by the novel, but these readings build upon Samuelson’s categorical 
error in confusing a person who has doubt for someone who identifies as a doubter. 
Thus these critics fall into a pattern of interpreting the novel’s nuances or ambiguities 
as a balancing act between science and religion, or between the claims to authority of 
each magisterium. In fact, it is very hard to read Miller’s believers’ moments of doubt as 
evidence of a skeptical paradigm. Francis’s euphemistic view of the world is shaken 
during the highway robbery that deprives him of his illuminated blueprint, but he 
remains capable of blessing the robber: he “quietly praised God for the existence of 
such selfless robbers, who could make such an ignorant mistake” (104)—that is, 
stealing the illuminated copy, not the original. Dom Paulo contends with Taddeo over 
the scholar’s responsibility for his work, and though he questions his own culpability in 
opening the Memorabilia to researchers who would only turn their discoveries into 
weapons of war for their benefactors, he ultimately affirms that “neither infinite power 
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nor infinite wisdom could bestow godhood upon men. For that there would have to be 
infinite love as well” (238). For him, this is a measure of comfort, because while he 
mourns the lack of love, the lack of love among the powerful also means that they are 
not gods, and that there is, by implication, a true God who does possess power, 
wisdom, and love in infinite abundance.  
 Of the believers in Miller’s main cast, Zerchi’s inner conflict is the most 
incendiary. His denunciation of the Green Star camp leads him to punch the doctor 
running it, in a moment of great shame. When he is trapped under the rubble of the 
abbey near the novel’s close, he embraces the torment as an expiation for asking those 
seeking the Green Star’s services to endure that kind of pain as well. But when Mrs. 
Grales—the two-headed mutant—appears in her transformed state as an awakened 
Rachel, his faith is affirmed. “He did not ask why God would choose to raise up a 
creature of primal innocence from the shoulder of Mrs. Grales… He had seen primal 
innocence in those eyes, and a promise of resurrection. One glimpse had been a 
bounty, and he wept in gratitude” (336). In all three of these monks is a posture of 
humility and gratitude, even in extremity. There is no good reason for this posture. 
There is only faith. 
 The other major thread of scholarship on Canticle picks up on this and affirms it 
as a quintessentially religious work, which grapples with the necessity of submitting to 
an established order, however imperfectly understood and however imperfect the act 
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submission may be. Teresa M. Tavormina argues that the practice of order in liturgical 
and epistemological contexts gives shape to the novel’s ultimate affirmation of hope. 
Ralph Wood highlights that the monks’ preservation of secular knowledge and their 
submission to the will of God as it is presented in church tradition is not a 
contradiction, but a radical embrace of the Logos in its totality: a robust church culture 
is capable of accepting suffering as an intrinsic part of existence, whereas modernity (in 
the novel) rejects the necessity of suffering. Deanna T. Smid reads the novel’s religious 
embrace of totality in terms of Fredric Jameson’s discussion of synchronic versus 
diachronic mapping. The monks live a liturgical life of order, one inevitably sensitive to 
historical progression; yet, “While the monks desire a single, synchronic understanding 
of the past, even their lives deny such a model” (45). In Miller’s novel, they desire the 
integration of the fragments of the totality—represented by the recovery of the 
Memorabilia—a yearning for, as Smid interprets it, an Integrator. This remains an ideal, 
not a realizable goal, provoking precisely the “representational dilemmas” and “low-
level or everyday ideological questions about change itself” that Jameson notes in his 
own discussion (89). But the Integrator is, for the monks, Christ, not a mere historical 
telos, a truth which demands an attitude of epistemic humility even as it commands 
them to persist in preserving human knowledge. The historical knowledge that the 
monks so often fail to grasp in its particulars is still worth conserving because they 
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affirm its intrinsic value as a reflection of cosmological order into which they believe 
each person is ultimately called to integrate. 
 Dominic Manganiello argues that Canticle’s yearning for integration operates 
within an explicitly typological, linear framework. Miller’s novel, he argues, has “the 
purpose of a warning… His historical vision at once embraces nuclear catastrophe and 
transcends the immediate spectacle of tragedy. In this respect, he resembles most the 
Old Testament prophets, whose view of history, despite the terrible judgments on Israel 
they announced, was always hopeful of God’s promises” (165). In a word, A Canticle for 
Leibowitz is a jeremiad. Like Smid, Manganiello emphasizes “Miller’s eschatological 
optimism,” interpreting the apparent cycle of destruction in the book’s structure as a 
Kirkegaardian “‘recollection forward’ to the final coming of the Integrator or Lord of 
history, who, as Alpha and Omega, is able to join the beginning and the end, fold up 
the narrative of the human story like a book, and fit things together again” (166-67). 
Miller’s eschatological optimism, however, is not quite the same as that outlined by 
Bercovitch. Miller’s is more provisional, more contingent on not knowing precisely 
where the Promised Land is or what the city on the hill ought to look like. More 
important than a nation or even the makeup of the community is that the people be 
united by a posture of humility—toward the cosmos and toward their own potential. 
Though Miller emphasizes contingency and humility, the optimism does take material 
form, and it does indicate a rebirth of civilizational innocence, though in quite different 
!253
ways. And each of these ways in connected to the exodus which takes place at the end 
of the novel. 
 As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Miller offers two alternative 
images of hope. The first is the aforementioned awakening of Rachel, the second head 
of Mrs. Grales. She represents a divine mystery. Walker Percy declares it to be the key 
which every reader should ask at the end of the novel: “Who is Rachel? What is she?” 
And “the answer,” he says, “will tell whether he got the book or missed it.” But this 
question, Percy posits, is a correlate to the questions that Percy imagines Brother 
Joshua asking the native inhabitants of Alpha Centauri when Quo Perigrinatur arrives 
with the survivors of Earth: “‘How is it with you? Did something go wrong? Was there a 
disaster? If so, where do you presently stand in relation to a rectification of the 
disaster? Are you at a Time Before? Or a Time After? Has there been a Happening? Do 
you expect one?’” (578). Percy speaks of the tendency of cultures to compare each 
other on a time-line of progress, a model often used in sf: “the abscissa runs from left 
to right, from past to future” (575). But he also speaks of y-axis intersection that lets 
readers locate Canticle at a particular set of coordinates, and identifies that y-axis as 
Judeo-Christian. This interruption or challenge is where the first image of hope—Grales
—intersects with the second: the exodus aboard the Quo Peregrinatur. Because only a 
Joshua would even think to ask about a Rachel, and the questions he asks are about 
the people and their soteriological experience, not about their degree of technological 
!254
advancement. Returning to Percy’s example, Grales/Rachel and Joshua are connected, 
but they are like opposite ends of the y-axis; that is, they are opposite ends of the Quo 
Peregrinatur’s exodus to the stars—a starship which embodies as an interstellar quest 
the yearning for the coming Integration.  
Canticle of Canticles 
  
 Before turning to the exodus that concludes Canticle, we should take stock of 
the exile experienced by Miller’s protagonists to better understand what the exodus 
means to them when they finally undertake it at the end of the novel.  Unlike the 
Babylonian captivity, the exiles in first two books of have engaged in a more or less 
willing retreat from the world, after the fashion of the early desert fathers or medieval 
monks in the Christian tradition. In each book, a character seeks some sort of 
knowledge. In “Fiat Homo,” it is Brother Francis, who seeks spiritual enlightenment first 
in a desert fast, then through illuminating his copy of the blueprint, then finally in a 
pilgrimage to New Rome. In “Fiat Lux,” it is Thon Taddeo who undertakes a 
pilgrimage. Unlike Francis, who is too simple a soul to fully grasp the intricacies of 
theology—or the blueprint or even the fundamental purposes of his monastic discipline
—Taddeo seeks practical scientific knowledge in he Memorabilia, something to fortify 
his theories. The self-imposed exile of the Albertian monks in “Fiat Homo” gives way in 
“Fiat Lux” to a genuine exile-in-captivity, as the arrival of the Thon presages the 
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coming empire of Hannegan. These books set the stage for the exodus, as the conflicts 
between different ways of knowing the world in each previous book indicate the 
different ways of living in the world in “Fiat Voluntas Tua,” lifeways that are finally 
incompatible with a world bent on annihilation itself. 
 A wandering Jew encounters Brother Francis during the novice’s Lenten fast in 
some ruins near the abbey. He helps Francis find a keystone for the rudimentary shelter 
he has built for himself aboveground (somewhat in contravention of his ascetic 
program) and inscribes the rock with the Hebrew letters lamed-tsade; lifting the rock 
causes a small avalanche which reveals the fallout shelter. Scholes and Rabkin translate 
the inscription as “fool” (225), but Russell Hillier provides a more nuanced 
interpretation, pointing out that it carries the connotations of scorner, mocker, 
blasphemer. The stone itself therefore represents a fateful choice about the importance 
of finishing his shelter. “The outcome of Francis’s choice will affect human history far 
beyond Francis’s own imagining. For to take the keystone is to finish the first rationally 
constructive project in the book” (171). Thus this “mocker-stone, serving as a keystone 
to Francis’s impoverished miniature dome, is, in turn, Miller’s satirical omen presaging 
the second nuclear apocalypse… His one small impulse resonates over the course of 
the novel’s post-apocalyptic history” (172). In short, had Brother Francis Gerard of Utah 
focused a little more on his meditation and a little less on the danger posed by desert 
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predators and mutants, the cycle of destruction depicted in the book might have been 
forestalled.  
 But Francis’s fast in the desert is dual-edged. Though he engages in a sort of 
double-withdrawal—first, from his monastic community, for the purpose of mediation; 
second, into the safety of his crude shelter—he also engages actively with the cosmos. 
First, in his effort to focus his mind and soul on God; second, in his interaction with the 
wanderer. In an ironic twist characteristic of the novel, Francis is murdered at the end of 
“Fiat Homo” precisely because he seeks to engage with the bandits who robbed him; 
he waits at the ambush spot with money with which he intends to purchase back his 
illuminated copy of the blueprint, somewhat ashamed that he had initially fought the 
robber to keep it. The monk who constructed the shelter (which led to his discovery of 
priceless Memorabilia) out of fear of the desert’s dangers is ultimately slain for 
gathering the courage to face a band of cannibals. So “Fiat Homo” is bookended by 
Francis’s two attempts to obtain the blueprint and the scientific knowledge it signifies. 
The first attempt is entirely inadvertent: he discovers the fallout shelter entirely by 
accident, but only because he employs engineering technique (however crude) out of a 
perceived need for self-defense. The second attempt is purposeful, but it is undertaken 
in a spirit of contrition, with no thought whatsoever of self-defense. In the end, he has 
learned to abandon his pride, and he dies for the sake of redeeming an engineering 
blueprint (the true significance of which he still does not fully understand) invested with 
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his creative spirit. While Hillier is right to note that Francis’s impulse leads to 
apocalypse, it is also important to note that Francis’s arc leads to a tragicomic embrace 
of his own limited power. In the end, he accepts that he cannot defend himself against 
the world he recognizes that he does not fathom; he can only seek to beautify it in his 
own humble, simple way. Naturally, the world consumes him, but Miller and his readers 
bear witness. 
 The key pilgrimage in “Fiat Lux” is undertaken by a secular scholar. Unlike 
Francis, Thon Taddeo is interested only in expanding his command over the materials 
of the universe; not for his own sake, but for the sake of knowledge itself. Yet his pride 
is wounded when he finds that these ignorant monks in the Albertian Order of 
Leibowitz have managed to create an electric light without the theoretical knowledge 
that he has spent his years cultivating. “‘Why have you hidden it? Is there some 
religious significance—,’” he sputters upon witnessing it for the first time (192). Taddeo 
blames the monks for having sat on useful knowledge for so long, later accusing them 
of having withheld it in his climactic confrontation with Dom Paulo. The abbot retorts 
that the monks’ reticence in promoting their knowledge should not be confused with 
keeping it secret, listing the the martyrs that the order has sacrificed to a world unready 
for such knowledge. He explains to Taddeo that he sees in Hannegan a tyrant unfit to 
receive the kind of power Taddeo could bestow, given access to the abbey’s 
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Memorabilia. “‘If you try to save wisdom until the world is wise, Father,” Taddeo 
replies, “the world will never have it.” 
 “I can see the misunderstanding is basic!” the abbot said gruffly. “To 
serve God first, or to serve Hannegan first—that’s your choice.” 
 “I have little choice, then,” answered the thon. “Would you have me work 
for the Church?” The scorn in his voice was unmistakable. (225) 
Unlike Brother Francis, who took up the mocker-stone in ignorance, Thon Taddeo faces 
his choices squarely and justifies it philosophically as a political exigency. He returns to 
Texarkana, Hannegan’s fiefdom, having returned as a point of honor the sketches his 
cousin’s spies had made of the abbey but vowing that the secrets contained in the 
walls will be brought into the open. War inevitably follows.   
  Samuelson notes Taddeo’s “evasion of responsibility” in this scene (246-47), 
while Smid observes that the scholar “cannot understand the interrelations of the 
factors of history and he accordingly does not acknowledge his own connections to the 
rest of humanity and the implications his research may have” (247). Tietge similarly 
contrasts the “amoral scientist” to the more prudent and world-wise Paulo (685-87), 
but ultimately concludes that the novel’s Cold War concerns with the nuclear arms race 
lead Miller to posit that science and religion are compatible, but that religion cannot 
provide the “moral grounding to prevent indiscriminate and disastrous use of highly 
powerful technology,” because it is still a human-made institution (688).  
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 Taddeo’s assumption that the monks had “hidden” their knowledge away would 
only make sense to a person raised in a culture where technical mastery is always 
displayed or deployed for political purposes. That is to say, technical mastery is 
correlated to the political ambitions of powerful individuals in Taddeo’s native culture. It 
is worth noting here some structural correspondences between Taddeo’s journey and 
Dagny Taggart’s. She, too, questioned why the technical mastery on display in Galt’s 
Gulch should be hidden under a bushel, only to find that it was so those responsible 
for cultivating their own mastery could exercise it more fully over a docile, blighted 
land. She eventually converts to this gospel. Taddeo does not have to be converted, 
though he does, like Rand’s strikers, care more about displaying and relishing his own 
mastery than he does for the impact his self-serving mastery will have on other people. 
Rand undoubtedly would excoriate Taddeo for not striking against Hannegan (thus 
making his selfishness truly immoral), but then she, unlike Miller, refused to imagine a 
world in which technical masters such as Taddeo or the lowly monk who reinvents the 
electric light would be anything less than towering, Nietzschean lords of creation. For 
Taddeo, as for Rand’s protagonists, the world is a wilderness meant to be redeemed by 
the applied power of the human mind—and for Miller, this positivist forward leap is a 
lurch toward the precipice. In jeremiadic terms, civilizational decline really begins in 
earnest once Taddeo helps Hannegan build his city on a hill. 
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 “Fiat Voluntas Tua” picks up at the end of a long period of declension, and it is 
the historical arc of the previous two books that form the foundation of why the exodus 
becomes necessary. Brother Joshua, at the behest of the Holy See, gathers together 
the passengers of his space ark, a project Zerchi considers “a long and doubtful 
journey, a new Exodus from Egypt under the auspices of a God who must surely be 
very weary of the race of Man” (292). Besides a cadre of the Order of Leibowitz, the 
ship will also carry the entirety of the Memorabilia. Joshua has his moment of doubt in 
the abbey’s garden, where he begs God for a sign whether he should lead the mission 
to Centaurus. He thinks he hears a snake in a rose bush and throws a rock out of fear, 
instantly feeling “sheepish.” He reflects, “Ask for an omen, then stone it when it comes
—de essentia hominum” (289), then drifts back inside to join the mass in progress, 
submitting to the burden: “Accipiam” (290).  In the final chapter of the novel, the 30
starship departs. “The last monk, upon entering, paused in the lock. He stood in the 
open hatchway and took off his sandals. ‘Sic transit mundus,’ he murmured, looking 
back at the glow. He slapped the soles of his sandals together, beating the dirt out of 
them” (337). The posture of Joshua and the last monk (who may or may not be Joshua 
himself) is one of submission to a burden of great responsibilities. These responsibilities 
are to the generations past and present as well as the future, and all of them accept the 
failure and weakness as incipient aspects of humanity. (This stands in marked contrast 
to Rand’s abhorrence of such responsibilities, as we have seen.) Joshua’s exodus is thus 
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marked at each stage by a recognition of humanity’s collective failures, with the glow of 
atomic blasts lighting the way clear of the world. 
 Because the monks take with them the Memorabilia, the fate of the Quo 
Peregrinatur, or at least the fate that it signifies for humanity, has been read as 
forecasting yet another cycle of destruction. “Text, with the seeds of destruction 
encoded within it, follows man like a recurring damnation,” asserts Susan Spencer, who 
perceives Miller as viewing text-based literacy as inherently prone to papering over 
historical violence (341). Gary B. Herbert more forcefully suggests that preserving 
historical memory only loops back on the Hegelian “bad infinite”: “A Canticle for 
Leibowitz is, then, a canticle to the rhythmic reptition [sic] of historical forms, to 
imperfect incarnations of the nonmoral Logos, and to man’s inability to transcend. It is 
man’s imperfect desire for the perfect that makes unending repetition inevitable” (167). 
 But boarding the Quo Peregrinatur and taking literally Christ’s admonition in 
Matthew 10:14 to shake the dust of the unreceptive town off one’s sandals makes the 
exodus itself an embodiment of yearning for redemption.  It’s hope. As Teresa M. 31
Tavormina describes Miller’s motives: “Only faith and hope give him any reason to 
create a Rachel, or to send a bare handful of souls into interstellar exile before the final 
firestorm circles Earth like a sword” (58). In true jeremiadic fashion, even the trial of 
nuclear annihilation carries with it a promise of renewal. “As the new inheritors of God’s 
promises, these voyagers are prefigured by the faithful Remnant of Israel, who survived 
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various cataclysms. Their space exodus acts as a providential sign that the human race, 
if not the planet, will go on” (166). But there is more at stake for Miller in their exodus 
than mere survival. “The real problem,” argues Ralph Wood, “is how to direct human 
life to ends which are redemptive rather than expedient, ends which are not humanly 
devised and managed, but ends which enable people to live for a higher good than 
the avoidance of pain, even agonizing pain” (38). Without moral responsibility to a 
power higher than itself, Wood claims as one of Miller’s “most searing insights… that 
our culture’s anthropophagus urges spring from unconfessed fury against God for 
having made a suffering-laden world” (39). To Wood, that is the significance of Rachel, 
who actually enters the world singing: she “embodies the hope that can save the world 
because it is the hope that dissolves all bitterness. It comes whenever the saving words 
are pronounced: … Fiat voluntas tua: Thy will be done” (40). The exodus is an act of 
submission to a burden that nonetheless is graced with the benediction of innocence. 
It is also a submission to the will of God, not an extension of humanity’s will. When 
Zerchi and Joshua pass by Mrs. Grales and Rachel earlier, Joshua is the only one who 
notices Rachel smiling at him—a glimpse of the primal innocence that Zerchi sees only 
moments before his death, but a memory which, alongside the Memorabilia, Joshua 
may take with the remnant into the stars. 
 As an embodiment of submission, the exodus aboard the Quo Peregrinatur also 
embodies the desire for integration, for wholeness, for the tempering of knowledge 
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with utmost restraint. For medieval monastics, Dom Leclercq wrote, the Canticle of 
Canticles—also, and perhaps better, known as the Song of Solomon or Song of Songs
—was the biblical text of choice. At once it evinced a fervent desire for union with God 
while also inspiring a contemplative—receptive—posture toward spiritual truth.  Faith 32
in the power of man is what leads ultimately to the destruction of Earth, and Miller’s 
jeremiad is one that promises renewal, but only for those who strive for innocence. “A 
Canticle for Leibowitz, then is offered to its readers as a third testament or divine 
revelation that warns the world of the future that waits for it—the Götterdämmerung of 
the technological universe,” says Frank D. Kievitt, but “the single voice crying in the 
wilderness… reminds the world of its often forgotten vocation to know, love, and serve 
God regardless of what may happen or fail to happen in human history” (175). Among 
the stars, the remnant seeks only to preserve the memory of humanity in its glory and 
its fallibility, but will never seek to re-establish mastery over the desolated Earth. It 
bears only a humble message of love and communion with God across the celestial 
abyss… and, wherever the remnant settles, the fragility of human civilization. 
A Land Flowing with Likeminded Individuals 
  
 Whether they favored a more secular or more religious interpretation of Miller’s 
novel, all critics, as we have seen, have detected a certain level of ambivalence in A 
Canticle for Leibowitz. Part of this is rooted in the context of the Cold War and Miller’s 
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response to the ascension of the military-industrial complex. Like Donnelly in at least 
this one respect, Miller lamented the probability of civilization annihilation itself. He 
recognized that it would be an end that humanity has wrought for itself; in blunt terms, 
we would deserve what we get should the bombs fall. He also chronicled the foibles of 
his monks in equal measure to the faults of the politicians and scientists who 
dehumanize the Earth’s people and eventually depopulate the Earth itself. The Green 
Star camp physician that Zerchi assaults is not presented as an evil man; by his own 
estimation, he is offering the most humane treatment available. Miller recognizes these 
nuances. But he is not ambiguous about the positivism that links scientific progress to 
civilizational progress; that is the logic of the military-industrial complex, and it is the 
logic of mutually-assured destruction. A civilization willing to destroy itself along with 
all others because it must have dominance at any cost is a civilization trapped in an 
ideological captivity from which Miller’s remnant makes its exodus, with Rachel’s 
blessing. 
 In the end, the dominance that Rand justifies on the part of her own heroes 
stands in irreconcilable contrast to the humility embraced—however imperfectly—by 
Miller’s protagonists. They stand across a vast ideological gulf from each other. 
Fittingly, neither author’s engagement with the jeremiad appeals to the trope of 
America to reconcile its remnant to the rest of the population.  Rand’s science-
fictionally scrubs the United States as it has actually existed from her universe so that 
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her ruling caste may take its rightful place as the makers of the planet’s glittering future. 
Miller essentially abandons not only America, but the Earth, leaving our pale blue dot 
to the descendants of Rachel—beings that, by God’s grace, may not even be human.  
Rand’s heroes undertake an exodus to bring the world to its knees, to celebrate their 
own will to power; Miller’s protagonists undertake an exodus as a form of service, to 
celebrate the preservation of life itself. Both Rand and Miller dispense with America as 
a unifying fiction in their jeremiads, and the Promised Land at the end of their 
characters’ exoduses is not the United States, or even the ideal of America. In Atlas 
Shrugged, the rulers have broken the power of the nation-state altogether; it seems 
doubtful that such a political entity will be reinstated along lines at at all similar to 
something recognizably American. But they will certainly reinstate something—perhaps 
a kind of corporate feudalism like something imagined by William Gibson or Neal 
Stephenson in their cyberpunk novels, Neuromancer (1984) and Snow Crash (1992). 
Miller is reticent to give even a hint of the Promised Land. Rachel’s fate is unknown in 
the final pages of Canticle, as is that of the Quo Peregrinatur. What the Promised Land 
looks like for Rachel or the remnant aboard the starship is far less important in Canticle 
than how the attitude in which the remnant approaches it. Should Rachel and her 
offspring have the chance to repopulate the Earth, they will do so singing songs of joy 
and innocence. Whatever the monks aboard Quo Peretrinatur encounter elsewhere in 
the galaxy, they bring with them the memory of humanity laying waste to itself. They 
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bring with them the Memorabilia, a constant reminder of how the makers of history 
tend to repeat their mistakes. That starship is a vessel of last resort, a message of 
fragile hope tossed upon the roiling currents of history: a wan hope, a lament over the 
nations trammeled underfoot in the march toward manifest destiny, a humble exodus 
toward a horizon untainted by the radioactive dust of the onetime city on a hill, which 
now smolders in the afterglow of its hubris. 
 Jeff Walker in The Ayn Rand Cult (1999) argues forcefully for the former; Jennifer Burns in 1
Goddess of the Market (2009) leans toward the latter.
 See Burns, “The Three ‘Furies’ of Libertarianism: Rose Wilder Lane, Isabel Paterson, and Ayn 2
Rand” (2015).
 See Burns, “Godless Capitalism: Ayn Rand and the Conservative Movement” (2004).3
 See Burns, Goddess of the Market, pp. 59-60.4
 See pp. 79-82.5
 Rand summarizes the first night of Dagny and Hank’s consummated passion as “hours of a 6
violence which they could not name now, not in words or in daylight” (Atlas 253).
 See Tucker-Abramson, pp. 80-81.7
 Apart from the introduction, the chapters of the Romantic Manifesto largely appeared first as 8
essays in her Objectivist newsletter between 1965 and 1969, with a few appearing even earlier.
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 See Burns, Goddess, p. 2. Among the potential literary influences on the plot and characters 9
in Atlas Shrugged, Jeff Walker offers arguments for Theodore Dreiser’s The Financier (1912) 
and The Titan (1914), Garet Garett’s The Driver (1922), and Ernest Bramah’s The Secret of the 
League (1907). In making he case for understanding Rand in the context of Russian literature, 
Adam Weiner strenuously alleges in How Bad Writing Destroyed the World (2016) that Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s Rakhmetov from What Is to Be Done? (1863) is the original mold for Galt, and 
suggests the influence of Dostoevsky and Nabokov on Rand besides. Curiously, while building 
his circumstantial case, Weiner neglects to engage at all with Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s Ayn 
Rand: The Russian Radical (1995), which accounts a bit more persuasively for Chernyshevsky 
more marginally while situating Rand’s philosophy more broadly in dialogue with dialectical 
thought in Russian art, culture, and philosophy.
 Characteristically, Rand adjusts Aristotle to suit her own purposes, switching “poetry” to “fiction.” 10
Thanks to Jason Puskar for pointing this out.
 “Capitalist Eutopias in America,” pp. 192-205.11
 For examples of offhand remarks in scholarly literature, see the College English articles by 12
Mimi Reisel Gladstein, “Ayn Rand and Feminism: An Unlikely Alliance,” p. 49 and Judith Wilt, 
“On Atlas Shrugged,” p. 62, both in Gladstein and Sciabarra, Feminist Interpretations of Ayn 
Rand (1999). For an example of popular articles aimed at a geek audience, Gizmodo site io9 
has published a smattering of articles briefly situating Atlas Shrugged as science fiction; see 
Annalee Newitz, “Are Conservatives Better at Creating Futuristic Stories?” (2008) and Alex 
Carnevale, “The Longest Science Fiction Books of All Time” (2008), as well as commentary on 
the film adaptations passim.
 Scalzi, “What I Think About Atlas Shrugged” (2010); Brin, “Atlas Shrugged, The Hidden 13
Context of the Book and Film” (2011).
 It’s also interesting to note that both Miller and Campbell refer to Orwell, with Miller also 14
looping in writers like Aldous Huxley and Pat Frank, as exemplary of mainstream fiction writers 
dipping into sf—that is, they frame now-classic works of science fiction like 1984 or Brave New 
World or Alas, Babylon as outside the norm of typical sf, precisely because they were produced 
outside the sf community. The reason this is interesting, in this context, is that while Atlas 
Shrugged is not typically considered primarily science-fictional, these other works are now 
considered paradigmatic examples of sf as a genre.
 The section of Principle of Hope, Vol. 1 I find most helpful in this context appears in pp. 15
214-22, where Bloch discusses the “pre-appearance” of utopian images in exaggerated or 
fantastical form.
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 For a small sampling of the literature on alternate histories in fiction, see Amy Ransom, 16
“Alternate History and Uchronia: Some Questions of Terminology and Genre” (2003); 
Catherine Gallagher, “War, Counterfactual History, and Alternate-History Novels” (2007) and 
“When Did the Confederate States of American Free the Slaves?” (2007); Matthew Schneider-
Mayerson, “What Almost Was: The Politics of the Contemporary Alternate History 
Novel” (2009). 
 Again, though she covers this period in Goddess of the Market, Burns details the degree of 17
Rand’s involvement in conservative reaction against New Deal liberalism in “The Three Furies of 
Libertarianism” (2015).
 See Harvey J. Kaye, The Fight for the Four Freedoms (2014), esp. pp. 119-20.18
 See Weiss, Ayn Rand Nation (2012) pp. 10-11. The notoriously harsh review of Atlas 19
Shrugged which William F. Buckley, Jr. commissioned from the ex-communist is a staple of any 
scholarship on both the novel and Rand’s place in the conservative movement at the time. It 
was originally published in December 1957; I have referred to the reprint available on the 
National Review web site, posted in 2005.
 See my discussion of “occupation” in chapter 3; see Sutton (2014), pp. 4-5, 113.20
 Galt’s Gulch is almost a perfect literary realization of the middle landscape Leo Marx theorized in his 21
Machine in the Garden.
 The dynamo is a key metaphor for Isabel Paterson’s God in the Machine (1943); Burns offers 22
persuasive evidence of Paterson’s influence on Rand’s thought; see Goddess, pp. 74-78, 107-112, 
125-132.
 See Burns, Goddess of the Market, pp. 16, 24-26, 41-42. In an endnote, Burns agrees with 23
the many critics who have pointed out the many ways in which her vulgarized Nietzsche 
diverges from the philosopher, and acknowledges that Rand herself tried to put distance 
between herself and his influence after The Fountainhead, but emphasizes the importance to 
Rand of “Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values and his call for a new morality. From this 
perspective, though Rand’s reliance on Nietzsche lessened over time, her entire career might 
be considered a ‘Nietzsche phase’” (303-304n6).
 Teresa M. Tavormina describes the publication overlap as “not entirely coincidental,” arguing 24
that the appearance of these classic works is evidence of “an interest, not uncommon among 
educated Catholics of the fifties, in the relations between faith and various forms of 
knowledge” (60). I tend to agree that the publication is likely not entirely coincidental, but I 
prefer to retain the framing of coincidence, if only because it is outside the scope of this 
chapter to chart the discursive parameters of Catholic interest in epistemology in addition to 
the rest of my argument.
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 Out of the Silent Planet (2003, originally 1938), Perelandra (2003, originally 1943), and That Hideous 25
Strength (2003, originally 1945).
 The sections were originally published in this respective order under these titles: “A Canticle 26
for Leibowitz” (1955), “And the Lights Is Risen” (1956), and “The Last Canticle” (1957); see 
Olsen, ““Re-Vision: A Comparison of A Canticle for Leibowitz and the Novellas Originally 
Published” (1997).
 That is to say, widely-remarked-upon: Besides winning the Hugo Award for Best Novel 27
(1961), Canticle has placed consistently in polls by outlets such as NPR (“Your Picks”) and Locus 
among the indispensable sf books, according to the International Speculative Fiction Database. 
Periodic essays on the novel, such as Jon Michaud’s in The New Yorker (2014), also appear 
sporadically to consider its legacy.
 See Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light (1985).28
 Both Seed and Samuelson duly note the allusion; see p. 265 and pp. 243-44, respectively.29
 Miller puns with Latin in this section to great effect. When Joshua first accepts the duty of 30
leading the mission, Zerchi asks, “‘Hoc officium, Fili-tibine imponemus oneri?’” (“This duty, will 
we assign it to you, son, to [be your] burden?”), and Joshua mishears the last word, replying, 
“‘honorem accipiam’” (290). The misunderstanding is gently comic, but it’s worth noting that 
the verb form of accipiam here is both indicative future and subjunctive present, so it could 
mean either “I will accept the burden (or honor)” or “May I accept the burden (or honor).” 
Furthermore, while the verb accipio’s cognate is the primary meaning here, the verb also can 
mean to receive, sometimes with connotations of being ready to learn something new, to obey, 
or to begin a new task. So the exchange underscores on several levels the posture of humility 
and submission to the burden/honor of leading the exodus.
 In Matthew 10:9-15, Jesus tells his disciples: “‘Do not get any gold or silver or copper to take 31
with you in your belts—no bag for the journey or extra shirt or sandals or a staff, for the worker 
is worth his keep. Whatever town or village you enter, search there for some worthy person and 
stay at their house until you leave. As you enter the home, give it your greeting. If the home is 
deserving, let your peace rest on it; if it is not, let your peace return to you. If anyone will not 
welcome you or listen to your words, leave that home or town and shake the dust off your feet. 
Truly I tell you, it will be more bearable for Sodom and Gomorrah on the day of judgment than 
for that town.’” Exploring various exegeses of this passage are beyond the scope of my 
project, but I’ll register two intriguing questions raised by this passage in the context of 
Canticle. First, how does preserving the Memorabilia comport with Jesus’s command not to 
bring nothing on the journey but the clothes on one’s back? Second, though the answer seems 
obvious, what does the allusion to Sodom and Gomorrah’s destruction and its relative 
bearability suggest with regard to Miller’s view of Western civilization?
 Leclercq, pp. 84-86.32
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CONCLUSION. Imagining the Science-Fictional Jeremiad 
July 1969: A Lunar Chalice  
 In the midst of exalting the historic achievement of the Apollo 11 mission, Ayn 
Rand watched the broadcast of Neil Armstrong’s first moments on the surface of the 
moon with some apprehension. “I felt one instant of unhappy fear, wondering what he 
would say, because he had it in his power to destroy the meaning and the glory of that 
moment, as the astronauts of Apollo 8 had done in their time,” she wrote, recollecting 
the Christmas Eve reading of Genesis 1 in 1968. “He did not. He made no reference to 
God; he did not undercut the rationality of his achievement by paying tribute to the 
forces of its opposite; he spoke of man.”  The relief Ayn Rand expressed at 1
Armstrong’s philosophically-correct announcement of his “giant leap for mankind” is a 
rhetorical lodestone in an essay that morphs into a jeremiad.  
 The distance traveled by the Apollo 11 crew—now demarcated by the 
separation of the Saturn V’s stages—becomes in Rand’s essay a metaphor revealing “an 
abyss between the physical sciences and the humanities that has to be measured in 
terms of interplanetary distances.” This “abyss” marks the separation between the men 
and women of America’s space program—astronauts, theorists, technicians—and those 
whose response to this achievement is to wonder why the enormous resources 
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involved weren’t instead spent on solving socioeconomic inequality. The proliferating 
think pieces that Rand sampled in her essay—those castigating the American 
government for expending so many resources on such a socially useless endeavor—
grieved her deeply, and served as an illustration of the gap between what Rand saw as 
the moral and immoral voices in society. The distance the Apollo 11 astronauts put 
between themselves and their world erected a clear division between purpose and 
purposelessness, between creation and parasitism, and America, Rand thought, was far 
too beholden to the latter on both counts. “If the United States is to commit suicide” 
by spending its wealth on government programs, then: “Let some of its lifeblood go to 
the support of achievement and the progress of science. The American flag on the 
moon—or on Mars, or on Jupiter—will, at least, be a worthy monument to what had 
once been a great country.” The only thing that could have shattered that monument 
to man’s mastery of the universe, in Rand’s view, would have been to invoke the divine, 
the ultimate symbol of altruistic, collectivist, purposeless irrationality.  
 Unbeknownst to capitalism’s most vociferous twentieth-century apologist, Edwin 
E. “Buzz” Aldrin had, shortly before his comrade Armstrong became the first person in 
history to set foot on the lunar surface, signed off the module’s broadcast and quietly 
served himself communion, becoming the first person in history to celebrate the 
eucharist on the surface of another planet. He kept his sacrament private in part so as 
not to further anger areligious zealots who, like Rand, found the Apollo 8 Genesis 
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reading to be intolerable blasphemy.  Aldrin later described that moment with humility. 2
“It was my hope that people would keep this whole event in their minds and see, 
beyond minor details and technical achievements, a deeper meaning behind it all—a 
challenge, a quest, the human need to do these things” (qtd. in Armstrong et al. 251). 
Rand might have agreed with that sentiment, but would have found the ritual to be a 
degrading framework for it. Aldrin’s gesture of submission to the dictates of NASA’s 
public relations, to the imposing nature of the historical moment, and, most critically, to 
the Word of the Lord, was anathema to her ethos of heroic self-fulfillment through the 
application of pure reason. In the moon landing, Rand celebrated “not the greatest 
achievement of science, but its greatest visible result” (“Apollo 11”), whereas Aldrin 
celebrated “our particular task, and the challenge, and the opportunity that had been 
given me” (qtd. in Armstrong et al. 251). An astronaut withdrawing from the world’s 
attention to read John 15:5 silently to himself would hardly have befitted the 
comportment of a man whose very presence in that capsule, to Rand, symbolized the 
conquering spirit of a species whose crowning achievement was to leap from this 
planet, cross the radiant abyss of space, and stamp an ageless bootprint in the dust of 
our celestial satellite. 
 The last chapter concluded with a summation of the difference between Rand’s 
jeremiad and Miller’s engagement with the jeremiad, in which the attitude of conquest 
evident in Atlas Shrugged is contrasts sharply with the attitude of submission in A 
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Canticle for Leibowitz. With regard to Atlas Shrugged, I made the case for the 
importance of Rand’s science-fictional approach to alternate history. Her approach to 
building the world of the novel is of a piece with the attitude she displays in her 
remarks about the moon landing. For Rand, human accomplishment is all about 
mastery, dominance, the will to power. In her 1969 jeremiad, the meaning of the Apollo 
11 mission is tied to her diagnosis of her nation’s decline: the men who planted the 
American flag on the lunar surface are evidence of a once-great country’s last gasp. But 
the moon landing itself is a testament to the power of the human mind; she celebrates 
this achievement as the kind of destiny mankind is meant to embrace, one which may 
herald the species’s world-historical redemption. Aldrin minimized the technical 
accomplishments as “minor details;” for Rand, the technical accomplishment was the 
fulfillment of the quest, this seizing of a scientific holy grail. 
 In Rand’s view, the moon landing did not, in fact, belong to mankind in the 
sense that Armstrong meant it. It really belonged to those who were capable of 
recognizing what the United States’ greatest technical accomplishment really meant: 
that the victory did not belong to America or even humanity itself. It belonged to those 
dedicated to the task of exalting the human mind and its dominance over the Earth—
and beyond. The Saturn V rocket was an Arabella for a new kind of chosen people, the 
kind venerated in Atlas Shrugged and Rand’s other writings. These people owed 
allegiance ultimately to themselves, to their capacity to possess the Earth and make of 
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it what they will. Walter M. Miller, Jr.’s Canticle stands as a humble rebuke to all that, as 
does Aldrin’s private eucharist. But in order to serve as a sufficient rebuke to the 
rapacious conquest worshiped by Rand, Miller, too, cast off allegiance to the nation 
and to the world. When Aldrin speaks of the moon landing being an occasion to 
meditate on the meaning of “the human need to do these things,” is he ignoring the 
the Space Race and the cultural victory it delivered to America in the context of the 
Cold War? When Aldrin speaks of the “opportunity” given to him, is he mindful of the 
privilege that benefitted him as a member of the white caste in America? What of the 
enormous infrastructure planned and managed by technical experts of every kind that 
helped put him there—a technocratic edifice designed primarily so that the nation 
could gain an edge in its civilizational contest with the U.S.S.R.? And why was it that 
three American men crossing such a vast, vast distance from the Earth to it moon, and 
two American men setting foot upon the lunar surface could even be read as a shared 
accomplishment for all humanity? Did the success of Apollo 11 stem the tide of 
nationalist movements that continued to spring up in the wake of decolonization? Did 
the workers of the world finally unite? Did the visible success of the enormous 
infrastructure erected by America’s space program bring its own people together? In 
light of these questions, Aldrin’s humility is perhaps even more warranted. But could it 
be that Rand was also right in this one, narrow sense: that if the Apollo 11 mission was 
a success, it was so in jeremiadic terms? Not as a sign of political salvation for the 
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United States, but a sign that the Elect are not defined by nation, but by other markers 
of political solidarity? 
We, a People 
  
 The questions asked above are predicated on the very ideas we explored in 
each previous chapter. In each chapter, we saw how the authors’ science-fictional 
engagement with the jeremiad highlighted a particular political function of it. Chapter 
one examined how distances in time and space reinforced the irreconcilability of 
political difference; the jeremiad often creates and maintains distance between political 
constituents that can only be resolved by one side or another claiming total victory. 
Donnelly and London were primarily concerned with class interests, but the racial 
character of their classes were founded upon assumptions that were interrogated by 
Du Bois and Schuyler in chapter two. There, we examined how the social construct of 
race reinforces the caste dynamics. Caste systems depend on social hierarchies and 
reinforce them. Though Donnelly attempted to evade class hierarchy, he ended up 
doubling-down on it in his utopia, but London, Du Bois, and Schuyler tried to theorize 
ways beyond caste—to varying degrees of success, but never quite escaping it 
altogether. The space operas we explored in chapter three explicitly made the case for 
caste hierarchy, and particularly privileged those with an aptitude for technocratic 
control. In retrospect, we can see this penchant toward technocratic control in 
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Donnelly’s vision of a strong, central state. In embracing the logic of the Iron Heel to 
fight against it, London’s revolutionaries also adopt the Heel’s then-emergent 
technocratic characteristics. Max Disher also displays an aptitude for technocratic 
management in Black No More, which Schuyler identifies with his entrepreneurial spirit. 
 Not all of these valences work in total alignment, of course. London’s more 
totalizing class consciousness is more comprehensive than Donnelly’s. E. E. Smith’s 
outright authoritarianism—much more in alignment with the characteristics of 
technocracy in the 1930s—is not quite the as Asimov’s fumbling attempt toward a more 
liberal-democratic politics, one which aligns much more closely with technocracy as it 
evolved in the latter course of the twentieth century. Rand’s heroes are a libertarian 
union of the Smith and Asimov schools of technocratic control, replete with all the 
technological positivism. Like Smith’s galactic crusaders, the strikers in Atlas Shrugged 
are violent, frontier-taming übermenschen, but they display all the powers of mind and 
managerial sophistication championed by Asimov. Schuyler would admire their 
entrepreneurial spirit, though it seems unlikely that Max Disher or Crookman would see 
any profit in joining Galt’s strike. By contrast, their retreat into Galt’s Gulch in order to 
let the world fall to pieces feels like a corollary to Donnelly’s protagonists doing the 
same at the end of Caesar’s Column, though Donnelly would likely (correctly) identify 
them as simply latter-day plutocrats adopting the methods of the Brotherhood of 
Destruction. 
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 In all of this, the engagements with the jeremiad rehearse the familiar tropes—
an Elect, an exodus, an errand into the wilderness, a covenant, providential historical 
thinking—without relying on America as the nominal vessel of covenantal hope. 
Though these texts are all written by American authors primarily for American 
audiences, but their science-fictionality manipulates the conceptual boundaries of their 
jeremiadic engagements—those engagements undermine, subvert, expand beyond, or 
focus more narrowly than the idea of America itself. None of this is to say that these 
texts are not legibly about American concerns. I think it is entirely possible to read, say, 
Caesar’s Column as an expression of the nineteenth-century Populist movement, which 
was very much a Midwestern-Southern phenomenon. Similarly, A Canticle for Leibowitz 
is absolutely in dialogue with the discourses of the nuclear arms race and the role of 
the scientists in America’s military-industrial complex. Each of my readings of these 
texts is grounded in such contexts. Yet reading each of these novels through the 
paradigm of the American jeremiad, as exposited by Sacvan Bercovitch, reduces or 
erases the science-fictional ways in which they engage with the jeremiad. The particular 
science-fictional approaches of each author have intersected with the prophetic tenor 
or purpose in ways that simply make it impossible to read them as performing what 
Bercovitch saw as the jeremiad’s most crucial function: neutralizing political dissent by 
folding it back into the middle-class New England Way. 
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 One thing I hope that this dissertation has accomplished is establish that 
scholarly work on the American jeremiad must, at the very least, account for how it 
does not, in some instances, contain dissent at all. In some cases, this may simply be a 
failure in its execution. But in many cases, the jeremiad may offer a vision of what 
America is or ought to be that diverges significantly from the status quo. In rarer cases
—and I believe that many of the texts examined in this dissertation—the jeremiad 
implies a severance from everything that America is purported to contain. What this 
means in political terms often hinges on how the jeremiad construes its subjects, their 
political differences with the rest of the people, and the terms under which the political 
project of the prophet can be integrated into the American political project. Perhaps 
that simply will not even be a real possibility. And when it is not a real possibility, when 
it is something that can be visualized concretely only in the imagination, that is when it 
is perhaps most profitable to examine science-fictional prophecies that engage with 
the jeremiad. 
 The other thing I hope that this dissertation might accomplish is to establish that 
when a writer engages with the jeremiad to create and sustain an irreconcilable 
divergence from the status quo, the political ramifications may be somewhat 
ambivalent. Most of the authors included in my project display authoritarian tendencies 
in some form or another: Donnelly, London, Smith, Asimov, Rand. But there are 
elements of their prophetic critiques which ring true. In some ways, for instance, 
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Donnelly and London adopt the authoritarian tendencies of the forces they are fighting 
because, as Wegner suggests, they had to find ways to make their coalitional interests 
legible and actionable. In historical hindsight, their racism may not be forgivable, but 
their struggle to imagine a genuinely egalitarian politics is one we still face. For another 
example, Asimov struggled dialectically with his own premises throughout the 
Foundation series, never quite content with the authoritarian implications of his story. In 
such cases, it seems too easy to read the texts as simply supporting a view of the 
jeremiad in American literature as supporting a nascent neoliberalism or 
authoritarianism or some other form of social control. Prophecy is always about control 
and about establishing some sort of hegemony. So are most forms of politics. Some of 
the prophets we have seen appear quite sincerely to lament the implications of their 
jeremiads. 
 That element of compassion is easy, I think, to write off as a rhetorical ploy, but it 
is probably more productive to take it seriously in its own right. The pathos of writers 
like Du Bois and Miller opens space for their readers to share in their ambivalence. As 
the cited examples in chapter two show, Du Bois’s prose can be stentorian or 
lachrymose—in a word, “purple”—but he has an ineffable sense of timing that keys 
into emotional moments. That car horn at the moment of Jim and Julia’s epiphany, for 
one. Also the final line, when Jim embraces his wife with a sob. These are moments 
when the Veil almost pierced, almost lifted, almost, almost, almost. Du Bois at his most 
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prophetic seems genuinely to weep because he is unable to wrench the world free of 
the color line. Miller himself, with his authorial eye for tragic irony, is merciless—as 
when Francis is murdered at the end of “Fiat Homo” or Zerchi’s passion at the end of 
“Fiat Voluntas Tua.” But he presents and preserves a universe in which mercy exists, 
where hope in the face of impending nuclear catastrophe is not facile, but simply 
necessary. When I read these jeremiads, I feel that the authors are creating or reifying 
irreconcilable political divisions. I feel troubled, appropriately, by Du Bois’s critique of 
white supremacy. I feel implicated, inevitably, by Miller’s unsparing critique of 
participation in a technologically positivist society that has lost the sense of life’s 
intrinsic value. In each case, though, I also feel that these Jeremiahs have not lost sight 
of a crucial fact that people, in America or anywhere else, coexist. We share land, the 
Earth itself, a common humanity, however different it may be experienced or 
constructed in each of our own separate contexts. At their best, a jeremiad reminds us 
that our contexts are intertwined, or that they could be, if only. The prophet might not 
be able to see a way to bring us together, and might even weep for being unable to do 
so. But maybe that is why we need a way to see, hear, touch what we cannot otherwise 
imagine. Perhaps that is one of the unique strengths of approaching the world science-
fictionally. So if we want to listen, to understand what kind of world is being prophesied 
by the voice calling out in the wilderness, the science-fictional jeremiad—American or 
otherwise—will show us the way. 
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 Rand, “Apollo 11” (1969). As noted on the Ayn Rand Institute’s web site, Rand’s essay on the 1
Apollo 11 launch originally appeared in the September 1969 issue of The Objectivist 
newsletter.
 See Andrew Chaikin, A Man on the Moon (2007), pp. 207-208.2
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